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THE MILITARY AEROPLANE

• BY

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The types of military aeroplane with which the combatants started the war have now been tried in many months of intensive air warfare. Some new types are already in use and others, on both sides, will shortly join in the battle. The air war cannot properly be understood without some knowledge of the main classes of military aeroplane—bomber, fighter, reconnaissance machine—and of the way in which they are designed to carry out the different functions they perform; of their limitations and their possible future development; and of the lessons which have already been learned.

This knowledge Mr. Shepherd briefly supplies in this pamphlet. Two points of special interest which he discusses are the functions of the long-range fighter, of which Britain has more than one highly efficient type now coming into service, and the differences, hitherto, between German 'precision'-bombing and British.

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THE MILITARY AEROPLANE

Why Specialization is necessary

PEOPLE in many parts of Great Britain have come to know some of the things which aeroplanes do in war. They are aware, from their own experience, that some drop bombs. They have occasionally seen combats far above their heads, and they know that most bombers have guns for their own defence against fighters which also carry guns. They learn that a good many aeroplanes are engaged on reconnaissance. Sometimes they read that reconnaissance aeroplanes have engaged in bombing or that they have brought down enemy machines. They have even learned that German fighters have often dropped bombs. They have news of float sea-planes which lay marine mines or release torpedoes, of flying-boats which to-day may be bombing a submarine and to-morrow may be bringing help to the shipwrecked crew of an unfortunate merchant-man.

By this showing the military aeroplane may be counted a jack of all trades undeserving the specialist attention which was devoted to the creation of this class and that. If the bombed population of London and other British ports and industrial towns should conclude that too much fuss has been made of the bomber and the fighter as such, no one, examining the evidence of this war, could rightly complain.

Germany has tried all the types of machines she possesses in all the forms of combination and improvisation she could think of. That is merely to acknowledge that, with her existing material, she

has found nothing capable of winning for her, despite her large numerical superiority, a quick victory over the British. And that may not be because, in principle, the material is unsuitable. It may be that the British defences are too good, or that the German method of using their equipment is ineffective, or that skill is lacking in some branches of the German air arm, or simply that the British can take a lot of punishment and still go on fighting. Nothing in the experience of the war so far has proved that it pays to use a fighter for bombing or that it is wasteful to design aeroplanes for special work within certain broad divisions.

Fighters and bombers are drawing closer together in the matter of performance, but that tendency has been in progress for many years. Ten years ago the fighter was faster than the bomber by a good 30 per cent.; to-day the fighter's margin represents a bare 15 per cent. The fighter capable of 400 m.p.h. is already flying in Great Britain, in Germany, and in the United States; the bomber which can fly at 350 m.p.h. is expected in two countries at least. Certain characteristics are common to both, but there are so many characteristics in which they differ that the two types are much more distinct than recent experiences have suggested that they need be.

The same experience which has shown the British public how fighters can, in a difficult situation, be used as bombers has also shown that nothing but the fighter is a real defence against the bomber. Anti-aircraft fire can keep the bomber high and can upset its aim and break up the formations so that mass bombing or pattern bombing becomes im-

possible; but only the fighter can destroy the bomber before he can drop his bombs, and make bomber excursions so costly to the raiding force that they must be discontinued. Day bombing in fine weather was virtually abandoned by the Germans after the famous occasion on which the fighters of the Royal Air Force claimed 185 victims in one day. On that day—15 September 1940—the British obtained their first great victory of the war. And it passed without the country's realizing that a victory in the military sense had been won.

That day of tremendous destruction put an end, for the time being if not for ever, to the German belief that it could defeat Great Britain by means of mass air-raids. Thereafter the Germans used their bombers sparingly by day, restricting them mostly to the coastal towns or allowing single machines to make daylight attacks on London only when good cloud cover was to be had. That defeat of a cherished German plan was the equivalent of repelling an invasion. It forced the Germans back on to the uncertainties of night bombing and then to concentrated night raids on the centres of cities when they found that by night they could rarely hit a selected target. It left the Germans with the opportunity to do wanton and vicious damage by night, but it deprived them of the power to do precise and particular damage of military value. Those battles of the autumn of 1940 showed that, given a strong and determined defence, the bombers can still be routed. The air supremacy which guarantees a passage for the day bombers can only be gained by the fighters. The fighters therefore are the key to successful air warfare. They hold

the pass against the raider, and they sweep the sky for the passage of their own raiders.

The double task would appear wellnigh impossible. By the showing of the German fighters over England it might be argued that the opening of a path for a raiding force by day is impossible. The home team, so to speak, would seem always to hold an advantage. It can be the more rapidly reinforced. Its players can the more quickly rearm and refuel when they come to the end of their ammunition and their petrol. They have the stimulus which comes from defending their homeland. And they have the added feeling of security which arises from the knowledge that if they must 'bale out' they will come down in a friendly land. •

The Fighters

Making allowance for the better training and finer spirit of the British pilots, the German onslaught on Great Britain was beaten by slightly better fighter aircraft. The superiority was expressed partly in speed, partly in power of manoeuvre, partly in armament. By the time the test came, the Spitfire and the Hurricane had been given a little better speed than they had at the beginning of the war. By arranging for them to use specially doped fuel, their top speeds had been raised by something between 5 and 7 per cent. The Spitfires had risen from 362 to about 387 m.p.h. The Messerschmitt 110's speed still stood at about 365 and the Messerschmitt 109's at about 354 m.p.h, while the Hurricane's had been increased from 330 to about 345. Those improvements were invaluable when the enemy fighters had to be intercepted or pursued.

In the matter of manœuvre the British fighters likewise had an advantage. For the weight they carried they had more wing area than the German fighters and that, in association with certain other features of design, meant that they were able to turn within a shorter radius and could, in general, be 'thrown about' with greater ease and sureness. When dogfights developed this fact was of the utmost importance because it meant that British fighters, turning in smaller circles, could get on the tails of their opponents and pump lead into them while the enemy were unable to get into position to reply. When once they opened fire at short range the effect of the battery of eight machine-guns set in the wings of the British fighters was devastating, as the huge collection of Messerschmitts made on British soil during the period may testify.

If Germans during the critical period could have poured the new Heinkel 113's into the fights in sufficient numbers, the outcome of many a combat might have been different, for that new fighter is reputed to have a top speed of more than 400 m.p.h. It would have been far more difficult to intercept or overtake or to avoid on the occasions when a British pilot found himself in too hot a spot. But the Heinkel fighters were only just beginning to appear and Great Britain was well enough served by what she had. When the time comes for her to face the Heinkel 113's in large numbers she will have something better for her own use.

The Need of Long Distance Fighters

The shifts and turns of the Germans in their attempts to overcome the R.A.F. tended to confuse

any onlooker who may have been trying to deduce from the swirling tides of air warfare some general conclusion as to the nature and form of fighter work. The proximity of German air bases to the principal British objectives since the fall of France has also obscured one form of fighter activity which the British have been forced to examine since they lost their advanced bases in France. The British had apparently expected to fight for air supremacy only in the defence of Great Britain and in the neighbourhood of the Army's front in France. That is to say, they believed their fighters would not have to fly great distances but would be engaged chiefly in meeting the enemy near the British coasts and near friendly territory on the Continent. They had assumed that British bombers raiding deep into enemy territory would be able to defend themselves. Great Britain consequently had provided herself with no long-range fighters before the war began.

Germany, on the other hand, had put no faith in the ability of the bomber to defend itself against enemy fighters, and when things were put to the test was proved to be right. But whereas Great Britain had relied on the bomber's powers of self-defence for successful operation by day, Germany had depended on the speed of the bombers to save them from fighter attack. Her mistake in applying that theory lay in her failure to give them sufficient speed. The net result of both policies was that, when the war broke out, neither country had fighters capable of accompanying bombers on long raids. Germany had the Messerschmitt 110 long-range fighter building; Great Britain had the new twin-

engined, single-seat fighter, the Whirlwind, only in prospect. The lack of those fighters on both sides may have been largely responsible for the relative immunity of the warring nations from day bombing during the first year of the war.

Both Great Britain and Germany soon found that daylight raids by the bombers had to be paid for by heavy losses. Great Britain quickly gave up the game temporarily and resorted to night excursions on which for many months only pamphlets were carried. Germany restricted herself to sporadic raids by few aircraft and trusted to the element of surprise to give her an occasional success. Both nations realized that the day bombers, flying many miles over hostile country, would have to have fighter support. And Great Britain, after the collapse of France, soon had cause to look for a fighter with enough duration to stay in the air throughout the hours of darkness to deal with the persistent night raider. Thus as the war progressed the British need of a long-range fighter more loudly expressed itself. The characteristics of the long-range and short-range types differ widely.

The essential performance features of the home defence fighters have already been mentioned in the comparison between the Spitfire and Hurricane on the one side and the Messerschmitt 109 on the other. These are single-engined fighters. When they were designed they could all count on about 1,000 h.p. and no more. The Messerschmitt 109 indeed began life with only 690 h.p. They had therefore to be kept as small and shapely as possible so that the best speed on the available power should be obtained. At the same time they had to be

packed as full of guns as could be conveniently arranged, and they had to carry as big a load of ammunition as space and weight considerations would allow and as the balance between fuel load and fire power made advisable. Ability to manoeuvre had to be remembered. Take-off and landing speeds had to be borne in mind. Weight would affect all these matters unless the dimensions of the wings were increased; and if this were done, the speed would fall. In the compromise which has always to be accepted, range or duration was limited. The Spitfire has a normal range of about 600 miles; the Hurricane's is rather more and the Messerschmitt 109's about the same.

These fighters plainly could not be used to escort bombers except on the shortest of journeys. The fighter fit for that duty would have to be based on an entirely different conception. Its armament must be no weaker, its speed must be no less, but its carrying capacity must be much greater. That means that its dimensions must be somewhat bigger and that its power must be largely increased. The answer is the twin-engined fighter which in Germany is represented by the Messerschmitt 110 and in Great Britain by the Whirlwind and another type which must not yet be mentioned. At its most economical cruising speed the Messerschmitt 110 has a range of about 1,750 miles. The truth is that the long-range fighter has many features in common with the day bombers it may expect to escort. Take for instance the fastest British day bomber of which full particulars have been made public. The latest mark of the Blenheim, with a top speed of 295 m.p.h., can carry 1,000 lb. of bombs 1,900 miles.

The Messerschmitt 110, when it is used as a bomber, can carry two 500-lb. bombs, externally, at the price of some reduction in its speed. The capabilities of certain new British fighters cannot yet be disclosed.

Essential Qualities of the Fighter

The essential qualities of the two classes of fighter are thus yet to be discerned. The home-defence fighter can sacrifice long duration in the interests of a high rate of climb and ease of handling. The escort fighter, because of its bigger dimensions and its twin-engined design, must sacrifice something in manœuvre for the sake of long range and plentiful armament. The two types are bound to meet and theoretically the escort fighter, as conceived by Germany, should have the better of the match. It has more of the guns of big calibre and it has a rear gunner to protect it from stern attacks. Yet the Messerschmitt 110, with its four forward firing machine-guns and two cannon, to say nothing of its speed of 365 m.p.h., has often been shot down by the older Hurricanes capable of only 330 m.p.h., and carrying only eight machine-guns, which have a shorter effective range and less penetrative power against armour than the cannon. The secret has lain in the power of the Hurricane to turn more quickly than the bigger machine and so to give it bursts of fire from positions in which it could not reply.

Subject to the ability to manœuvre quickly, the question of fire-power is one of the most important in a fighter, and the British have certainly not neglected the small air cannon. The latest mark of the Spitfire is armed with cannon. The cannon used so far in aeroplanes fires a 20 mm. or 35 mm. shell

and is thus of quite small calibre. Probably the ideal fighter would be one about 50 m.p.h. faster than the best bomber and armed with eight small cannon able to fire shells at the rate of 600 a minute each for a period of about three minutes. If to these characteristics could be added a range of 2,000 miles, an initial rate of climb of 4,000 feet a minute and a ceiling of 45,000 feet, then the lucky air force would have obtained an instrument which would take the heart out of its opponents. Before the war is over there may be such a fighter.

Bombers

For the present the nations have to be content with something less formidable. Fighters have not yet passed out of the stage of mixed armament—machine-guns and small cannon. Bombers are still a good deal slower than the fighters which oppose them, and they are still at the stage in which self-defence is allowed to conflict with speed. The best that Germany has yet put into service is the Junkers 88. It has a top speed of 317 m.p.h., and this represents a fair advance on the 274 m.p.h. of the Heinkel III, Mk. V, with which Germany confidently started the war. Much better may be expected of both the chief combatants now that the course of the war has shown the value of speed to the day bomber.

Experience, as has been remarked, has discounted some of the more advanced ideas of the peace period. A few years ago the light bombers were frankly described as day bombers and the heavy machines as night bombers. When the power-operated gun turret became available in Great Britain, the view which came to be generally

accepted was that the big bomber, given good powers of self-defence, could be used by day as surely as the lighter type.

The old distinction of night and day bomber was abandoned. Every bomber became a medium bomber. In theory it could be used by day or by night. Its range and the load of bombs it could carry were to determine its tactical employment. Its speed was a minor consideration. The Wellington and the Hampden had speeds of 265 m.p.h. The Blenheim began with 285 m.p.h. and raised that in a later version to 295 m.p.h. With the prospect of meeting fighters capable of 350 m.p.h., these bombers clearly had to rely on their massed formation fire to get them through. Flying in 'V' formation the bombers could generally expect to bring several of their movable guns to bear on enemy fighters no matter which quarter the attack might come from. British bombers have on occasion done well in such circumstances. A British bomber often shoots down an enemy fighter in these days and sometimes in these nights. Yet latterly when day bombers have been used on either side they have relied more on cloud cover than on fire power to save them from fighter attack.

That might be no more than an acknowledgement of the fact that the bomber's prime task is to bomb and not to fight—a dogma which has been reinforced by the proof in action that the well-armed bomber is not particularly good in combat with a fast and manœuvrable fighter. Its orders usually forbid it to stop and fight. It is expected to keep as steadily as possible on its way, keeping good formation with its fellows and contributing its share to

the protection of the whole. If the formation gets broken, the single machine may have to 'take evasive action', but it will not attempt to dogfight. It may dodge and dive, or it may release its bombs and climb according to the circumstances in which it finds itself. It may thus get down to sea-level and save itself from underneath attacks, or it may get into clouds and shake off its assailants by a little ingenious blind flying or even by circling in the patch of cloud until the fuel of the fighters begins to run low.

Whereas the fighter wants nothing so much as a good fight, the bomber accepts a fight only if there is no reasonable way of avoiding it. Many a German bomber in daylight raids over England has accepted failure rather than 'mix it' with the British fighters which came to dispute with it. That is to say, it has turned away before reaching its target, has dropped its bombs on something less important, and has run for home with all the power at its service. When British bombers have been required to press through their attacks on particular objectives, the casualties have generally been heavy. The first V.C. won by the R.A.F. in this war was awarded to the leader of a formation of Battle bombers detailed to destroy bridges over which the enemy were advancing into Belgium. Only one of the nine machines returned. The theory of protective fire as the safeguard of a bomber formation has been proved in war to be somewhat faulty.

What is required of the Bomber

The reasons are to be found in the type of work the bomber has to do and in the design character-

istics which cater for it. The three important things in a bomber are the ability to fly far enough to reach its most likely targets; to carry a bomb load big enough to do serious damage to such objectives; and to be fairly sure of hitting its mark without coming so low as to foul the cables of barrage balloons. The third point does not apply to the bombers designed for diving attacks, nor to the torpedo bombers which attack ships, but these are specialist bombers and are discussed separately below. The greater part of most bomber forces consists of types intended for precision bombing at all heights up to their service ceiling—the height at which climbing is still theoretically possible but not profitable. Before the war the R.A.F. had provided itself with ranges for practice bombing at heights up to 30,000 ft. There has been no news yet of bombing from that height, but there are frequent reports of bombers having made their journeys to the targets at heights above 20,000 ft. The crew of the bomber is thus almost as accustomed to taking oxygen while it works as the pilot of the single-seat fighter.

Rarely does the bomber require high powers of manœuvre or a fast rate of climb. Instead, it has to be able to get a big load off the ground and carry it with certainty to the place where its bombs must be dropped. Arrived there, it must be able to depend on steady level flying while the bomb-aimer gets the target in his bomb-sight, and it must be sure of releasing its missiles at the precise moment which will secure their striking the ground close to the target. Having delivered the goods it should be able to find its way home again—a distance perhaps of

1,000 miles—even if the weather should have closed in behind it and A.A. fire makes it dangerous to fly low in search of landmarks. It may be out on a particular raid for ten hours, and a measure of comfort for the crew is most desirable. Thus the bomber tends to be rather more capacious than the fighter, though this may not continue to be the case as the long-range fighter is developed. It will still have to differ somewhat from that fighter because its total load will probably be greater.

At present the bomber goes in largely for self-defence as well. The British bomber usually has a rotating turret, driven by hydraulic power or by electricity, in the nose and tail and some sort of gun station amidships. In the Wellington, the Junkers 88 and the He. 111 K, guns can be fired out of the side windows. But the bomber's guns, as we have seen, are much a matter of fashion. In the next phase, guns may be replaced by more speed and the weight of the turrets (nearly a ton each in the big British bombers) will go to swell the load of petrol or the load of bombs according to the length of the journey. Whatever happens to the bomber in that respect, it must still remain a vehicle in which work of precision can be done.

Precision Bombing : British and German compared

The difficulty of hitting a target like a bridge or factory or power station or railway station with a bomb has been made evident to everybody who lived in London during the autumn of 1940. The extremely local effect of a bomb-burst has likewise been impressed on the minds of those whose houses were far enough from the blast to allow them to

form an unbiased opinion. In the average case a bomb which misses its target by 200 yards does no harm whatever to the target, beyond breaking a few panes of glass. A distance of 200 yards is nevertheless a small error in a projectile which may have fallen 15,000 ft. and travelled forward a mile and a half in the course of its descent. It is an error which can easily occur if all the influences acting on the bomb in the course of its fall have not been allowed for.

Height and forward speed are easy to discover and transfer to the bomb-sight. They are shown on a sensitive altimeter and on an airspeed indicator, though the speed reading needs correction for height and temperature according to ascertained scales. A less certain quantity is found in the wind. Its strength and its direction in relation to the path of the falling bomb have to be estimated and added to the calculations which the bomb-sight automatically makes. The sight is then ready for the bomb-aimer to use in order to get the aeroplane into the position from which the bomb should be dropped if it is to hit a target.

If the bomber deviates slightly from its straight path, the resultant course of the bomb will be deflected. If the nose of the aeroplane is tilted upwards or downwards, the bomb will take a slightly more flat or steep course on leaving the bomb-rack. If the height is varied after the bomb-sight is set, the bomb will strike the ground too soon or too late to demolish the target. If there is the slightest lag in the operation of the release gear, the bomb will overshoot its target. The results of such influences can be seen in wrecked houses, shops, offices, and other

non-military objectives all over London. Possibly other influences account for some of the bad misses by the bombers of the Luftwaffe. The Germans are not sufficiently interested in accurate bombing to give their bombs a good streamline form or to carry them in such an attitude in the machine that they are pointing in the direction they must take at the moment of release.

For economy in space most German bombers carry the bombs vertically, nose uppermost, ignoring the fact that for some seconds after they are released they must travel forward on a path almost parallel with that of the machine they have left. German bombs, dropped vertically when they have to follow a virtually horizontal course, usually turn over and over at the beginning of their fall and so introduce an incalculable factor into those estimates of bomb behaviour on which the design of the bomb-sight must be based. Some further irregularity in rate of fall and in the path they follow may also occur from their cylindrical form.

From all of this it will be seen that a bomber which does not afford a steady bombing platform is rather like a gun on a boggy emplacement. Nobody can be quite sure where its projectiles will go. The British insistence on stability in bombers has certainly given good results. Before the war many bomber units on practice bombing could be sure of dropping 80 per cent. of their bombs 'within the target area' from heights up to 10,000 ft. Their work against hundreds of specified objectives in Germany suggests that equal accuracy can be obtained even by night when once the target is located and identified.

Range of Bombers

In some circumstances, the bomber has little need to consider range. That is true of the bombers which come, chiefly by night, from bases in Northern France, to attack London. It was true of those British bombers which hammered the invasion ports on the French coast at the time when the Germans first assembled an expedition to subdue Great Britain. It was true of the dive bombers which supported the strokes of the German army against France and Belgium. All these bombers were making short journeys, and the dive bombers stand in a special category as substituting dash and courage for the cool processes of scientific bomb-aiming. Precision bombing demands accurate data for the bomb-sight and a steady platform for the aiming of the bomb. Dive bombing means coming down within range of the A.A. and Bren gun fire, so that the aeroplane itself may be aimed at the target and the bomb may be brought so close to the target before release that it can hardly miss.

Dive Bombers

The Germans have made a great song about their dive bombers. The ones they used in Poland and France were Junkers 87's—machines of poor performance, for their top speed is only 242 m.p.h. and their range a bare 500 miles. The type can carry a single bomb of about 1,000 lb. weight. Yet these machines were of great help in the military undertakings of Germany rather because of the moral effect of aeroplanes diving on gun crews and troops in action than because of the damage their bombs

did, serious though that was on occasion. Since the campaigns ended, the Junkers 87 has been tried against shipping with only moderate success. The interesting thing is that dive bombing was invented for precisely that purpose.

It was started by the British as an alternative means of bombing naval vessels. When a ship is manœuvring to avoid bombs two methods of ensuring a hit are available. One is to employ a bomber formation to set a pattern of bombs about it, arranged on a plan which makes it mathematically impossible for the ship to escape them all, no matter which way she may turn. The other is to dive the bomber at the ship and release the bomb at a height of about 1,500 ft. and sometimes even lower, thereby giving true direction and a high initial velocity to the bomb. The R.A.F. were practising dive bombing in association with the Navy during joint exercises in 1933, but having learned something about the art, the British left the Germans to discover a military use for it and to apply it.

When the war began, the R.A.F. had no bomber designed specifically for dive bombing, while the Fleet Air Arm had the Skua in small numbers. Germany had her 'Stukas' (Junkers 87's) in great numbers and she was following up that single-engined machine with the twin-engined Junkers 88 which could be used either for dive bombing or for ordinary precision bombing. History will probably show that the Air Council was right in not equipping some of the R.A.F. squadrons with dive bombers. The success of the German campaigns in Poland and France have given a fictitious reputation to the dive bomber. In a hastily created air force like that

of Nazi Germany it is a means whereby mediocre bombers and poorly trained but courageous pilots can be flung into action in support of an army. Dive bombing is a costly way of employing good bombers and good pilots, for the casualties which must be accepted are enormous.

Losses in dive bombing are likely to be heavier still now that troops are becoming accustomed to being dived upon. The temptation to duck as the bomber dives can soon be overcome, and then the diving aeroplane, unable to twist or turn as it comes screaming down, presents a continuously improving target to the gunner who can coolly await to get it well within range of whatever his weapon may be—Bofors, Bren, or machine-gun. It is a still better mark when, having delivered itself of its mischief, it flattens out and begins laboriously to climb to a safer height or to race away just above the surface of the sea. For what it is worth the dive bomber has won itself a reputation and its cult will certainly persist through this war, if only because the dictators are content to accept heavy casualties in any arm for the sake of success in offensive operations; yet all that it can do may be as well done at smaller cost by precision bombing. Since the type has gained a place for itself, the peculiar characteristics of the dive bombers may be examined. They introduce a few novel points.

What usually happens in dive bombing is that the aeroplane comes along at the side of its target so that it may have it constantly in view up to the moment of beginning the attack. Arrived level with the target the bomber turns right or left in a stalled turn which starts it diving. Starting at a height of 8,000

to 10,000 feet the pilot has plenty of time to sight his aeroplane on to the target just as the fighter pilot aims his machine at his quarry to bring his guns to bear on it. The engine of the dive bomber is kept running to pull the machine downwards in a straight line towards its mark, and with the joint force of engine power and gravity, a high speed can be reached. Here arise two possible disadvantages. High diving speed means uncomfortably high rates of revolution in the engine with the possibility of heavy vibration in the aeroplane if nothing worse. The dive bomber is equipped, therefore, with diving brakes designed both to limit the speed of the dive and to give the machine greater steadiness in the dive.

In the German machines, the dive brakes are slats which lie flat under the forward part of the wing during level flight and are swung downwards to face the direction of the dive just before the dive is begun. In the British Skua, the ordinary landing flaps on the trailing edge serve the same purpose in diving as the brakes of the German bombers. The angle of the dive also may introduce complications. If it is unduly steep, the flow of the air over the tail organs may be so disturbed as to upset control. Few dives therefore exceed an angle of 70 degrees from the horizontal. German dive bombers brought down in England have been found to have lines painted on the side windows of the cockpit to enable the pilot, by glancing out at the horizon, to check the diving angle of his machine.

Torpedo-bombers

The dive bomber evidently needs no fine instruments. Its pilot needs little skill. Apart from its

problematical value as a means of attacking ships, there is little to be said for it. In principle it may seem to have an affinity with the torpedo-bomber, though in fact the functions of the two are widely different. The dive bomber, when used against naval vessels, must rely on doing vital damage by blows struck above the water-line; the torpedo-bomber, like the submarine, seeks to hit its target below the water-line and, as the exploit of the Fleet Air Arm at Taranto in November 1940 showed, stands an excellent chance of doing serious damage. On that moonlight night, Swordfish torpedo-bombers of the Navy found a large part of the Italian battle fleet at anchor in Taranto harbour. They launched torpedoes at them from the air and crippled a capital ship and badly damaged two other battleships, two cruisers and two supply ships. The Swordfish had been flown off the deck of the new aircraft carrier *Illustrious* and, when the raid was over, all but two of them landed again on the deck of their flying aerodrome.

The Fleet Air Arm has always had a goodly supply of torpedo-bombers. The Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force too keeps a number of such units to deal with enemy naval vessels which may appear in the narrow seas. A few of them are float seaplanes but the majority, like the Swordfish of the aircraft carriers, have wheel undercarriages and carry the torpedo between the legs of the undercarriage. Both Germany and Italy have torpedo-bombers but they have made little use of them, preferring to trust to the bomb rather than the torpedo as a means of disabling ships from the air. The torpedo-bomber has generally had to approach

to within a few hundred yards of its victim and release its torpedo at a height of not more than 50 feet. If the torpedo were released at a greater height, it would hit the water so hard as to upset its mechanism and interfere with its subsequent course towards the side of the ship.

Torpedo dropping has always been regarded as one of the most hazardous flying jobs, yet the small casualties suffered in the Taranto raid contradict that belief. A war-time development in the art of torpedo dropping would account for that if one were free to describe it. For the present, it must suffice to say that the torpedo which an aeroplane delivers is of the ordinary naval type, though it is not usually as big as the biggest used in naval warfare. The one most commonly carried by torpedo-bombers weighs 1,750 lb. It is slung beneath the fuselage, its nose pointing forward. In making its attack, the aeroplane comes down to the appropriate height, flies towards the side of the ship and, at the proper range, lets go the torpedo just as though it were a bomb. The speed of the aeroplane starts the torpedo on its course and, as soon as it enters the water, its own mechanism keeps it going on the same course.

Torpedo-bombers are load carriers. The Swordfish, for instance, is only a single-engined machine, yet its useful load is more than one and a half tons. It thus needs fairly large wing-area and that means that, with the power available, it cannot have high speed. Its top speed indeed is only 154 m.p.h. Its requisite wing area is obtained in compact form by employing the biplane design which, in turn, simplifies the folding back of the wings so that the

machine may go up and down in the lifts between the flying deck and the hangars of the aircraft carrier. The biplane wings also confer on the Swordfish the boon of easy manœuvre which gives it a chance to turn away quickly out of the line of fire as soon as it has sped its projectile. Lightened of so big a load, it has also a good rate of climb—a rate almost as good as that of the Bristol Blenheim which has a top speed of 295 m.p.h.—and so is able quickly to get up to a height at which the anti-aircraft gunners have a poorer chance of destroying it. Its chance of escape is, for these reasons, better than that of the dive bomber, which continues to sink for some time after it has pulled out of the dive and during that period of losing its downwards momentum is almost a stationary target.

Reconnaissance Machines

In general, it may be said that the torpedo-bomber belongs by right to naval forces. Reconnaissance machines are essential alike to navies, armies, and air forces, for all three must have information, in photographic form for preference, of what is happening on the enemy side of the fence. The Royal Air Force, for example, collected much information about the massing of barges and small ships in the ports of France, Belgium, and Holland before it embarked in September and October 1940 on the intense bombardment of the 'invasion ports'. The Fleet Air Arm no doubt made a careful reconnaissance of Taranto before it set out on its raid. While the British Expeditionary Force was in France, a daily watch was kept on the German lines for any sign of unusual activity and over a

period of some weeks a complete photographic record of the Siegfried Line was compiled. Those are the obvious forms of reconnaissance for the three Services. There is another form which is concerned with the defence of our coasts and with the protection of shipping in the seas near home. A separate command of the R.A.F.—the Coastal Command—is charged with this work, and some hundreds of aeroplanes of various kinds are constantly engaged on what is virtually offensive reconnaissance.

These aeroplanes have to sweep the seas and watch the enemy harbours. They have to attack enemy submarines and surface raiders. Often they go bombing ships or supply depots in enemy-occupied ports. In association with the Navy, they keep British shores free from naval attack and they protect British shipping at the approaches to the ports. Their work is often challenged by enemy fighters and they have had to fight their way out of tight corners. Much of their work is monotonous, but their devotion is occasionally rewarded by a slice of excitement like the destruction of a submarine or the location of the *Altmark* in a Norwegian fjord and the guiding of the Navy to that prison ship. A regular duty which falls on the Coastal Command is that of locating, marshalling, and helping to escort the vessels of convoys on the last stages of their homeward voyages. Another job it undertakes at times is that of laying mines.

The work which falls on these reconnaissance machines is as various as that which is undertaken by the Navy. The Coastal Command, except that it lacks fighters, is an air force in miniature. It has

flying-boats which can drop bombs, landplane reconnaissance craft which can also carry bombs, bombers which can also undertake photographic reconnaissance work, and torpedo-bombers which at need can take bombs instead of torpedoes. All these craft have to work mostly over the sea, unescorted by fighters and usually far from the zones in which the home defence fighters operate. They have to work in the wireless silence imposed by the Navy, and they have to do without the help of directional wireless in keeping the watches allotted to them and in finding their way home at the end of them. They have therefore to be able to defend themselves and the crews have to be able to rely on themselves for accurate navigation. Strangely enough, one of the most successful of the landplane types is a converted American air liner, the Lockheed Hudson, which is simply the Lockheed 14 supplied with two Browning guns to fire forward and a rotating turret near the tail for protection against stern or beam attacks. For the purposes of celestial navigation it has a small transparent dome in the roof. Many people may have travelled in similar aeroplanes before the war, for the Lockheed 14 was used by British Airways on its services to Brussels, Hamburg and Scandinavia.

Many people too may have flown in the prototype of the biggest and most formidable of the Coastal Command's craft. The four-engined Sunderland flying-boat is developed from the Empire flying-boat which Imperial Airways put on its long routes more than three years ago. In its military form this boat has a gun turret in the nose, another at the very tip of the stern behind the tail organs,

and it has two gun stations amidships in the upper part of the hull. It also carries a rack of bombs on a sort of yard-arm which can be swung outwards through a hatch in the side of the hull when the time for bombing comes. It has plenty of living space for its crew of six. This allows sleeping and cooking facilities to be provided. The top speed of the Sunderland is 210 m.p.h. and, with full military load, it can carry enough fuel for a flight of 2,800 miles. That means that it can go out from a home port, locate shipping 500 miles out in the Atlantic, and keep a fatherly eye on the convoy for eight or nine hours before it has to start its journey back. That represents patrol and reconnaissance work at its highest. In lesser degree, all the machines of the Coastal Command have duty of a similar kind to perform. They link up home defence with the work of the Navy in defending the sea routes and in resisting attempts to break the British blockade or to impose a blockade by means of submarine and aeroplane on Great Britain. As the Fighter Command deals with threats by air to British soil, so the Coastal Command deals with threats by sea, as an associate and companion of those naval forces which operate in the narrow seas.

Army Co-operation

The Army, like the Navy, and the Air Force, needs air reconnaissance, and especially trained squadrons of the R.A.F. have been available for the service of the Army ever since the last war. But the modern Army needs more than reconnaissance from the Air Arm. It needs fighters to save it from interference by enemy bombers and it needs

bombers to help break down enemy resistance in the fast developing situations of certain battles in which artillery cannot be brought forward quickly enough. At other times it needs bombers to impede enemy preparations for a battle or to isolate the enemy's advanced units from his supports and supplies in the rear. A separate command of the R.A.F. is now at the service of the Army. It bears the title of the Army Co-operation Command and it numbers among its units all the squadrons designed specifically for Army work. It has a call on other units—bomber and fighter squadrons—which have had training in giving air support to Army formations in manœuvres and exercises. When the Army embarks on its offensive, the Army Co-operation Command will be with it in such force as the scale of the operations may warrant.

Aeroplanes of special kinds, apart from those which undertake tactical reconnaissance and sometimes direct the fire of the guns, are not likely to be prescribed for the Army Co-operation Command. The work of the fighter is much the same whether it is holding an umbrella over an Army in a battle or over the factories and workshops which give that Army its striking power and its mobility. The bomber unit is trained to find and destroy its target whether it be a goods yard at Hamm, or an ammunition dump in the rear of an Army, or a concentration of tanks awaiting the order to advance. In some circumstances there may be occasion for the bomber to come down close to the battle and make sure of smashing particular centres of opposition by dive bombing. The cult of dive bombing is so

strong that the Army would probably not be content with air support which failed to include a proportion of dive bombers. Yet one sees no reason why such machines must be dive bombers of the wasteful and uneconomic German pattern, sacrificing bomb load and performance for the special diving equipment and facing heavy casualties for the moral effect of coming down close to the troops to release their bombs. Some of the existing bombers, like the Blenheims and certain of the types arriving in quantity from the United States, are capable of modified dive bombing. New bombers can be designed with the dual purpose of precision bombing and the not-too-steep dive bombing, and that would be the most profitable line of development with the interests of the Army as well as of general air strategy in view.

Probable Future Developments

The war has driven the progress of the military aeroplane hard along two urgent courses. It has made it seek speed and more speed, and it has compelled it to seek a means of detecting and intercepting raiders by night. Of the steps taken to improve the night fighter's chance of interception nothing can be written. In any case they are scientific as much as aeronautical steps. Of the devices employed to give bombers speed equal or nearly equal to that of the fighter something has already been said. Competition in that department will be keen, for the day offensive, which must eventually give the intensity, persistence, and accuracy that night raiding alone cannot achieve, will depend in great measure on the production

of the fast bomber. Germany has given ample evidence of complete conversion to that creed. Great Britain will not be able to resist the lessons the war has taught.

In another sense, height will become important. The Germans have given particular attention to this and have been helped by their determined development of direct petrol injection in their engines instead of supplying the more familiar mixture of petrol gas and air through carburettors. Great Britain is tackling the question from another angle and may show good results. But it is well to acknowledge that the Air Force which can count on a ceiling only 2,000 feet above that of its opponents will have won a most valuable advantage. The most important factor in determining maximum height is engine power. As the air becomes rarer at great heights, less support or lift is obtained from it at a given speed than is derived at sea-level. At the same time the air serves the engine's processes of combustion less efficiently, so that just at the time when more speed is wanted to improve the lift, less power is available to secure it unless some reasonably cheap means of pumping quantities of the thin air into the engine can be arranged.

In all those respects which matter most, the British aeroplane so far has been just the little superior to the German which suffices to turn the scale. One result of that is that the spirit of the men who fly Great Britain's aeroplanes has never suffered from a sense of having to use inferior apparatus. Some of the fighter pilots became 'war weary' in the intense operations of September and October 1940. Squadrons have had to be rested

since. But never have the British units been out-matched. The time when new types on both sides may be expected to go into full squadron service is approaching as these words are written. The secrets of both sides are well kept and details of the new machines will be slow in gaining currency, but the names and characteristics of some are already known. The Tornado fighter with its new Vulture engine should have a speed of more than 400 m.p.h. The modified Spitfire III should be not far behind it. The big four-engined Stirling bomber and the Botha reconnaissance landplane and torpedo-bomber represent other aspects of the British effort to maintain superiority in performance. There are newer machines in prospect which must still remain secret. Both sides are striving above all for speed. The war in the air has shown that he who goes fastest by day has the best chance of getting to his target, and that even by night, he who goes fastest has the best chance of escaping the guns and the intercepting fighter. And since it is the bomber and not the fighter which wins an air war, the bomber must set the pace.





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THE JEWISH QUESTION .

BY
JAMES PARKES

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This pamphlet attempts to remove the prejudice and misapprehension and confused thinking which befalls the Jewish question, and to examine it realistically and in its essence. The 'problem' of the Jews is shown to arise from two sources: Jewish *tradition*, which has inculcated in Jews the need to keep themselves separate, if they were to survive as Jews, and Jewish *experience* at the hands of the peoples among whom they have lived. Among the Jews themselves two main programmes have been proposed and followed; assimilation with their countries of adoption, or the foundation of a Jewish National Home (Zionism).

The special causes of modern antisemitism are examined, and it is shown to be due to two main factors: the persecutions in Tsarist Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, which led to the flooding of Western Europe and America with several million Jewish refugees from a totally different level of culture; and the fever of nationalism which followed on the heels of the 1914-18 war, and which made life difficult for all minorities.

Mr. Parkes is also author of Oxford Pamphlet No. 31 on *Palestine*.

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THE JEWISH QUESTION

THE Jews of to-day are the representatives of the oldest surviving civilization of the Western world, and it is still as a 'civilization' that it is most accurate to regard them. They are not a 'race', for they are of an origin more mixed than many other peoples. Nor are they a 'religion' in the individualistic sense in which that word is used to-day. For among Jews, as among Christians, the majority are little more than formal adherents to any religious faith. And, in this particular case, not only do men not think of Judaism when they think of the Jewish problem, but they find the problem present among people who are personally Christians, but are Jews by descent. For, whether they are adherents to 'Judaism' or not, they are the heirs of a tradition built up by their prophets and rabbis, and moulded by their experience, through more than three thousand years of history. The qualities which have made them unique among the peoples of the world, and have often made them also a problem to the peoples of the world, are the products both of this *tradition* (which is their own creation) and this *experience* (which has usually been imposed upon them by the rulers and people of the countries wherein they lived).

Jewish Tradition

It is significant for the whole of their subsequent history that the Jewish religion assumed its classical form in exile or in subjection. Their brief period of independence was already drawing to its close when their great prophets and lawgivers arose, and

the religion which they created has been able to survive, not only the loss of independence, but even the loss of a country or any geographical centre. Geography *naturally* induced the inhabitants of Britain ultimately to blend themselves into a single society. It was conscious teaching which created this unity for Jews. It is therefore not surprising if they still show a tendency to remain distinct from the societies within which they live; for it is to the persistent inculcation of that need to keep themselves separate that they owe their survival.

Of course they have to pay a price for this unwillingness to be completely absorbed into the mass of the population. It is natural, especially in times of stress, that unthinking people should automatically assume that every difference is dangerous; so that it is important to discover wherein the difference of the Jews consists. Does Judaism, as anti-semites constantly assert, make it impossible for Jews to be good citizens? Is it based on ineradicable hostility to all outside the Jewish fold? The answer to these questions is much easier to find than is usually assumed. The basic authority of Judaism is the Old Testament, a book shared by the Christian Churches; and the mass of literature which subsequent Jewish generations have built up on that foundation may be extraordinarily dull and confusing to the outsider, but it is neither mysterious nor secret. And its main principles are quite simple.

Judaism is primarily an intellectual not an emotional religion, and it is much more interested in *ethics* or behaviour than in *theology*, or speculation about the nature of God. It is interested as much in the community as in the individual, and

it has a tendency, which may seem to others odd and exaggerated, to define with precision ethical obligations. It is a commonplace accusation that Judaism is 'legalistic', but that, after all, is a matter which concerns Jews rather than others; it does not make for bad citizens. But on three points which do concern others, the teaching of Judaism is quite straightforward. Firstly, it has taught, from the earliest times of the dispersion, the duty of loyalty to the State within which Jews are residing. Secondly, on relations with non-Jews, it is interesting that among the earliest Jewish laws, going back perhaps to the time of Moses, is the command to pay especial attention to the well-being of the fatherless, the widow, and *the stranger*. Thirdly, injunctions to be especially honest in dealings with non-Jews, for the sake of the reputation of the community, are common in Jewish literature of all centuries. At the same time the command to keep separate was equally frequently repeated, and the whole system of Jewish life was built up to preserve the distinction between Jew and non-Jew. This distinction was in its intention neither selfish nor arrogant. It was based on the idea of the service a holy community should render to the world by its faithfulness to the revelation given to it.

Such is the religious tradition, and while a minority which wishes to keep itself separate will usually create a certain social irritation, it is clear that Jewish religious leadership recognized this, and by its political and social attitude did all it could to ensure the loyalty of the community. But it is also inevitable that any minority which wishes to remain distinct should have to carry the responsi-

bility for its offenders. The fact that as a community Jews wish for the privileges of having their special days of rest, their food prepared in special ways, their own marriage regulations makes it inevitable that the public should also think of the Jewishness of Jewish offenders against the law or against social custom, when it would remain quite indifferent if the offender were a member of the Anglican Church or the Conservative party.

Jewish Experience

The Jewish problem is the product of both Jewish *tradition* and Jewish *experience*. The difficulties caused by *tradition* are not serious. On the non-Jewish side there is the possible irritation caused by a group wishing to remain separate; and on the Jewish side there is the inevitability of being held responsible for all offenders who happen to be Jews. More difficulties are created for both sides by the inheritance of the experience of Jews at the hands of the majorities under whom they have lived.

Historians can show many periods when relations between Jews and their neighbours were perfectly friendly, and where the distinction of tradition was more than counterbalanced by general mutual respect and co-operation. But unfortunately periods of bad relationships have been common, and have left their mark on both sides. For a long period the hostility was religious. Where Jews lived in the midst of a degenerate paganism, they passed many regulations to prevent the taint of idolatry entering into Jewish life, and their laws sometimes showed intense hostility to their pagan

neighbours. But as Europe became Christian its laws showed equal hostility to Jews.

Religious intolerance soon leads to other than religious consequences. The exclusion of Jews from many occupations led to their concentration in those still open to them. Then these in turn were denounced as overrun by Jews; and in this way Jews were gradually forced down the social scale. From the standpoint of their future history, the most important change was that which made them merchants and money-lenders in the Middle Ages. It was no racial aptitude, but the accident of history; and even in the Middle Ages there was never a period when they possessed a monopoly of the trade. But they became identified with it in the popular mind, and incurred all the odium which borrowers generate towards creditors. To the hatred begotten by religion was added detestation of the usurer, and it is in these two facts that the background of modern antisemitism is to be found.

It would not be surprising if there were much bitterness in the attitude which experience has led Jews to assume towards non-Jews; it is surprising rather that there is so little. The explanation lies in a simple fact—the extraordinary optimism which is an inheritance of their religious tradition. Optimists are too busy thinking of the future to spend their time working out plans for revenge!

Such bitterness as there was showed itself in the only way possible within the narrow confines of Jewish occupations—in overreaching their neighbours in business and commerce. In the conflict between lofty religious principles and the bitterness engendered by constant humiliations it is not among

Jews alone that the latter often prevails. But it is here, and not in any teaching of the Jewish religion, or fundamental principle of the Jewish people, that the explanation is to be found of the commercial antagonism and suspicion which undoubtedly Jews often arouse.

In the nineteenth century the small but important Jewries of Great Britain and Western Europe came to enjoy equal civic rights with their non-Jewish neighbours, and, together with the rapidly increasing Jewish population of America, they found most of the doors which had been closed to them for centuries gradually opening. As the nineteenth century was a period in which the emphasis passed from land-owning to commerce and industry, and from the country to the town, and as Jews were by their history largely town-dwellers and occupied with commerce, they soon became unexpectedly prominent. What was but a natural consequence of the general situation was regarded as a deliberate plot by those to whom the developments of the nineteenth century were distasteful.

The result was that political and economic freedom was not always accompanied by social acceptance. In court and official circles, and by the Church, these new-comers were regarded with suspicion, and they were regarded as the causes of a situation of which they were, in fact, only the symptoms. For none of the main developments of the century owed their existence to the presence of Jews. They owed far more, for example, to the British for their industrial development, or to the French for the free thought and republican philo-

sophy which had sprung out of the French Revolution. But as Jews seized upon the opportunities which British and French developments offered, they were conveniently used to concentrate popular opinion against those developments by those who preferred the old order; and modern anti-semitism was born.

Jews thus came to be identified with all the malpractices of modern commerce and industry, and with all the extravagances of nineteenth-century speculation and free thought. Of course there were Jews who were correctly so identified, but so were also many who were not Jews, while the majority of the Jews were innocent of the charges made against them.

A similar explanation underlies the alleged identification of Jewry with Communism. Actually few Jews are Communists, but the proportion which rises to leadership makes it natural to assume that they represent a much larger following than is really the case. Interest in social questions is an inheritance of Judaism. Hence the innumerable Jewish gifts to hospitals and for educational purposes. Treat a young and enthusiastic intellectual as a social pariah—as Jews were treated in most countries of Eastern Europe—and the result is often to create a revolutionary. And, being better educated than most members of revolutionary parties, he is likely to come to the top.

Such being the Jewish *experience* it is not surprising that it has posed another dual problem akin to, but very much more serious than, that posed by Jewish religious tradition. It is, in fact, here that the roots are to be found of 'the Jewish question'

as it presents itself to both Jews and non-Jews in the world to-day. The problem itself can be posed in a nutshell, and it is the same for both sides. It is the problem of undoing the effect of abnormal history—not unhappily a *past* history, for the sufferings of the Jewish people under Nazi rule, or where Nazi influence has penetrated, are more severe to-day than they have ever been. It is a very sick society which cannot digest the petty difficulties inherent in the desire of *an ordinary minority* to retain its distinction—Jews on this score often present less of a problem than, for example, the Society of Friends who do not accept military service. But it is only a healthy society which has the patience, the elasticity and the good humour to allow *an abnormal minority* the time and the assistance which it requires to recover its normality. The treatment of the Jews in any community is, therefore, an excellent guide to the moral health of that community.

The Problem is not Insoluble

Because people think that there is only *one* Jewish problem, which has existed for centuries, and exists to-day wherever there are Jews, they constantly assume that it is insoluble. In fact there have been and are various different 'Jewish problems', and they have frequently been solved. In the eighteenth century the arrival of a considerable number of German and Polish Jewish refugees in England constituted a considerable problem. They were said to indulge in every crime from highway robbery to coining. By the middle of the nineteenth century they had settled down into a

thoroughly law-abiding and estimable middle-class community, causing no problem to their neighbours or to the authorities. Yet they still maintained their separate community and their religious customs. There was no Jewish problem in modern Italy, although Jews had lived there continuously since Julius Caesar's time, until Mussolini consciously created it. A Jewish community, allowed the time to settle down to a normal life and granted political equality and religious toleration, has never presented a problem to its neighbours except on one condition: where there is an appreciable difference in general level of civilization between the Jewish minority and the majority. When the level of the Jewish community is higher, there is likely to be exploitation on one side and jealousy on the other. When it is lower, there is likely to be ostracism and resentment on one side and corresponding reactions on the other. But these two situations obviously create two quite different 'Jewish problems'.

What has made the problem acute for both Jews and others in our day is a twofold misfortune. Violent persecutions in Tsarist Russia between 1881 and 1905 led to the uprooting of a quarter of the whole Jewish people, and to the flooding of Western Europe and America with several million Jewish refugees who came from a totally different level of culture, civilization and commercial practice, and had never enjoyed political liberty. They came in masses; they naturally settled together, for they felt themselves in a totally alien atmosphere, and they *did* provide a meal which it would take the strongest digestion some

generations to absorb. But before these immigrants could be digested, the fever of nationalism which spread over the world after the last war made life difficult for all minorities, and, especially since the rise of Hitler, for the Jewish minority in particular. The figures of the flight from Germany are much smaller than those of a couple of generations earlier, but economic capacities to absorb new citizens had also shrunk throughout the world, and it proved even more difficult to swallow ten thousand refugees of equal social and cultural standards in 1933 than it had been to absorb ten times that number coming from a totally different level at the time of the flight from Russia.

On the other hand we know much more about the nature of the problem now. We possess accurate and scientific studies of the question; we have seen the effects of past experience, and with planning and co-operation there is nothing in the Jewish problem which need cause pessimism or despair on either side.

The Jewish Population of the World

It is sometimes thought that the Jews are a very small people, and that there must therefore be some sinister explanation of the number of Jews who attain prominence. They are not a particularly small people; there are over sixteen millions in the world, and it must be remembered that by far the larger number of these live in countries where they have historically been excluded from the profession of the bulk of humanity—agriculture—so that the majority of Jews live by industry, commerce, the professions, and other urban occupa-

tions. That a people, numbering sixteen millions, and with a long tradition of commercial and intellectual life, should produce a considerable number of great bankers, scientists, and business men is only to be expected. And it is still more to be expected in that this is a commercial and industrial age. What is surprising is that half a million Jews have gone back to agriculture during the past century, mostly in a conscious effort to redress the balance of centuries of restriction.

Undoubtedly a considerably larger number *could* take up agriculture if they wished; there is no legal bar to their doing so for the five million Jews of America, the two million Jews of Western Europe, or the three million Jews of Soviet Russia; but the general trend of the age is away from agriculture, and all humanity, including Jewish humanity, is conservative. Statistics show that the tendency of sons is to seek the same kind of occupation as their fathers, even when they have migrated half across the world from their ancestral homes. Saxon villages in Transylvania still bear their German stamp after centuries of separation from Germany. German, Danish, Finnish towns in the United States or Canada can still be distinguished from each other by the survival of national ways of living.

The Organization of Jewry

There is no central government of Jewry. There are national communities and international voluntary organizations. There are Jewish communities of over one thousand members in sixty-five different countries—the United States, Poland, and the Union of Soviet Republics each containing

communities of several millions. In some countries, in England for example, the Jewish community has a statutory basis as a religious community; in others, for example the United States, its organization is completely voluntary; in pre-Nazi Germany all members of the Jewish community, like all members of the Christian Churches, paid a compulsory tax for the upkeep of the community which was collected through official channels.

Even where Jewish communities are officially recognized their powers are very limited, and extend only to religious matters, charity, and control of Jewish food. But they possess no legal powers, and Jewish courts have only the status of courts of arbitration which cannot enforce their decisions if they are not voluntarily accepted. It is often forgotten that a Jewish community has no legal power over the commercial or professional morality of those whom the general community chooses to consider 'Jews'.

In addition to its central body, most Jewish communities of any size possess synagogues, mutual benefit societies (akin to such societies as the Oddfellows), sport societies, educational societies, as well as hospitals, homes for orphans and the aged, and burial societies. In a few countries they have well-equipped theological colleges and Institutes of Research. There is only one Jewish University containing the general faculties to be found in other universities, and that is the new Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

The international organizations of Jewry arose from a single cause. The Jews of Western Europe became citizens of the countries in which they lived

at various periods from the French Revolution in 1789 onwards. The more numerous, but much poorer, Jews of Eastern Europe had to wait for the end of the last war—and many have found little reality in the citizenship then obtained on paper. International organizations came into being in Western Europe to relieve and provide modern education for the poorer brethren of the East, to assist their emigration, and to fight for their political freedom. At the end of the nineteenth century, when violent outbursts of antisemitism made even some Jews of Western Europe feel insecure, an international body of a different kind came into being, the Zionist Organization, whose aim was to find a more radical solution of the Jewish problem by finding a territory where Jews could again form a homogeneous national community, living the normal life of the other nations of the world.

Conflict of Opinions in Jewry

The emergence of Zionism, and its official acceptance by the Allied Powers during the last war, brought to a head a conflict of opinion in Jewry which had been steadily growing during the previous half-century. It posed anew the question: what are the Jews? Are they a religious community, or are they a nation? Those who accepted the former definition demanded only that personal freedom to practise their religion which is accorded to all in a civilized State. Politically and socially they desired no distinctions to be made between themselves and their neighbours. This was the predominant feeling among the more prosperous Jews of the West. They desired to be 'assimilated',

in all but religion, to their British, French, or German environment. Those who believed themselves members of a 'nation'—and this feeling was more common among Jews of Eastern European origin—felt that they were deprived of two rights naturally accorded to other nations, firstly a home of their own—and here they would accept only their ancient homeland of Palestine—and, secondly, in countries where they lived in large numbers, rights as a national minority controlling its own social, educational and religious welfare. The 'Balfour Declaration', approving the idea of constituting a National Home in Palestine, appeared to concede the first in 1917; the Minority Treaties, signed by the Allies with the countries of Eastern Europe in 1919 and 1920, would, it was hoped, provide the second. In neither case did the matter turn out as simple as at first appeared. The one encountered an Arab opposition on which it had not reckoned (but a remarkable community of already over half a million Jews has been established in Palestine in spite of it), and the other foundered in the rising tide of European Nationalism.

In spite of the conflict between them both, Assimilation and Nationalism represent legitimate developments of Jewish history, and assimilationist and nationalist have as much to contribute to a healthy Jewish life as different political parties in any normal democratic community.

Parallel to the political conflict in Jewry is the religious conflict. The decline of organized religion, noticeable among the Christian Churches, is equally noticeable in Jewry; and the efforts made to stem the tide are similar in both religions. 'Reformed'

synagogues have arisen somewhat similar to 'Modernist' movements within Christendom. The struggle, however, has peculiar features, based on the peculiar situation of the Jews. Any religion becomes conservative and rigid when it is constantly on the defensive; and orthodox Judaism, having been a minority within Christendom for over fifteen hundred years, is apt to be especially rigid and unyielding on points which appear trifling to newly emancipated generations. Reform Jewry, on the other hand, tends to be as much influenced by its Christian, especially Protestant, environment as by its historic Jewish inheritance.

There is only one sense in which Jews can be spoken of as a united people. Like all others they unite in the face of persecution, and the solidarity of Jewry in relief of the refugees, first of Russia then of Germany, has led people to imagine their unity to be much more deeply rooted than it is. The most conspicuous characteristic of Jewry, to those who know it, is the extent and violence of its internal divisions. In any ordinary discussion on 'the Jewish question', or any point of Jewish policy, if there are ten Jews present, there will be at least eleven opinions!

The Jewish Problem—what the non-Jew has to face

The presence of a Jewish community within a non-Jewish society provides a problem either for both sides or for neither. Of course individuals may dislike all Jews on principle, and any Jewish community may possess criminals. But personal dislike does not constitute a national problem, and every human community must be allowed in the

present state of the world to have its quota of unsatisfactory individuals.

If there is a problem, then, on the non-Jewish side it is because the majority has to decide on its attitude towards a minority claiming special privileges, and, possibly, occupying a particular place in its national economy; and the Jew has to decide wherein he desires to remain separate, and wherein he desires to be absorbed; what rights he can legitimately claim, and what duties he properly owes.

These are real problems, and neither side can evade them. The Jews are in a unique position in that they are a people of considerable size, but without a home of their own, so that they are compelled to live in 'other people's countries'. While Palestine may provide a solution for a certain number of Jews, it is out of the question at the present stage of history either to find an empty country capable of absorbing sixteen million people, or to discover means by which a migration of sixteen millions could be effected in a short period. Any consideration of the question must therefore start from the assumption that a Jewish minority exists and will go on existing in most countries of the world.

In a civilized community the decision whether equal citizenship can be refused to individual residents just because they are Jews does not constitute 'a problem'. Conditions for acquiring citizenship differ from country to country, but whatever they may be they must be open to all equally. The attempt to base citizenship on 'blood' and 'race' leads to results of which the world has become painfully aware. The German theory is not ac-

cepted by any scientist of standing in any free country in the world, and every State is a racial mixture, as is every individual. In fact a large number of non-Jews live in 'other people's countries' just as much as Jews do. Thousands of good Englishmen trace their descent from Germans, Dutchmen, French, or Poles, and have lived in England no longer than many Jewish families. The difference is that *all* Jews except those living in Palestine are in this position.

The first real problem for the non-Jew arises out of the fact that as a *community* Jews inevitably require a minimum of special privileges in order that they may maintain their religious observances. These privileges are threefold: permission to observe the Sabbath as a day of rest and to maintain the Jewish festivals; permission to maintain Jewish law in relation to circumcision and marriage; and permission to maintain slaughter-houses for the ritual killing of Jewish food.

Most civilized communities will be prepared to grant these privileges. The observance of a special day of rest creates certain difficulties in mixed communities, for it arouses a certain amount of commercial jealousy and it has led occasionally to unfair advantage being taken of the right. But these are not serious difficulties, for they can be dealt with by proper legal regulations. Such disadvantages as accrue from inability to work on days when others are working are a Jewish affair, and if they are prepared to accept them out of loyalty to their religion, that does not concern the non-Jew. Circumcision and marriage offer no problem; but ritual slaughter has at times upset people who have

felt it to be less humane than the method in force in ordinary slaughter-houses. It is certainly less pleasant to see, but the question is one for expert rather than emotional opinion; and the experts, including such bodies as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, do not consider that it involves cruelty.

In a State composed of various nationalities, such as were all the States of Eastern and Central Europe, a further set of possible privileges come into view. In Western Europe or America Jews speak the language, and attend the schools, and vote in the elections of the majorities. In Eastern Europe there are 'minorities' of all kinds. Most have a certain geographical homogeneity, but the Jewish minority is usually scattered throughout the territory. That the presence of minorities is a fruitful source of trouble the present age knows only too well. For in addition to possible religious privileges, an organized minority demands educational, legal, linguistic, and cultural autonomy. It requires a share of the State budget for these purposes, the recognition of its language in official documents and transactions, a statutory position for its communal organization, and communal control of its schools. This raises more complicated issues, and it is well known that the States of Eastern Europe only accepted the Minority Treaties imposed after the last war, with the greatest reluctance and under the strongest protest. Events have proved many of their fears well grounded, but it is also an important question whether their own conduct was not largely responsible for the disloyalty or difficulties created by the minorities.

Looking back on the experience of the past twenty years, it might be suggested that a minority is entitled to the following rights:

- (a) A communal organization, recognized as a public body, and with control over primary education, and teachers' colleges, charitable foundations, and cultural activities.
- (b) Religious freedom, and authority in religious matters (where the minority is also a religious minority).

On each point the majority has certain rights. It is entitled to insist that its language be taught in the primary schools in addition to the language of the minority, so that secondary education may perform its function of binding the different elements in the State into a unity. Two other points concern certain minorities, but not Jews. A majority can object to the cultural activities of a minority inculcating separatism and disloyalty, and it may refuse to allow religious practices which offend the morality of the majority.

But one problem arising out of the position of a minority concerns Jews more than others. Is a minority entitled to as many positions in the public or economic life of the general community as it can obtain? To this question both Poland and Hungary have replied 'No', and even in the United States universities have adopted means to limit the number of their Jewish students. And it was one of the main planks of Nazi antisemitism that Jews, who were but 1 per cent. of the population, occupied a disproportionate number of important places in the universities, medicine, the law, and elsewhere.

The problem is not always simple, even when the exaggerated figures usually given of Jewish participation in a profession are reduced to their proper size. The natural reply is: 'Why not, if they have gained their places by fair means and are the best qualified for them?' And it is certainly true that no one has yet been able to show that the mere fact that a doctor is a Jew *proves* him to be a bad doctor. In fact all the evidence is in the other direction. Jews have made extraordinary contributions to modern medicine, contributions which certainly are out of all proportion to their numbers. And as a client is free to go to the lawyer whom he most trusts, it might be said that natural selection will fix the number of Jews who can make a living by the law. And the same answer might be given about the commercial activities of Jews. They will find their own level.

In well-established countries, with well-developed and stable economies, this natural answer is probably sufficient, but in new or backward countries there is something to be said on the other side, especially where the Jewish community demands a definite status as a 'minority'. In Poland, for example, university education was free, but accommodation was limited. In the earliest days of the Polish Republic over 30 per cent. of the students were Jews, and there was a considerable number of Jewish students abroad who hoped to return to Poland to practise their professions. Jews were accustomed to town life; Jewish students could live cheaply at home or with relatives; they were accustomed to intellectual activities. The Poles were a country folk; they were much slower to pick up

education than the Jews; they were just as poor, but had fewer facilities in the towns; thus measures to protect the Poles were neither unnatural nor unjust. In post-war Hungary the middle class of what had been a large empire had suddenly to seek new ways of living in a tiny State. Before 1914 it was a matter of indifference to them that Jews were numerous in law, medicine, journalism and similar professions. The army and civil service offered ample scope. Again competition was not equal, and the Hungarian middle class felt it legitimate that some protection should be given to its sons in learning a new way of life. In Poland again one of the most necessary measures for social betterment was the development of co-operatives among the peasants and urban workers. Such co-operatives were inexperienced; they had little chance against the experienced Jewish businesses. A measure of protection was legitimate. And in all these cases such protection could scarcely help taking the form of 'anti-Jewish' measures. While the propaganda of antisemitism attacks the press as 'Jew-controlled' instead of attacking the corruption of the press, whoever controls it, here it really was a case of a single group being, or appearing to be, in a too favourable position.

The same problem presents itself to-day in a somewhat different form in countries such as Great Britain and America, where there is no question of the Jewish minority being able to dominate the highly developed societies around them. Yet anti-semitic feeling is growing in both the countries mentioned. But instead of claiming that Jews monopolize such or such professions it is said

rather that they *set the tone* to them, and that this tone is in conflict with the ethical ideal towards which the community as a whole is said to be striving. Thus in medicine, in the law, in many sections of commerce and industry, and especially in the entertainment profession, Jews are said to be acting as a solvent of standards laboriously acquired by previous generations. It is quite true that such a fall of standards has been frequently commented on; and it is equally true that Jews are frequently found among the delinquents. But the experience of Germany is a warning against accepting the easy theory that the elimination of the Jew is the solution of the problem. For no observer would claim that German professional or commercial standards had risen since 1933.

In actual fact the course of events would seem to be as follows. In a growing and developing profession or business new-comers are quickly absorbed and little noticed. Then follows a period of stabilization, and of fixing of standards. 'Outsiders' who come in accept the standards that they find. But we are living in a third period, a period of breakdown of our social and economic order. Shrinking markets and opportunities, the 'over-production' of entrants into professions where opportunities are not increasing at a similar rate, make it doubly difficult for a new-comer to earn a living. He is easily persuaded to accept the lowest professional standard which he finds, to the indignation of his older-established competitors.

As the main sources from which new-comers have entered Western societies in the last half-century have been first Russian and then German

Jewry, it is easy to see how this decline is associated with 'the Jews', and the fact is forgotten that Jews in established positions *are not* showing these qualities, and that others, who are not Jews, *are* showing them. The decline, where it exists, is merely part of that whole breakdown of civilization which has led us to our present juncture, and which was most evident to the ordinary man in the political field—a field in which it would be difficult to link together 'Jews' with the chief agents of decline, either in the Totalitarian or in the Democratic States. In actual fact it is impossible to identify either side with any one 'racial' or social group, and the kind of propaganda which does so is merely inviting disaster, by misleading people as to the real nature of the problem which confronts them. The use of antisemitism by Fascist propagandists comes almost entirely within this category.

We need then carefully to distinguish two quite different situations. In countries like Great Britain or the United States the raising of 'the Jewish question' is a dangerous red herring, for it is not of importance whether the group whose conduct is debasing the community's standards contains a high or low proportion of Jews. The decline must be attacked *as such* and the attack is merely made futile when, as in Germany, Jews of the highest character are lumped together with offenders, and 'Aryan' offenders remain untouched, because they are not Jews. But in the situations described earlier, in pre-war Poland or Hungary, the position is different, and in these cases it may have to be conceded that the non-Jewish majority may have to exercise a certain discrimination against its Jewish citizens. The

tragedy in pre-war years has been twofold. In the first place Jews have been excluded from or limited in participation in certain occupations, but no effort has been made to open to them, and to encourage them to enter, other occupations. In the second place the necessity of compulsory emigration has been urged, without any recognition that such a policy may have to be accepted at times as an extreme measure, but can in no sense be inflicted on a section of the population as a punishment, as though it had committed a crime by becoming a problem, through no fault of its own, to the majority among which it was living.

The progress of the war has altered the whole situation, and those who imagine a settlement of Eastern Europe along the lines of redrawn frontiers and more skilfully elaborated Minority Treaties are living in a world of illusion. But it is still necessary to bear in mind what has been called 'the anti-semitism of facts'. There *were* too many Jews in various countries of Eastern Europe for the national politics *as they were* to digest, and, in themselves, both limitation and emigration were policies which, however delicate to apply, were entitled to consideration.

Now, however, we are facing a new situation, the reconstruction from the bottom of social structures within a new framework. But we still need to guard against a re-creation of conditions in which the anti-semitism of facts will again lend itself to skilful propaganda, and the antisemitism of men. Professional redistribution and emigration will be questions affecting much more than just the Jewish minorities, and the essential will be the planned

provision of alternative lives for those who cannot or do not wish to return to their homes.

The essential task of the non-Jew in facing this aspect of reconstruction is the facing of the Jewish question as a whole, and the co-operation with the Jewish people in the provision of such conditions as will make it unlikely that subsequent Fascist agitators may skilfully exploit the abnormalities of Jewry to the undoing of democracy.

The Jewish Problem—what the Jew has to face

While many aspects of the Jewish question are seen to be insoluble without the official or unofficial co-operation of the non-Jewish world, the main burden of the problem, and a great deal of the initiative, must lie on the Jews themselves. But even here they are entitled to the sympathy and understanding of all men of goodwill. For a very large number of their problems are not of their own creation, and very few of their problems are of their own choice.

The basic problem confronting Jews, compelled as they are to live as minorities amongst other peoples, lies in the view which they take of their status. Do they wish to be considered merely a *religious* minority, allowing themselves to be completely absorbed, except for religious privileges which create no problem? Or do they wish to be considered a separate *national* minority, entitled to preserve their distinction in any field which seems to them essential? To-day, partly as a result of the shock of German antisemitism—for Germany was a country in which Jews were almost more assimilated than anywhere else—the majority of Jews

incline to think of themselves as a *national* minority. And if the negative side of this feeling be reaction against treatment in Germany, the positive side is pride in the achievements of the Jewish *National* Home in Palestine. In either case Jews will obviously and rightly fight for their individual equality as citizens in the countries where they live. In the second case they will also fight for some form of minority rights which do not, at the same time, lessen the full citizenship of the individual Jew.

Where the main issue is confined to individual equality the problems which remain are more often social than legal or political. There is no doubt that a great deal of avoidable irritation and hostility is aroused by the fact that it takes a considerable time for Jewish families or groups to adjust themselves to the general habits and customs of the people among whom they live. Here, where no religious principles are involved, it is the clear duty of the minority to do all it can to avoid such irritation.

The difficulties which arise out of political minority status have already been shown. Jewish action towards the abnormal position created in countries like Poland had been twofold. It is not surprising if they have used all their power to fight against discrimination, and have refused to consider its occasional justification. For no assistance has been given them in finding other occupations. It was a true statement of the position when the President of the Jewish Student Association of Warsaw remarked that if they were allowed to be tram-conductors, large numbers of young Jews would never have tried to be students.

At the same time protest has not been their only reply. For more than half a century Jewish leaders have recognized the serious problem created by the narrow concentration of Jews into a few occupations where they inevitably acquire an unwelcome prominence. With local funds, and with help from the richer Jewries of Western Europe and America, loan banks and training centres have been brought into being all through Eastern Europe, which are steadily introducing young Jews to agriculture, and to craftsmanship. While no Jew would accept it as an obligation that part of any Jewish community should emigrate, a chain of offices throughout the world assists emigration, reports on conditions, prepares emigrants, guarantees their settlement, and smooths their way into the new country. Such work is slow and expensive, but no reproach can be levelled at the Jews by any non-Jew on this score. They have worked with little help and little sympathy from outside.

It is often assumed that Jews do not need outside assistance, for their own wealth is adequate to the burdens they have to shoulder. The small Jewries of the West, and the large Jewry of the United States, are indeed prosperous, but so are the non-Jewish communities within which they live. The bulk of Jewry lives in Eastern Europe in conditions of deep and increasing poverty. Of course there are rich Jews who flaunt their wealth and take no part in the burdens of the community, but the majority of wealthy Jews tax themselves to an extent of which the non-Jew has absolutely no idea. For the refugees from Germany—of whom 15 per cent. were not Jewish—it has been calculated that

the average Jewish contribution per head in Great Britain has been between ten shillings and a pound, while the Christian contribution has been less than a penny; and in the early years the Jews had to take responsibility not only for their own refugees but for many Protestant, Catholic, and other refugees as well, since there were no Christian funds available to help. .

The problem of settlement, with which the future of the National Home in Palestine is intimately linked, is the biggest problem which confronts contemporary Jewry. And it is made more difficult by the fact that Hitler has made the world 'Jew conscious', and that the spread of antisemitism in every country has been a definite plank in the platform of all pro-Nazi and Fascist parties. Jewry has to confront these problems against a background of increasing hostility, misrepresentation and calumny.

What figures, what countries may be involved it is still impossible to foresee, but it is possible to foreshadow the main lines of possible solutions, by stating the alternatives before us. These are only two.

The National Home in Palestine has been the main achievement of the Jews of the last half-century. Either future settlement is definitely linked to what has already been achieved in Palestine, or it has to make a new start in one or more other scattered centres. In the second case, it must depend on what is the general programme of migration after the war, for the Jews are not the only people in need of living space, and in some way or other some means must be found for

alleviating the pressure of population on the peasant half of Europe. But if the specifically Jewish resettlement is to be linked mainly to Palestine, then it is already clear that it can only succeed if two developments take place within Zionist circles.

The achievements of Zionism in Palestine are remarkable from many points of view. They have not only achieved considerable economic and social success, but they have produced results in a more difficult, but equally essential field. Part of the problem of undoing an abnormal history is to restore the self-respect and inner integrity of the victim of that history; and there is no doubt that a share in the rebuilding of the National Home has had that effect on tens of thousands of Jews, especially of younger Jews, from Central and Eastern Europe. But in the political field there are, as yet, no comparable successes to record. Zionists have achieved neither inner political stability among themselves, nor statesmanship in dealing with external problems; and progress in these fields will be essential before Palestine can make any real contribution to the post-war Jewish problem.

The old and weary battle of the Balfour Declaration *versus* the promises to the Arabs must be abandoned once and for all, and a *new* basis sought for the acceptance of the Jews among the peoples of the Near East. There are signs already that Jewish groups in Palestine are recognizing this, but the movement has still very far to go. And, though they can prepare the ground, nothing final can be done on this subject by the Jews themselves. Jewish plans will be invaluable, Jewish consent and co-operation essential, but a new basis can only be

established as part of a general Near Eastern policy, in which the main responsibility must lie on Great Britain.

The ultimate problem of Jewry is the rediscovery and reassertion of the fundamental spiritual and social realities of Judaism to which both Assimilation and Zionism are capable of offering soils already prepared. The care of the seed must inevitably be the task of the Jew, but the value of the harvest cannot be great if the ground is perpetually resown by the non-Jew with the weeds of antisemitism, and surrounded with an impenetrable hedge of ignorance and indifference.



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GERMANY'S
'NEW ORDER'

BY
DUNCAN WILSON

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In the late summer of 1940 the German propaganda orchestra triumphantly announced a new theme and began to play variations on it, designed to attract a wide variety of audiences. This theme was of a 'New Order' which was to dawn in Europe, and it was well chosen. It was calculated to appeal to a continent in chaos, and at the same time had the flexibility and vague emotionalism which the German propagandists had found so useful in such catchwords as 'living-space', 'encirclement', 'race' and so on.

The reforms and benefits promised by the German propagandists are primarily economic. Accordingly in this pamphlet Mr. Duncan Wilson, after discussing the various forms in which the 'New Order' has been announced to the world, describes the German economic system since Hitler's accession to power in 1933, and in the light of this examines the probable effect on Europe's economy of Germany's plans for the future. He shows that the essence of the 'New Order', in whatever guise it is presented, is the political and economic domination of Europe by Germany. Europe would be largely turned back from industrialism to agriculture, in the interests of German industrial hegemony, with a consequent general fall in the standard of living—outside Germany.

Mr. Duncan Wilson had a distinguished academic career at Oxford, and since the beginning of the war has been engaged in a study of the German war economy, and of German economic propaganda.

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GERMANY'S 'NEW ORDER'

THE 'NEW ORDER' PROPAGANDA: ITS ORIGIN AND VARIETIES

MUCH has been heard in the course of the last seven months of a 'New Order' which Germany will introduce, or is introducing, in Europe. The phrase is at first sight attractive; there is a widespread desire for order, particularly economic order, in Europe after the chaos of war and preparations for war.

The Versailles Treaty failed to take economic factors sufficiently into account; and the events of the years 1919-39 have led many peoples throughout the world to set a higher value than ever before on economic security. Particularly the peoples of the Americas want to see their interests safeguarded by an economic stabilization of Europe, with which their normal trade relations could be restored. The 'New Order' is therefore most often presented as an economic order, and must be discussed as such.

The Timing of the Propaganda Campaign

The 'New Order' propaganda meets an existing demand, and therefore needs careful analysis. But it is important that the German propaganda should first be seen in its proper setting. For like all German propaganda campaigns, it is clearly timed to fit in with a strategic plan. The 'New Order' in Europe has not been an avowed German war-aim since September 1939; it made its appearance only when Germany had gained control of Western Europe by the defeat of France in June 1940; and

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although there was a steady propaganda barrage throughout July and August, it did not reach its fullest intensity till after Germany had lost the first great Battle of Britain in August and September. The 'New Order' propaganda was in fact not fully developed till the moment when there was clearly no immediate prospect of success in the war against Britain; and at that moment the 'New Order' took its place as the main theme of the German propaganda offensive. The resistance of opponents and possible opponents to German ambitions was to be sapped by the promises of a better world now being organized by the Germans—a Utopia whose realization was only delayed by the senseless resistance of the British. The disturbances to European and American economy could be blamed by the German Propaganda Ministry entirely on the British blockade.

This propaganda technique is remarkably similar to that by which the Nazi party achieved power in Germany itself. In 1933 an anti-social enemy was conjured up—the power of Jewry and Marxism—and the Nazis promised employment to the workers of Germany, stable prices to the farmers, new markets to the industrialists. In 1940 and 1941 the technique is the same; the enemy is Britain, wielder of a mythical economic supremacy in Europe, and the promises are bigger and better, addressed to the workers, peasants, and industrialists of the European continent.

What does the 'New Order' offer?

One great difference between 1933 and 1940 is that the people of Europe and the Americas are not so credulous as the people of Germany. After some

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experience of the Nazi régime the world is suspicious; but there is still a wide demand to know what the German programme can offer, and what Europe and the world have to gain from it. It is not enough to reject the German plan because of the suspicious circumstances in which it was put forward. The plan must be examined for what it is worth. Unfortunately, it is difficult to give any concise analysis and criticism of this plan; there is no single and authoritative enunciation of a German economic programme for Europe which can be approved or disapproved point by point. The theme of the 'New Order' is taken up repeatedly but variously. In a great number of cases the plan as explained by the Germans consists of nothing more than the abolition of a mythical and world-wide tyranny exercised by the British. There are other and more serious pronouncements, but they exhibit considerable differences. Some common factors may be found in most of them, but even so, the settings differ greatly. A discussion of the German 'New Order' cannot therefore take the form of a debate on particular economic proposals, which may be embodied in a draft constitution for Europe. We have to sift first what the Germans are saying about their scheme and to find out what its main features are meant to be, without becoming embedded in economic details.

There is, for instance, a measure of agreement in German pronouncements on some of the technical economic means which will help to establish the 'New Order'. The abolition of the gold standard, in particular, and the setting up of a multilateral clearing system¹ for Europe have been from time

¹ See p. 10 below.

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to time much publicized. From some economists' point of view there is much to be said in favour of such measures, which might simplify many problems of international exchange. But they do not by themselves make or mar the German plan. To approve or disapprove of them has little to do with upholding or condemning the 'New Order'. What people want to know about Germany's 'New Order' is whether it is planned for the economic benefit of Europe and the world, or only for that of Germany, the planner. The abolition of the gold standard or the introduction of multilateral clearings might, while excellent things in themselves, be features of a plan designed solely for Germany's benefit.

The essential question is, therefore, what benefits Germany's programme has to offer to the people of Germany, Europe, and the world beyond Europe.

German Versions of the 'New Order'

It would naturally be supposed that German propaganda would leave us in no doubt of the blessings to be enjoyed under the 'New Order'. Its benefits are, however, depicted variously according to the audience which is being addressed.

The German people themselves are promised a higher standard of living, and the enjoyment of European production, rationally planned and fully developed, of food and raw materials. At the same time, Europe's markets will be expanded to take the industrial products of Germany, its sole supplier. Berlin will take London's place as Europe's financial centre. Free from British interference, the Germans will find a place in the sun in Africa, which can provide Europe with any resources which it

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lacks. These are the most moderate prophecies in which the German leaders indulge. At times they promise far more to the German people.

To the inhabitants of the occupied countries the emphasis of German propaganda is different; the great benefits which they are to enjoy, and are already enjoying, from the 'New Order' are the abolition of unemployment, the sale to Germany of their agricultural surplus, and the fixed prices which Germany pays for it.

The European inhabitants of Africa are told that under the 'New Order' the resources of Africa will be properly developed in order to supplement those of an otherwise autarkic Europe.

At the same time and without regard for contradiction, the peoples of the Americas are assured that under the 'New Order' they will be free from the tyranny of the British Navy, and will be able to sell all their surplus produce, now being wasted, in a Europe pacified at last, where demand and prices will have been finally stabilized.

These are the main themes of German propaganda on the 'New Order', and it is difficult to construct from them any coherent picture of its general nature. The promises to develop and absorb African resources 'from cotton to coffee' and at the same time to extend trade in the same commodities with the Americas are obviously inconsistent. Even the more moderate of the promises made to the German people (and there are plenty of extravagant ones), when compared to those made to the people of the occupied territories, suggest a somewhat unequal distribution of benefits. In one case the emphasis is on prosperity, in the other on stability.

Which if any of the themes of German propa-

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ganda on the 'New Order' represents Germany's true intentions? A study of the various statements of the German case, with all their ambiguities and inconsistencies, is bound to excite the suspicion that the 'New Order' is variously disguised to suit its different audiences, and planned in the interests of Germany alone. But to answer the question fully it is necessary to turn from the evidence of German propaganda, and to examine the trend of German economic planning now and since the Nazis came to power.

THE GERMAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM 1933-41

Germany

It is by now possible to see the outlines of German economic policy since 1933. Both at home and abroad it has been directed to one single end, the strengthening of the German war-potential. The German economic system has been one of exploitation under various forms, and its first victims were the German people themselves. In this case the means of exploitation were at first comparatively orthodox. On the one hand, there has been a vast increase in taxation, of various kinds, including indirect taxation in the form of compulsory contributions to social services such as the *Winterhilfe* fund. The most curious example of such indirect taxation is the enforced payment for the much-advertised 'People's Car' which has not yet been, and is not likely ever to be, made available to contributors. A more brutal and effective part of the economic mobilization of Germany was the appropriation of Jewish wealth and property by the Nazis.

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On the other hand, while the resources of the German people were being mobilized, measures were taken even in peace to limit the choice of goods which could be bought with the money still available to the German consumer. Germany's foreign exchange was required to purchase materials to supply her war machine, or to form war reserves. It could not be used to provide materials for the satisfaction of normal consumers' demands. In a recent lecture¹ General Thomas, chief of the War Economic and Armaments Office in the German High Command, was quite frank about the aims of Nazi economics. He emphasized that the organization of the German armed forces on a war economy basis during the years of peace was the making of the effective instrument for war, and among the decisive factors of war economic organization he stressed reserves of raw materials and facilities for the requisitioning of raw materials that were lacking. The war-time system of rationing and regulations is only an extension of the system that already existed in Germany. In fact, Germans themselves have admitted that from an economic point of view the transition from peace to war conditions was hardly noticeable.²

The Balkans

The German system of exploitation has extended beyond the borders of Germany under different forms. The economy of the Balkan countries was for some years before the war being adapted to

¹ Reported in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, 1 Dec. 1940.

² The German policy of economic self-sufficiency ('autarky') and its effect on the German consumer in the years before this war are fully discussed in Professor A. G. B. Fisher's pamphlet *Economic Self-sufficiency* (No. 4 of this series).

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supply German needs, particularly of agricultural produce. Germany offered these countries the chance of disposing for years in advance of their agricultural surplus, and they could not afford to neglect such a chance. They might in return receive goods for which they had little use—such as the famous aspirins, and mouth-organs—or insufficient quantities of the industrial products which they did need. There was always danger that the Germans would raise the prices for their exports. But the Balkan countries could not afford to break with Germany, for in that case they forfeited all chance of being paid. In the meantime they had to extend and adapt their agriculture to the German need for animal fats and oil-seeds, for whose cultivation companies were formed under German management; and they were forced to discourage their own industries in order that a market might be left for Germany's industrial exports.

Clearing Agreements

The main instruments of the German order operating in the Balkans were, as they still are, clearing agreements involving the fixing of trade quotas, exchange rates, and, sometimes, prices.

A clearing agreement is an instrument of barter trade. Ideally the import and export of goods under a barter agreement should balance exactly, although in practice there will be periods over which one country will import more goods than it exports, or vice versa, so that debits or credits will accumulate on the clearing account. If a country continues to accumulate debits, it is importing goods without having to pay for them immediately in goods,

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services, or foreign exchange. Under normal conditions countries will try to prevent other countries from accumulating large debit balances by restricting exports to the debtor countries.

In the two years before the outbreak of the war there was a strong tendency for Germany to accumulate debit balances with most of the countries with which she had made clearing agreements. This was particularly serious for certain Balkan countries, which were sending goods to Germany and not receiving sufficient in return; but it was difficult for them to restrict exports, since they were so closely tied to the German market. Indeed, it was not till 1940 that this increase in German debts came to an end. This was due partly to bad harvests, and partly to the closing of many of Germany's normal export markets, whereby supply of German goods available for the Balkans was increased. The change in the trade balance put Germany in the position of being able to demand increases in the exchange value of the mark which made imports from the Balkans correspondingly cheaper for her, and in some cases (e.g. Hungary) to suggest that German clearing credits might be used to buy up shares in industrial concerns. Thus Germany was able to take advantage alike of her debit and credit balances.

Occupied Europe

In the occupied territories the position is even simpler, since questions of trade and exchange rates are not even formally the subject of free negotiations, but are simply the result of the decisions of the occupation authorities. The machinery of clearing agreements remains the same, as if to attract

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attention to the continuity of German economic policy. The results are on a far grander scale. Denmark, the only country for which clearing figures are published, may be taken as an example. After only eight months of German occupation the Danes had a credit balance of over 400 million kroner in Berlin. This figure does not represent the full extent of the exploitation to which the Danes have been subject. To it must be added the costs of the German occupation which are covered by credits of the Danish National Bank.

The importance of the German method is that the semblance of normal trade is preserved. The Danes receive good prices for their products which go to Germany, but payments to Danish exporters are only made possible by the issue of credits by the Danish National Bank. In return the bank gets nothing but a credit in the German clearing account.

On their side the Germans have imported all that they could take, and given in return only what they chose to spare. Although German exports are still very considerable, their direction is governed largely by military and political rather than by commercial factors. The Danes who need coal and possess credits in Berlin may not use the credits to buy coal; the Germans prefer to send it to the Italians, who probably have no credits in Berlin. The Germans maintain that after the war their export capacity will be such that the clearing debt will very soon be repaid. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether they will be able to provide Denmark with the raw materials necessary for the rehabilitation of her agricultural industry, whose capital has been largely lost as a result of the German occupation.

A dangerous consequence of the large excess of

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Danish exports has been the flood of paper money which has been issued. Inflation, which the Germans themselves must avoid at all costs, has been exported, and trade exchanges between Germany and Denmark have amounted indeed to no more than the barter of inflation for plenty.

There is no reason to assume that the case of Denmark is particularly unfavourable to Germany. The same features of the German economic order may be observed in other occupied territories. Raw materials and finished products have been imported into Germany, and many sections of industrial, commercial, or agricultural life are being stripped of working capital and left to decay.¹ Whatever Germany may be willing to send them after the war, it is unlikely that these enterprises can be revived without extensive replenishments of raw materials. These Germany certainly cannot provide.

The details of the workings of German exploitation naturally vary from country to country. In the case of France particularly, the fixing of a very high exchange rate for the mark (20 francs) has made it easier for German soldiers and traders to buy up French goods. There are further refinements by which German clearing debts are prevented from increasing too rapidly. In France, for instance, the occupation costs of 400 million francs a day pay for a very large part of the French goods acquired by the Germans, while in Yugoslavia a similar effect is produced by the enforced payment to German creditors of old debts of the Kingdom of Serbia dating from before 1914.

¹ For a summary account of German depredations in the occupied territories, see Viscount Maugham's pamphlet, *Lies as Allies*.

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GERMAN PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

Is the 'New Order' already in Operation?

There is therefore abundant evidence for the existence of a German economic order now in operation. The Germans themselves, it is worth noting, frequently claim that it is the 'New Order' itself which is operating throughout the occupied territories. In a talk from the German-controlled Radio Hilversum it was actually stated that the 'New Order' began to function in Germany in 1933. The nature of that German order has been sketched briefly above, and differs widely from the Utopian conditions now put forward as German peace-aims. Another fact casts doubt on the good faith of the German 'New Order' propaganda, namely, that its stock economic phrases are used euphemistically to describe the process of spoliation by clearing agreement and exchange rate now going on. Thus we are assured that Danish and Norwegian exporters are enjoying great prosperity owing to Germany's unlimited capacity to absorb their surpluses. Holland is congratulated on the possession of such a wonderful 'hinterland' as Germany can provide for her vegetables and dairy products. We have heard almost exactly the same terms used to describe the ideal conditions which Europe as a whole will enjoy under the 'New Order'. It is difficult in the circumstances to quell the suspicion that what is euphemism in one case will be nothing but euphemism in the other, and that the 'New Order' will be but the present 'Order' writ large.

Such suspicions do not amount to conclusive proof. It remains to be seen whether the Germans

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are simultaneously producing anything that could be called a 'New Economic Order' to replace their present system. When forced to take a defensive attitude about present conditions in Europe, they admit that the 'New Order' cannot yet be realized. They say that its realization is deferred by British resistance, and above all by the British blockade, which they blame for all the disturbance caused since the outbreak of war to European economy. This defence deserves a more careful examination. If it could be shown that the Germans had any economic plan conceived for the general benefit of Europe, which they could put into execution at the end of the war, then, in spite of their past and present record of exploitation, German propaganda for a 'New Order' could not be completely discredited. The war and all preparations for it could then be represented by the Germans as the birth-pangs necessary to produce their European Utopia.

German Long-term Plans

In fact there is plenty of evidence more concrete than the generalities of the 'New Order' propaganda about German long-term plans for the future. There is the evidence of their own leaders' words which, when speaking at home on concrete issues, they do not trouble to harmonize with the professions of good faith put out for foreign consumption by the Propaganda Ministry. More important, there is the evidence of their actions in occupied territories; the exploitation by clearing agreements and exchange rates is limited by the amount which can be immediately removed from the countries exploited. In Denmark, for instance, it seems that the peak of exploitation is now passed.

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But Germany has, by her own confession, longer-term plans for the mobilization of the resources that remain in the occupied territories—capital, manpower, and production.

Control of Industry, Banks, &c.

In a speech, of 1 September 1940 Dr. Funk observed that under the 'New Order' nations 'would be free to develop their own resources and to trade with one another but only according to the German principles and methods'. Since the date of his speech, German principles and methods of developing other nations' resources have been fully illustrated. While Germany is engaged in the self-imposed task of freeing Europe from the 'domination of foreign capital' she is replacing this largely imaginary domination by a direct or indirect control imposed on business and financial concerns in the occupied and neutral countries of Europe. In this way Germany is already beginning to fulfil the role which she has allotted to herself in the 'New Order'—that of Europe's sole big industrial power. The great textile factories of Poland, which add some 15 per cent. to the existing productive capacity of textiles in the German Reich, have been taken over, mainly by the big German companies, Glanz-Stoff A.G. and Thuringian Zellwolle A.G. The heavy industry of Belgium and Northern France has also fallen under German control, as illustrated by the amalgamation (at present only partial) of the steel company Otto Wolff of Cologne with the famous Belgian company of d'Ougrée-Marihaye.

In general, the Germans can dominate most industries in the occupied territories without any

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formal amalgamation, by their control of stocks and imports (if any) of raw materials essential to industry, and in some cases by the mobilization of skilled labour throughout their European Empire for their own use. German control is also extended to banking and financial operations. The banking system of Alsace, for instance, has been detached from that of France, and German banks have started to operate. In Holland steps have been taken to bring the insurance companies into German hands.

This process is not confined, any more than the clearing system, to countries under German occupation. In Yugoslavia, for instance, the capital of the Yugo-Slavischer Bankverein has recently been increased from 60 to 100 million dinars, and the new shares have been taken over by the Credit-Anstalt Bankverein of Vienna. The Germans in fact control a majority of the shares of what is now the biggest private financial concern of Yugoslavia. It hardly needs emphasizing that those who gain from the extension of German industry and banking are not even the German people as a whole, but principally the big shareholders, who are often identical with the Nazi leaders.

The peoples of Europe are not likely to be the only ones to suffer from the German grip on their industries. As the Germans gain control over European industry and financial institutions, they are putting themselves into a position not only to regulate European production (and in particular the production of armaments), but also for the future to control Europe's imports of raw materials, and her overseas export markets. Dr. Funk foreshadowed what such control would mean to the world outside Europe in his speech of 25 July 1940.

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'The economic solidarity of Europe will give it a favourable bargaining position *vis-à-vis* other countries.' The 'New Order' which the German planners are thus establishing over European industry can clearly be reckoned as a long-term plan, not as an improvisation forced on them by the exigencies of war. And this National-Socialist plan as manifested so far could not be more exactly described than by the formula 'Imperialist Capitalism'.

Re-Agriculturalization of Europe

While the Germans will control what industry remains in occupied Europe, industry, as the Germans have frequently and explicitly stated, will under the 'New Order' be concentrated in Germany. In fact many industries in Western Europe which depend on imports of raw material are already being forced to close down, since the Germans have seized all industrial stocks (of copper, rubber, &c.) that are of value to their war-machine. In the circumstances, the Germans say that the occupied territories were over-industrialized, and that a rational plan for European production, such as they are putting into execution, demands a return to the land by the peoples of Western Europe.

Plans to increase the cultivated area of all the occupied countries, and their self-sufficiency as regards foodstuffs, have been publicly discussed: but it is to France, which under normal circumstances already produced enough cereals, potatoes, and sugar to feed its population, that the propaganda of 'back-to-the-land' is most particularly addressed. German propagandists touring in the wake of the

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German armies discovered that agriculture had been strangely neglected in Northern France (where production has in fact compared favourably with that of Germany's agricultural districts): Marcel Déat supported them with the prophecy that 'France will once more become a country of peasants, to its own advantage' and the *Völkischer Beobachter* summarized German views in the statement that German organization could make the fullest use of France's natural resources, and that the Germans were as much interested in next year's harvest as the French themselves.

It is in fact highly unlikely that any sanely planned agricultural development could absorb a large proportion of the urban population, thrown out of employment by a large-scale de-industrialization of France. Further, it is improbable that French agriculture would benefit greatly by any large 'back-to-the-land' movement. In the Balkan countries, where a large proportion of the population is engaged in not very highly developed agriculture, the proportion is too large for the highest agricultural efficiency to be achieved. In France under the suggested German plan, families would return to the soil, not in order to redress the balance between town and country, but simply because other occupations had been forbidden them.

Exploitation of Labour

The proposed re-agriculturalization of Europe, while it may be forced on the Germans by the difficulties under which European industries suffer in war-time, is also part of their long-term policy. It is a corollary of their attempt to turn Germany into

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the great industrial centre and the only armament centre of Europe; it serves an incidental purpose by increasing Europe's self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and lessening the need to import from the Americas in particular. More important, it will serve indirectly to increase Germany's own supply of imported labour. At present there are over 1.4 million foreigners working in Germany, exclusive of prisoners of war. About a million Poles (mainly prisoners) have been forcibly conscripted, and work under conditions far worse than those of the average slave of the classical age. All kinds of inducements and threats are employed to attract 'voluntary' labour from the other occupied territories, where Germany has to keep up appearances. In Holland the unemployed who refuse to take work in Germany when it is offered to them are not entitled to any unemployment benefit. This redistribution of labour is at present, as the Germans are never tired of pointing out, some kind of solution of the unemployment problem which the German war has forced upon the occupied territories. But the gradual de-industrialization of the occupied territories will create a permanent unemployment problem for them; and the forced redistribution of labour, which Germany needs, is intended as a permanent solution for this problem. The point has been made explicitly by Dr. Stothfang, of the German Ministry of Labour: 'Germany, owing to its central position in the New European Order, will continue to attract foreign labour reserves . . . especially as a continuous shortage of German workers is to be expected. The foreign countries, on the other hand, mainly of an agricultural character, have large population surpluses which will

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need an outlet.'¹ The Germans do not trouble to conceal that this theory applies to the co-founders of the 'New Order', the Italians, who already enjoy the title of 'harvest-helpers'. A lecturer reported in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* (31 October 1940) that the passive trade-balance, which Italy was bound to have with Germany, would be remedied by 'Germans travelling in Italy and Italians working in Germany'.

Economic Version of 'Herrenvolk' theory •

These are the main features of the long-term economic plan which the Germans are adopting (as their words and deeds prove)—control and centralization in Germany of European industry, and resulting from that, the re-agriculturalization of Europe, and a forced redistribution of labour. These plans pay no attention to the welfare of the countries under German domination, and in fact could only be achieved at the cost of a terrible fall in their standard of living. They represent a continuance and fulfilment of the German tradition of exploitation, as applied already to Germany itself, the Balkans, and the occupied territories. The 'New Order' of 1933 is developed, but remains in operation and is not succeeded by any 'Newer Order'. It appears then that only one of the various types of 'New Order' propaganda run by the Germans need be taken very seriously—that addressed to the German people themselves, and promising them untold benefits at the end of the war.

That is the one propaganda theme which does

¹ It is possible that in the long run German demand for foreign labour could not keep pace with the surplus population of a re-agriculturalized Europe.

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not run counter to the whole trend of German thought and practice.

The 'New Order' turns out on examination to be no more than the economic expression of the official German political theories. Inside Germany the prevailing economic regimentation results from the same distrust and contempt for the mass of the people which Hitler expressed in *Mein Kampf*. Thus we read in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (13 October 1940) that 'the public is obviously unreasonable. It is quite useless to appeal to its reason and to safeguard the just distribution of goods by enlightening the public. The only expedient is to use force psychologically or physically.' At the same time the despised German public is the destined master of the world, a *Herrenvolk* to dominate other peoples; and as the 'New Order' embraces peoples outside Germany, it is revealed as the economic form of the *Herrenvolk* theory still being expounded by German thinkers and enforced by German soldiers. In the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 7 October 1940 it is written that 'We Germans are born to rule Europe and must show that we are masters of our destiny'. This political doctrine was translated into its simplest economic terms by Dr. Ley as long ago as 31 January 1940. He laid it down that 'A lower race needs less food, less clothes, and less culture than a higher race', and the simplest illustration of this economic proposition is the double scale of rationing now enforced in Poland, by which a German gets nearly twice as much food as a Pole. The attitude of Germany to her junior partners in the 'New Order' finds classical expression in *Das Reich* of 6 October 1940: 'The German people as the pivot and leaders of Europe's

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new era must avoid the temptation to devote their energies to the good of others. That temptation was never so strong as to-day.'

THE 'DYNAMIC' OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM

In the face of the Germans' declared intention to convert the economic system of Europe to their own ends, it is impossible to take seriously their promises of a golden age bringing general prosperity, or their excuses that only war conditions prevent them from introducing their brave 'New Order' immediately. Even if they could introduce such an order, they evidently have no intention of doing so. But a still more fundamental criticism of the German economic system is possible. Even if it were allowed, by a colossal stretch of imagination, that the Germans at the end of a victorious war would suffer a change of heart, and organize a 'New Order' acceptable to the rest of the world which did not leave Germany as the sole military and industrial power of Europe, the question remains whether they would be able to put such a plan into execution. The final answer to German propaganda is that the Nazi régime could hardly by now introduce any reasonable 'New Order', even if they won the war and intended to do so.

The War-machine cannot go into Reverse

The main reason for this is that the great war-machine, on which their precarious domination depends, cannot be put into reverse gear. At present the German economic order imposed on the occupied countries can only be maintained by

force or the threat of force and the German war-machine is necessary. But supposing the Germans introduced an economic system which would be freely supported by the other nations of Europe and accepted by nations outside Europe, it would be unnecessary for Germany to maintain an army on the vast scale of recent years, nor could Germany do so from her own resources alone. The natural outcome would be a reversal of the war-machine and a return to the organization of a peaceful economy. But to this development there would be two insuperable objections for the rulers of Germany. First, the Nazi chiefs would oppose disarmament since they and their friends are the people who profit directly and largely from the German armaments industry.¹ Secondly, and more important, the reversal of the German war-machine would produce for them and for the German people as a whole another problem of the utmost gravity—a sharp increase in unemployment. For any country the transition between a war economy and a peace economy is difficult. But in Germany it has been the chief boast of those responsible for social policy that unemployment has been finally abolished. Now unemployment has only been abolished by mobilizing the labour resources of Germany to work for the war-machine, and so ultimately for war. To adapt the huge armament and munition factories of Germany to peaceful uses and to demobilize the

¹ It is curious to observe in this connexion how the German gibes at pluto-democracy can be turned against the National-Socialist system. Hitler deduced from Chamberlain's prophecy of a three-year war that Chamberlain could not draw sufficient profits from armament shares in under three years; he should have remembered that Marshal Goering, one of Germany's biggest shareholders and directors, declared himself ready for a war of five years.

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great German army would have to be a very slow process, all the slower in Germany than elsewhere since Germany had been preparing so long and so completely for war. The large-scale conversion of swords into ploughshares would be a matter of great difficulty, and any serious slowing-down of the German war-machine would mean unemployment for millions of German workmen.¹ Employment is the only benefit which Hitler's social policy has had to offer the German people in return for many hardships and restrictions. Unemployment is the trouble which Hitler's régime could not face.

The Need for Continual Expansion

The war-machine will therefore remain, if it is not broken in war, as the centre and driving force of the whole Nazi system. It provides the 'dynamic' of which the Germans boast, and is bound to initiate a terrible sequence of events. The origins of this 'dynamic' may be political or psychological, but its nature and consequence can best be explained in economic terms. Goering presented the German people with a choice of economic means to satisfy their political ambitions—the choice of guns or butter. The choice was in fact a far more momentous one. The Germans were asked not merely to buy guns instead of food with their spare cash; they were asked to invest in armaments rather than in, say, merchant ships or bridges. The essential difference is that under normal conditions, while the merchant ships are in use, money is earned which contributes to the cost of their upkeep and eventual

¹ Even allowing for the fact that the first to lose their jobs would be the foreign workmen whom Germany is importing in increasing numbers.

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replacement. No money is earned by using the gun; when it needs repair or has to be replaced, fresh resources are needed which it has done nothing to provide. The gun may in fact need to be replaced before it has even been fully used, since armaments become obsolete fairly quickly. In brief, armaments unlike most other investments have no earning power and are not cumulatively productive.

The Germans invested their wealth in armaments, in a war-machine which had constantly to be fed and replaced by fresh resources. As the resources of Germany itself were exhausted by requisitioning, taxation, and enforced saving, other countries had to be exploited to feed the war-machine. The resources of Austria and Czechoslovakia were soon absorbed, those of Poland, the occupied territories of the West, and Rumania are now being digested. They will not last for ever, and a further expansion in search of further wealth will become necessary.

This economic expansion in space is the 'dynamic' vaunted by the Germans and the 'determinism of history' which Dr. Goebbels likes to invoke. It is as part of this vast outward movement, necessitated by the war-machine which cannot feed or reproduce itself, that the successive exploitations of Germany, the Balkans, and the occupied territories and the German economic plans for the future should be viewed. The nature and direction of the German economic order was determined by the decision to build up the war-machine. Its nature does not undergo any fundamental change and its direction cannot be reversed. It cannot in fact produce any really 'New Order'. The one and only German 'New Order' was born in 1933.

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THE WEAKNESS OF THE 'NEW ORDER'

Reaction in Germany and Occupied Territories

The Germans are forced to export the 'New Order' to feed their own war-machine, but the process is hastened for political reasons. Only by the promise of benefits to come can they reconcile the victims of the 'New Order' to its hardships, and such benefits can most easily be gained by wars of expansion. The dynamic of the 'New Order' is therefore amongst other things a sign of its greatest weakness, the resistance it has provoked among the countries incorporated in it.

The best evidence for the reaction against the German system in Germany and much more in the occupied territories are the newspaper articles and broadcasts by which the Germans seek to counteract it and to reassure themselves and their victims. In Germany itself the economic foundations of the 'New Order' are secure. But even there, where the successes of the war-machine bring far greater gains, material and psychological, than in the occupied countries, there is an increasing weariness born of seven years familiarity with what are virtually war-time restrictions. There is no immediate prospect of an end to these restrictions. It has been stated in the German press that the rationing system was likely to extend for at least a year after the war, and that there would be a prolonged shortage of consumption goods. Dr. Ley's descriptions of the social horrors of Great Britain and of the wonderful benefits which the German worker will enjoy after the war are therefore becoming more and more highly coloured. The English pluto-democracy is

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exposed by descriptions of factory conditions in the 1840's; the Germans are led on by promises of three-roomed flats with shower-baths planned by the Führer, and luxury cruises on Strength-through-Joy liners.

It becomes more and more difficult, however, for the Germans to justify their works to the occupied countries. In the Balkans the immediate benefits offered by Germany concealed for a considerable time the dangers of close connexion with the German system. But the case is different in the occupied countries of Western Europe. There producers were for a short time satisfied with the paper money paid to them in large quantities, regardless of what goods could be purchased with it. But that stage by now seems to have passed. Dr. Fischböck, speaking in Holland, admitted 'an excess of means of payment, and a shortage of consumption goods', but thought it wrong to speak of inflation. The distinction is hard to follow, and does not seem to have reassured the inhabitants. An increasing number of official warnings against hoarding and dealings on 'black markets'¹ show that people by now prefer to keep any solid assets that they have, or at least to sell them at their own price.

Resistance strains German administration

The scarcity of consumers' goods, and particularly of foodstuffs, in the occupied countries, resulting from the German exploitation, has far-reaching results. It automatically ranges producers in the country who do not want to part with their stock against consumers in the towns who are going short;

¹ Secret dealings at prices in excess of the official maximum.

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and that means considerable difficulties for the administration of the occupied countries and ultimately for the German authorities.¹

There is also more deliberate opposition.

It is now clearly and generally realized that the Germans have little to offer in exchange for the system of 'cards, clearings, and regulations' which, in the words of a German broadcaster to Holland, are 'rules of the German game'. The Danish press in particular has published complaints of the artificial rate of exchange imposed by the Germans, and of the lack of German goods sent to Denmark in return for Danish produce. 'There is plenty of goodwill on the German side', said a Danish official spokesman on 13 October 1940, 'but a considerable lack of transport.'

The fruits of a German victory look increasingly more remote, and in any case they are mainly reserved for the German people. In the meantime, the employment which the Germans offer takes the form of building up what the Germans themselves have destroyed, or of work far away in Germany. Security of markets for the producer seems to mean that the Germans take all that they can transport back to Germany, while war-time conditions, if nothing more, prevent import of goods on a corresponding scale. Stability, which the Germans have promised so often, proves to be only a relative stability; certainly the peoples of the occupied countries are tied without release to the German war-machine, but it itself is involved in an inexorable movement of expansion until it is destroyed.

¹ For instance, there are now 3,000 price controllers, including motorized units, to deal with hoarding and black markets in Belgium.

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All this the people of the occupied countries are beginning to realize, and as they realize it, they are less and less inclined to collaborate in the German plan.

The German plan of exploitation is designed to control all spheres of consumption and production, and to impose from above a rigid plan for the benefit of the *Herrenvolk*. The change from the normal system is symbolized by a typical change of name—the Market Place where men worry out their own economic problems becomes the Adolf Hitler Place where they fulfil their economic duty to the Führer, without enjoying corresponding rights or opportunities.

The attempt to impose the rigidly planned 'New Order' on the unwilling majority of people in Europe must involve an immense strain on the German administrative machine, and even on the German army, and the strain is only likely to be increased by any new addition to the German empire. On the one side, there may be immediate economic and strategic gains; on the other side, there will be the further complications involved for the machinery of government, and perhaps the necessity of devoting a still larger proportion of Germany's productive capacity to her military machine.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of our examination is that the bulk of German propaganda on the 'New Order' is nothing but bluff. The 'New Order' is only the old order of exploitation, successively manifested in Germany, the Balkans, and the occupied territories of Western Europe since 1933; its most usual

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instrument up to now has been the clearing agreement and manipulated rate of exchange. But the Germans are planning exploitation on a grander scale than anything yet attempted; industry, capital, and labour are to be mobilized throughout Europe, in the interests of the *Herrenvolk*. That is all that Europe can expect from the Germans; the programme of territorial expansion and total exploitation is forced on them by the unsatisfied needs of the war-machine to which they have tied themselves. Its abolition would involve social problems which the German régime could not face, but its upkeep involves them in the perpetual expansion which is the only dynamic of the German system. The weakness of the system, based as it is on force, is the resistance that it excites and which involves ever increasing strain on the German administrative machine.

The German 'New Order' propaganda is designed to minimize this weakness, to make the 'New Order' of exploitation acceptable to its present victims, and to conceal its true nature from those who would later be called on to resist it. With this end in view, the Germans have put up a smoke-screen of economic jargon, which should not be mistaken for a detailed economic plan. They are playing skilfully on the general desire in Europe and America for economic stability. They promise that the 'New Order' will bring this stability, and do not mention either the price of complete political subjection which has to be paid by its victims in Europe, or the dominating position which the 'New Order' would give to Germany in the markets of the world. The propaganda trick is remarkably similar to some of those by which the Nazis came to power in

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Germany. There it was the promise to relieve unemployment that won them millions of votes; the promise was fulfilled because the Germans were willing to pay the necessary price—economic and political. But the Germans had far more to gain in all fields from Hitler's 'New Order' than its present victims and those who would be destined in the future to subjection, if the 'New Order' were not smashed in war. German plans for the exploitation of industry, capital, and man-power, already beginning to operate in the occupied territories, show how little will be left to those who accept the 'New Order'. The inevitable expansion of the German system constitutes a threat even to those continents which are at present outside it. The 'New Order' is a modernized feudalism which will benefit only the German ruling caste with their soldiers, policemen, and propagandists as the counterpart of barons and priests. The secure status of a serf is all that the Germans can offer other races to compensate for the miseries of serfdom. No amount of specious economic theory can hide the fact that this is a bad bargain.

OXFORD BOOKS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

THE best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Vol. 14 of the *Oxford History of England*. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.).

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. 6d. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines in evidence to-day.

The outbreak of the present war is described and discussed in the lectures by H. A. L. Fisher, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray, R. C. K. Ensor, Harold Nicolson, and J. L. Brierly, collected and published in one volume under the title *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.). The deeper issues at stake are summed up in Lord Halifax's famous Oxford address, *The Challenge to Liberty* (3d.), which is included in the volume of his *Speeches on Foreign Policy* (10s. 6d.).

The economics of 'total' warfare are described in Mr. Geoffrey Crowther's *Ways and Means of War* (2s. 6d.), an enlargement of his two Oxford Pamphlets (Nos. 23 and 25).

The prices quoted above are net and held good in March 1941, but are liable to alteration without notice.



MAP I. CANADA'S POSITION IN THE
LAND HEMISPHERE

SINCE the development of the Americas by Europeans, the Atlantic, in Mackinder's words, has become the 'Mediterranean Ocean' and western Europe not the terminus but the centre of the modern, industrialized, populated land masses of the globe. Columbus not only discovered the position of America but changed the significance of the Atlantic Ocean and of Britain and France.

On sea (or air) routes Canada occupies a favourable North American position on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Eastern Canadian ports are nearer Europe and western Canadian ports nearer the Orient than American ports. Halifax, the naval base, and St. John, N.B., are nearer Liverpool, London, Brest, Gibraltar, Capetown, and Rio de Janeiro than New York is.

Sea Routes—Nautical Miles

Montreal-Liverpool .	2,750	Montreal-Rio de Janeiro	5,325
Halifax- "	2,425	Halifax- "	4,625
Churchill- "	2,925	New York- "	4,800
New York- "	3,050	Plymouth- "	4,850
Montreal-Capetown .	7,100	Vancouver-Yokohama .	4,275
Halifax- "	6,475	San Francisco- "	4,525
Plymouth- "	5,950	Liverpool (Suez) .	11,100
New York- "	6,800	" (Panama) "	12,650

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CANADA

BY
GRAHAM SPRY

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CANADA is now Britain's most powerful ally against Germany, and to Britons it seems the most natural thing in the world that Canada and Britain should be fighting together. Yet Canada is a sovereign nation, free to choose between war and neutrality, she is separated by 3,000 miles of ocean from the heart of the war, and her great neighbour, the United States, has for eighteen months remained a neutral. It is the aim of this pamphlet to describe the nation that Canada is, and to show how her national unity has been influenced by geography, economic dependence, race, federalism, and by European and North American associations. Such a background of knowledge is indispensable for a proper appreciation of Canada's attitude towards the war, and of the daily news from the transatlantic Dominion.

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NOTE

A special Canadian series of Oxford Pamphlets is published by the Oxford University Press, Toronto. These Canadian Pamphlets, to which Mr. Spry's furnishes an admirable introduction, are obtainable in Great Britain (Price 6d. each). The first eight titles are:—

- C 1 *All Right, Mr. Roosevelt*, by Stephen Leacock.
- C 2 *Canada and United States Neutrality*, by B. K. Sandwell.
- C 3 *The Ukrainian Canadians and the War*, by Watson Kirkconnell.
- C 4 *What the British Empire means to Western Civilization*, by André Siegfried. Translated by G. M. Wrong.
- C 5 *Canada and the Second World War*, by C. P. Stacey.
- C 6 *War for Power and Power for Peace*, by Lionel M. Gelber.
- C 7 *North America and the War: A Canadian View*, by Reginald G. Trotter.
- C 8 *Trends in Canadian Nationhood*, by Chester Martin.

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THE Dominion of Canada, as events have revealed, was not less and perhaps not more threatened than other nations on the continents of North and South America by direct German aggression or the consequences of a German conquest of Europe. The government and peoples of Canada, like those of other American nations, were free to decide between the policies of neutrality and intervention. Canada alone in the Americas declared war on Germany.

This declaration of war has been largely taken for granted by the people of Britain and the United States. Canada's membership of the British Empire has seemed sufficient explanation. This explanation is valid but incomplete. Canada, in fact, declared war on Germany through her own King, government, and parliament on 10 September, and for seven days after Britain was at war Canada was a British neutral. The British connexion has powerful practical and sentimental values for the Canadian people; Canada is the only nation in the Americas whose relations with a European mother country have never been broken. But Canada did not enter the war either wholly or predominantly because of this connexion, or of any decisive numerical preponderance of Anglo-Saxons or British-born in her population. Least of all was Canada's separate declaration of war due to any compulsion by or subordination to the British Government. Canada's sovereignty and constitutional powers are as complete in fact as those of Eire; geographically, Canada is more remote from either British control or German attack; economically, she is less dependent than Eire. Eire in the war zone is neutral and Canada in a neutral hemisphere is at war.

Because of her British associations or her American position, Canada is usually interpreted as a projection or expansion of Britain or of the United States. Canada is both

British and American, as indeed Canada is also French; but the pattern of Canada, the pattern formed by geographic influences and history, by racial composition and economic conflicts, by political practice and institutions, is a Canadian pattern. Canada is not 'the fourteenth colony' as Benjamin Franklin anticipated in 1774 nor 'the very image and transcript' of England as Col. John Simcoe, Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, hoped in 1792. The Canadian people's concept of nationhood is significantly different from the nationalism of the United States, their concept of the Commonwealth confirmed in the Statute of Westminster, 1931, was different from either the colonial separation or the centralized empire policies advocated by English political leaders in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Canadian life has flowed from so many sources, and is so new and varied compared with that of the older, deeply rooted, racially homogeneous nation-states of Western Europe that many interpretations of Canada are possible. Baldwin and Lafontaine, the Fathers of Confederation, Macdonald, Laurier, Borden, and Canadian statesmen and people of to-day have seen their task as the task of building a nation without severing relations with Britain or annihilating racial and cultural distinctions at home.

Through this task has run a delicate problem of unity and at times its corollary, the question of survival. A French observer, André Siegfried, has described the Dominion as 'a precarious creation'. This doubt few Canadians have shared: their statesmanship has been equal to the challenge, the people have had faith in themselves. Canada to be understood must be interpreted not only by her associations and her origins but as a nation and a Canadian nation. It was as a free nation that Canada declared war.

Peoples: Race and Religion

The Canadian population was nearly trebled in the sixty years of confederation from 3,689,257 in 1871 to 10,376,786

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in 1931. The present estimates approach 12,000,000. This population is scattered in a thin fringe along the waterways and trans-continental railways across a territory wider than Europe. Four-fifths of the people live within 200 miles of the American frontier. Some 700 miles separate the centres of population in the Atlantic provinces from those of central Canada, 900 miles of rock and water separate central Ontario from the prairies, 400 miles of mountain divide the Pacific Coast from the prairies.

Race further divides the population, religious distinctions largely coincide with those of race: both in a measure coincide with the sectionalism of geography and economic resources. Quebec, northern New Brunswick, and north-eastern Ontario are largely French and Catholic. Ontario, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia are predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. The three prairie provinces are less than half Anglo-Saxon, and there are significant groups of Germans, Scandinavians, and Slavs.


The Scandinavian and the older German populations quickly assimilate and have played an admirable part in Canadian life. The Slavs, particularly the Ukrainians, have been settled in 'blocs' within the last two generations and as yet form definite racial groups in the population. Assimilation to the Canadian mode of life is proceeding, and historically, whatever the future may hold, relations between older Canadians and 'New Canadians' have not yet raised very serious problems. Canadians of every race are represented in the divisions overseas. In the Royal Canadian Regiment, the senior regular regiment, for example, about one-quarter are French-Canadians, and the Intelligence section commands the use of 16 languages.¹

Almost a quarter of the Canadians were born outside Canada. For other Canadians, Canada has been a half-way

¹ The Hon. Vincent Massey, High Commissioner in London, recently quoted Stephen Leacock's comment on New Canadians: 'Leave them alone and pretty soon the Ukrainians will think they won the Battle of Trafalgar.'

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house to the United States.¹ The trend of population in a new country is difficult to prophesy. Two Canadian statisticians, Hurd and McLean, have estimated a population of 16,642,000 in 1971. Professor Hurd estimates that in 1971,



Racial origins and religious denominations of the Canadian people by percentages of total population, census of 1931. In the last ten years the percentage of British origin has fallen below 50. Canadian-born formed 77.76, British-born 11.42, American-born 3.32, and foreign-born 7.50 per cent. Protestants form 54.9 per cent. of the religious denominations.

if present trends continue, the French race will be 39.6, the British 38.9, and non-British and non-French 21.5 per cent. Canada's future population may well be small or intermediate in size but high in its standard of living.

When Lord Durham's Report in 1839 spoke of 'two nations warring in the bosom of a single state' he was speaking of the relations between the descendants of the original

¹ Canadians, like the Scots, get about. In recent years from Canadian-born there might be cited as evidence—a Prime Minister of Great Britain, a member of the present War Cabinet, United States Senators, a United States admiral, a member of the American delegation to the Versailles Conference, a director of the Bank of England, Cardinals of Rome, a director of the London *Times*, an officer of the American federal reserve bank, a governor of a West African colony, a general officer commanding an expedition in North-West India, the officer commanding the R.A.F. in Libya, and university or college presidents in the United States, India, Rome, China, French North Africa, and Great Britain, as well as Norma Shearer, Mary Pickford, Deanna Durbin, and Beatrice Lillie.

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18,000 people of French race and tongue who migrated to Canada before 1713 and the Anglo-Saxons who came from the British Isles and the American states after the fall of the French empire in America in 1759.

Each of these two main races in Canada almost fiercely retains and develops its own language and culture. The differences are, indeed, not biological but essentially of language, religion, and culture. The French-Canadian 'ideology' has the virtues of largely Latin, Catholic, hierarchical civilization derived from Rome and north-western France of the *ancien régime*. The English-Canadian 'ideology' is Anglo-Saxon with a strong Scotch or north country flavour, Protestant, liberal and derived from England or New England—from United Empire Loyalists of eighteenth-century revolutionary New England or nineteenth-century and modern Britain. It is significant that both races felt revulsion rather than attraction towards the two great revolutions of the eighteenth century.

The different environment and experiences of the two races transplanted to Canada have modified but not yet harmonized the differences between them. The French-Canadian population has not been increased by immigration from France since 1713, and has become deeply rooted in the Canadian soil. New France (Quebec) was one of the typical examples of the *ancien régime*, but before the French Revolution, George III, as Burke said, had displaced Louis XVI in Quebec, and French Canada shared none of the revolutionary experiences of France, either political or religious. French-Canadian life has been shaped by its profound Catholicism, by the Canadian physical environment, by association and conflict with predominant Anglo-Saxon North America, and by Canadian adaptations of the British institutions of monarchy, and representative and responsible government. Religious and cultural loyalties, conscious policies of group concentration and isolation, and three centuries of life in the well-defined St. Lawrence homeland have preserved the

French-Canadian people and given them a unique unity and strength. This people is perhaps the most sturdily Canadian and conservative in the Dominion.

The characteristics of the British stock are those of modern America or modern Britain. When the English-speaking Canadian looks abroad, he looks to London or to New York; the French-Canadian looks more perhaps to Rome than to either, but almost more to London than to Paris. The English-Canadian looks to the State for welfare, the French-Canadian to the Church. The English-speaking tend to be Scotch liberals, the French ultramontane conservatives: the kilt and the cassock flutter through the pages of Canadian history.

Each race feels in the other some measure of rivalry if not of menace to its individuality and integrity; bitter quarrels at times flare into flame. The question of French language and religious instruction in the provincial educational systems of predominantly English-speaking provinces was a deep political issue for fifty years. The enforcement of conscription by the English majority upon the French minority in the last war shaped the structure of the political parties for a generation and created a solid Quebec bloc of Liberals in the House of Commons.

The races live side by side but have not merged. They nourish their own language and individuality in their own clubs, societies, holidays, churches, business houses, and political associations. There is little inter-marriage. The school systems are Provincial and the French education is largely clerical, the English largely lay. There are two different and almost hostile interpretations of Canadian history. But there is growing, against all barriers, a common view of Canada's future which statesmanship and the dark challenge of this war may help to nourish. In the past the two peoples, in Siegfried's terms, may have shared only a 'modus vivendi without cordiality', but the idea of Canadian nationhood, the striving for unity rather than uniformity, the recognition of

differences rather than their destruction, common sense, and wise forbearance can slowly 'blaze the trail' to happier relations. Unsatisfactory as these at times have been, they have seldom passed beyond the degree of serious misunderstanding and rivalry.

To the French Republic in the instant of its anguish, Mr. Winston Churchill on 16 June 1940 offered a Solemn Act of Union with the British people. If this Union is offered again when Britain and Canada and their allies have re-won for France her freedom, the century and a half of peace and co-operation, though not always of harmony, between the British and French peoples in the Canadian federation stands as a hopeful and not unworthy model for Europe.

Geography: *A Mari usque ad Mare*¹

In the vast Canadian estate, as great as the whole of Europe, stretching from a latitude almost as southern as Rome and Madrid to the North Pole and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, there are few geographic influences to aid the hands of men in the ready shaping of a single nation. The Appalachian and Acadian region occupied by the three Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island; the vital system of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterways uniting the heart of the continent—Ontario, Quebec, and the American middle-west—with the Atlantic; the steppe-like prairies of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, and the great bulk of the Rocky Mountains rising sheer from prairies on the east and the salt sea on the west are all northern projections of similar regions in the United States.

Three geographic factors—the Canadian rivers, the Canadian Shield, and the climate—differentiate the Canadian

¹ The term 'Dominion' was taken from the verse in Zechariah, chap. ix, reading: 'And his dominion shall be from sea even to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth.' This is represented on the Canadian coat-of-arms by the words 'a mari usque ad mare'.

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territory from the American. The St. Lawrence river penetrates the Appalachian and Laurentian barriers inland to the Great Lakes and from the lakes, rivers point the way north and westward. This river system laid the foundations of a commercial and later a political union between the east and west. The railways and the airways of Canada to-day roughly follow the routes of that instrument of the fur-trade, the canoe.

Canada, from the beginnings of settlement in Nova Scotia (1605) and Quebec (1608), was first a projection of France and later of Britain across the ocean to the valley of the St. Lawrence. At Montreal (1642), a nodal point in the natural communications of the continent, the St. Lawrence led to the great lakes and thence by short 'portages' over the watersheds to the second continental river system of the Mississippi valley; the Ottawa river led north towards the 'portages' into the prairies and into Hudson Bay; the Lake Champlain-Hudson river system and its tributary the Mohawk led to the site of New York. A political factor, the presence of fur-trading rivals allied with the Iroquois Indians, closed this southern route and Canadian development was given its east-west direction. This initial momentum has never been lost, but always it has been in conflict with the 'pulls' of the north-south direction of the coasts, of the mountain barriers striking across it, and of the warmer, easier climate of what became the United States.

The colder winter of Canada, sealing the waterways and ports of the inland systems, the St. Lawrence, and the Great Lakes, marks off much of Canada from most of the United States and for five months deprives Canada of the competitive advantage Montreal might have, closer to the economic centre of the continent, over New York the gateway to the continent open to the sea in every month of the year.

The Canadian or Laurentian shield of basic Pre-Cambrian rock marches in a swooping crescent around Hudson Bay from the shores of the Lower St. Lawrence across Quebec,

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through central Canada and the north-western provinces to the Arctic Circle north of Alberta, and at only two points penetrates American territory.


More than half the Canadian estate is formed by the bold red, purple granites of these age-eroded, glacier-ground mountains and their wild, tumbling rivers, their still dark lakes, and shaggy forests of spruce and balsam, birch and jackpine. Here, agricultural land exists only in tiny pockets, but it was the domain of the fur trade from the seventeenth century, of the timber trade in the nineteenth century, and to-day it enriches and helps to sustain Canada with its gold, nickel, copper, lead, zinc, its wood pulp and newsprint, its winter and summer attractions to millions of American tourists, and its abundant, steady water-powers.

The Shield contributes by its north-western sweep to the east-west axis of the river systems, but by its unsuitability for settlement, it confines Canadian population to the St. Lawrence Lowlands of Ontario and Quebec, to the great plains of the west and to the valleys of the Rocky Mountains and the Appalachians. Canada's *Lebensraum* is not equal to Canada's area: not more than, perhaps not as much as, 20 per cent. of the Canadian soil is arable. Three-fifths of Canada is Laurentian rock, another fifth mountain, with ranges from five to ten thousand feet and peaks higher than Mont Blanc. These are geographic barriers, driving through the east-west axis of the waterways; they have been barriers to Canadian settlement and to the unity of Canadian minds.

Canadian history might be seen, indeed, not only as a conflict between man and geography but as a conflict between rival geographic influences. The coastal provinces of the Atlantic and the Pacific have natural sea routes to near-by American markets and sources of supply. The prairies of Canada are divided by no natural frontier from the prairies of the United States. The St. Lawrence route has its richer, warmer rivals in the Hudson river system and in the Mississippi. The striving first of the French and later of the British

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based on Montreal to link the centre of the continent based upon the Mississippi with the St. Lawrence route to the coast and Europe is the substance of much of the struggles of the continent. The French held not only what is now eastern



The Position of Montreal and New York. The rivers St. Lawrence and Hudson with their tributaries penetrate the highland barriers of the Canadian Shield and the Appalachians. They form the principal gateways for trade and settlement leading from the Atlantic into the heart of the continent.

Canada but, for a brief span, the whole of the empire of the Ohio and Mississippi; the horse and the turnpike roads over the shorter lines of communication with New York defeated the canoe and the long river communications with Montreal, and that early Canadian empire became the American empire. The canalization of the upper St. Lawrence in the early nineteenth century sought to cheapen transportation between the American states south of the Great Lakes, and to make Montreal the trading entrepôt of most of the continent. But the American canals and railways between Lake Erie

and New York early won the day. The present proposal to deepen the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterways to a depth of 27 feet from Lake Superior to the Atlantic for coastal and ocean shipping has its relation to this old struggle for the trade of the centre of the continent.

In the past, when wars between rival empires shaped, on the battlefields of Europe or in the valleys of America, the political structure of the continent, and to-day in the era of economic competition, the St. Lawrence penetrating from the Atlantic 2,000 miles into the heart of the continent, and linking that heart with Europe and the western world, is for the United States one *via* among several; for Canada the St. Lawrence is *vita*.

Economy: The Export of Staple Products

The rich harvest of cod and other fish first attracted Europeans across the North Atlantic to Canadian shores. Beaver fur drew them inland up the St. Lawrence, the Ottawa, and their tributaries into the Canadian Shield and over the 'portages' across the heights of land to Hudson Bay, the great plains and, by 1793, through the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific. The square timber trade followed the receding supply of fur, and as the 'stands' of white pine were exhausted, wheat was sown in the clearings. The expansion of wheat-growing to the prairies after 1870 gave farming and settlement supremacy over the fur trade in the north-west and confirmed the foundations of the economic unity fur had laid between the St. Lawrence valley, the West, and the Rocky Mountains.

At each stage of these four hundred years of economic history, Canada's livelihood depended upon the export of one or a few main staples to European markets. Cod, beaver, pine, wheat—these were the successive economic foundations of Canada.

At each stage, the export staples called into being, or imported and adapted, equipment, transportation, trading


relationships, political programmes, and constitutional forms appropriate to them: the canoe, the snow-shoe, the chartered company, the mercantilism, the feudal governance of a fur-trading colony of the old French régime; the canals, the ports, the wooden sailing-ships, and representative government of nineteenth-century merchants; nationhood, the Industrial Revolution, trans-continental railways, canals and ports, steamships, the manufacturing industries of central Canada, the lumbering and coal mining of both east and west, the banks and trust companies 'geared to the production of wheat'. In the twentieth century 'the whole economy prospered or suffered with the changing fortunes of the prairie farmer'.

Each of these stages has had its own peculiar problems and results, but throughout Canadian history persistent characteristics may be observed. Canada has been rich in resources, and now grows, mines, or manufactures a widening variety of products. But at no stage has Canada been self-sufficient and she has always been dependent upon selling through a competitive world system a few staples to a few markets. Originally, France alone was the market; to-day, Canada is dependent upon the United States and Britain. In 1938, 77·8 per cent. of Canada's export trade and 79·1 per cent. of her import trade were with United States and Britain.

This dependence is increased by the circumstance that Canadian mining, agriculture, and industry have adopted American techniques and largely employed American machinery, and that Canadian consumers have much the same tastes as American consumers. Canada is even more linked to and dependent upon the United States for imports than a simple percentage may indicate. Similarly, Canada is more seriously dependent upon Britain for the sale of her products than a figure may indicate. Canadian trade has been mainly triangular; exports to Europe have supplied a large proportion of the exchange to pay for American imports. The loss, then, of the British market would be to Canada a catastrophe

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and would compel harsh and fundamental readjustments in the basis of Canadian production.



Distribution of Canadian imports and exports in millions of dollars, and in percentages of total. Imports from the British Empire were valued at \$233.2 millions (29.2 per cent.) and from the British Empire and the United States combined \$720.5 millions (90.8 per cent.). Total imports were valued at \$799.1 millions. The figures for exports were: British Empire, \$517.4 (48.3 per cent.); British Empire and United States combined, \$940.5 (87.8 per cent.); and total exports, \$1,070.2. The figures are for the fiscal year ending 31 March, 1938.

Modern Canada imports iron ore, petroleum, coal, tin, rubber, cotton, and the whole range of tropical and sub-tropical products. These must be bought and paid for by a small if increasing number of exports. This dependence upon the export of a few staples at prices set by the world competitive system makes Canada highly vulnerable to world changes of demand and price; Canadian income is rendered irregular and unstable.

Being a new country, Canada has required, and been until recently unable herself to supply, the capital to finance the transportation and other equipment for her development. Dependent upon an external market for the sale of her products, she has also been dependent upon external sources for finance. Her income from selling natural products has been fluctuating and uneven; her debt charges have been large, high, and relatively rigid. The cost of her manufactured imports is similarly large and tends to be rigid.

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In consequence of this twofold dependence, the cycles of world depression strike the Canadian economy with great severity. Canadian income, as the price or demand for primary products declines, falls steeply and rapidly; the cost of imports and debts remains relatively the same or is adjusted more slowly.


This relationship between Canada and external markets for exports or for capital has its counterpart in the dependence of new areas of production in Canada on Canadian capital markets in older centres like Montreal and Toronto. The farming areas of the west, the mining of the Canadian Shield, the timber regions of east and west, borrowing capital from Montreal or Toronto to build railways, roads, schools, or government buildings, similarly face the problems of fluctuating income and fixed costs.

The impact of depressions upon Canada also varies sharply between different regions, industries, and classes; and influences the degree of national unity. In the great depression following the decline of world prices in 1928, Canada's national income was cut by one-half from an estimated \$6,121 millions in 1928 to \$2,969 millions in 1933. Export areas were struck first, and farm income fell more steeply than the price of manufactured goods or interest rates. Industrial unemployment followed the collapse of income earned from natural products, and the number of wage-earners fell from a peak of 2,444,000 in 1929 to 1,788,000 in 1933. At one stage of the depression some 11 per cent. of the population was maintained by direct relief from the State. Political conflict between debt areas and credit areas, between farmers and manufacturers, between employers and workers, between provinces and the dominion, even, in a measure, between race and race, spread through Canada. The unity of the old national political parties was strained, an avowedly separatist and racial political party gained office in French-Canada, the Social Credit movement of Mr. Aberhart, champion of the farm debtor, swept into power in Alberta, the

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first socialist movement on a national scale took shape; in all, five new political parties sprang into influence.

The depression was complicated by a further characteristic feature of Canadian economic history. It coincided with a fundamental change from one main staple, wheat, to dependence on another group of staples, base metals, newsprint,



The distribution of Canadian net production for 1937 in percentages between provinces and industries. The gross production was valued at \$5,658 millions and the net production at \$2,970 millions. Net production means the value left in the producer's hands after the deduction of the value of materials, fuels, and supplies used in the process of production. (Chart from 'Canada, 1940', Ottawa.)

and the tourist trade as well as wheat. With this relative decline in the importance of wheat in Canadian exports, and the relative increase in the importance of newer staples, the east-west 'wheat' axis across Canada to Europe weakened and the north-south axis with the United States strengthened. This trend was stiffened as London ceased after the last war to be, and New York became, the source of Canadian imports of capital. One-quarter of Canada's manufactured products are made in American-owned factories.

Canada has invariably surmounted the worst difficulties of the world depressions and internal economic change; at no stage in the depression of 1929-33 was the credit of the Dominion Government shaken, and in 1932 when American banks were closing their doors in every part of the union, not

a single Canadian bank failed. The economic power and status of Canada has grown, and Canada is one of the first six or eight industrial nations. Her standard of living is second only to that of the United States. Before the present war, Canada was fourth or fifth and is now the third exporting nation in the world and the world's largest exporter of wheat, newsprint, and non-ferrous metals. Her national income, in the meaning of the term used in Mr. Geoffrey Crowther's book *Ways and Means of War*, is equal to twice that of Czechoslovakia, three times that of Belgium, two and a half times that of the Netherlands, four times that of Norway and Denmark combined, half that of France; it is equal to that of Italy, a quarter of Britain's, and a quarter of Germany's and Austria's together. In productive power, Canada is Britain's first ally.

Governance: The Art of the Possible

Canadian institutions, like the Canadian people, have been transplanted from Europe and adjusted to Canadian conditions. External influences still exert their weighty pressures, but native forces have shaped the institutions to a Canadian pattern, and in some respects those institutions, and the political thinking behind them in their turn, have influenced those of other countries. From a status of 'perfect subordination' Canadian powers of government have come to embrace in fact all those of a sovereign State; some limitations exist, but not one that the Canadian people, if they would agree, could not instantly remove. Autonomy has been achieved without narrow nationalism, revolution, or rupture. This process since the fall of Quebec has been decisive in shaping the modern concept of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to a degree the principles which underlay the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The principles of autonomy and free co-operation might in fact express the underlying content of Canadian political thinking. It has its expression in the constitution of the

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Commonwealth, in the relations between the races and the provinces. The suggestion might even be extended to other spheres of Canadian life—the constitution of protestant churches, of political parties, of the wheat and cattle marketing co-operatives; to canoeing, ice hockey, and air fighting, each of which rests upon a high measure of individual or local initiative and ‘team play’ rather than upon supreme central direction. A contrary aspect, however, is seen in the strongly centralized control of the great Canadian industries.

Canadians, if their strong individualism is first emphasized, might perhaps be described as federal-minded. The architects of the confederation of the British North American provinces, with the example of a civil war on the issue of ‘states rights’ across the American border, leaned towards a stronger and unitary constitution, but the character and opinion of the original four provinces imposed federalism. The provinces were united as the Dominion of Canada by an Act of the British Parliament and upon that Act and the unwritten conventions of the British constitution Canadian governance has developed.

The Dominion or federal government legislates upon the subjects assigned to it by the British North America Act of 1867, and the Provinces legislate upon subjects assigned to them. The distribution of powers between the Dominion and the Provinces is subject to judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court of Canada or the Privy Council at Westminster, and with the vast changes that have occurred in Canadian problems since 1 July 1867, judicial interpretation has been frequently invoked. Provincial governments and publics are keenly jealous of their powers; conflict is persistent. Residual powers were granted by the constitution to the Dominion, and it was the intention of the Fathers of Confederation that the Dominion should develop greater unity on matters of national significance. This intention has been defeated by native sectionalism and by English judicial

decision. The Dominion Government was found incompetent to legislate on such national subjects as wheat marketing, insurance, price control, minimum wages, arbitration in industrial disputes, maximum hours of labour, and unemployment insurance. The fissures which developed in the unity of Canada in the depression years were in a measure due to the inability of the national government to meet national problems on a national scale.

To the divisive influences of geography, race, and religion was 'added the disintegrating force of provincial sovereignty'. The Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations appointed in 1937 to investigate the distribution of powers and revenues between the ten Canadian governments has made its report, and the Dominion and seven of the Provincial governments have expressed general support for its recommendations. The conference of the ten governments opened in Ottawa on 15 January 1941, however, made little progress towards an agreed acceptance of these recommendations, and the opposition of two or three governments, in particular that of the largest and wealthiest Province, Ontario, may result in indefinite delay. The Royal Commission recommended no rewriting and rebuilding of the constitution, but a revision of the powers exercised by the Provincial as well as the Dominion governments in the light of seventy years' experience. Some modernizing of the taxing and legislative powers of the Dominion and Provincial governments is urgently required to enable each more efficiently to perform its functions. In particular, the national government in the field of economic policy and social services requires the powers to do national things nationally and to reverse the trend of weakening federal authority.

Federal-Provincial relations form much of the substance of Canadian party and sectional politics. French-Canadian racial claims are defended and advanced by the Quebec Legislature. The legislatures of the three prairie provinces

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have championed the free-trade views of the western farmers against the protectionist views of industrial Ontario cities, the views of Maritime shipping, exporting and fishing interests are fought for by the Atlantic legislatures. Thus, the Provinces are not only the means of safeguarding local interests through local legislatures—a necessary condition of national unity—but are as well the instrument of different races, regions, and economic groups. Confederation extended the east-west axis of Canada from coast to coast; the rise of the Provinces has tended to cut across that axis.

Canadian political parties are conditioned by these sectional and provincial differences. The national party organizations are federations of provincial party associations. Their role in Canadian governance is essentially different from that of British political parties, and the names Liberal and Conservative represent only some of the content of similar parties in Britain. Canadian political parties are not primarily the means by which a majority is won to implement a defined national policy. They represent trends in national policy rather than clean-cut issues. A Conservative in the low tariff west may hold tariff views different from those of a Conservative in protectionist Ontario cities, a French-Canadian Liberal in Quebec have quite a different view on foreign and imperial relations from an English-speaking Liberal in Nova Scotia or British Columbia, and the railway worker in the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation thinking in terms of wage levels see the question of freight rates very differently from the C.C.F. wheat farmer of Saskatchewan thinking in terms of costs.

The national political parties in Canada have been not only instruments of local and provincial opinion but also a means of effecting compromise, some measure of accommodation and agreement between provincial opinions. The national parties are a powerful instrument of national unity.

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They are the plane upon which the sections have been related to one another and to the whole. In the party caucus, where the members of parliament from every part of the Dominion meet during the sessions, the issues are faced, thrashed out, interpreted, toned down, bought off, appeased, or overridden. The national party caucus meeting in the crowded, smoke-ridden conference rooms of the Parliament Buildings above the old fur-trade route of the Ottawa river is in its long-term influence a reinforcement and expression of the east-west axis of Canada.

The problem of Canadian governance is supremely the problem of national unity. National unity—the easing of stresses and strains, the softening of rivalries, the diversion of grievances that may nourish ideas of secession, the buying off or conciliation of battling economic groups—this is the task of any truly Canadian Prime Minister or party. Progress may be made only by consent, and the consent not of a mere numerical majority but of each important section. A policy must be found acceptable to the dominant current feelings and deeper interests in each province or section, each race or economic group. There are thus two kinds of Canadian politician: those who represent provincial and sectional interests, and those who are 'nation-minded' and seek to harmonize and ease the differences. Entry into Canadian politics is easiest through the representation of a section, race, or industry. The task of the national leaders, and particularly of Prime Ministers, is at once heavy and delicate. Policy must be formulated, it might almost be said, more as a British Prime Minister formulates foreign than domestic policy. It is a truism in Cabinet, Senate, House of Commons, and Civil Service that 'Canada is a difficult country to govern'.

Politics in Canada is eminently the art and science of the possible. Compromise and precise timing are the first essentials. Each Cabinet seeking to advance some new legislation is not unlike a man seeking to cross a Canadian river when

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the grip of winter has been broken, when the suns of spring have melted the dark frozen waters, and the crunching ice rushes down the flooding stream. Not the largest chunk, or that which first comes near will bear him steadily across: he must await, perhaps at each leap, the right relation, the exact conjunction and approach of several chunks, adequately large, adequately strong to carry him as they sweep down fast-driven by the deep, unseen currents from sources far away.

Unity and Foreign Policy

In Canada, foreign policy, like national policy, must secure the consent of all sections in some measure if national unity is to be sustained. Unanimity is too strong a term, but no policy on a great issue can be pursued if it is inimical to the interests or outrages the feelings of any substantial group in the Dominion.

In 1937 the prospect of a united Canada in the approaching war seemed difficult if not remote. On the surface at least, unity seemed to be severely strained. The slow, uneven recovery from the depression left controversial problems of social services and provincial finances. The national income returned to a figure between that of 1929 and 1933, but the contrast between continuing distress in one region or industry and improving prosperity in others remained. Quebec, governed by a party which played with the vision of a solely French-Canadian dominion, and Ontario, richer because of gold resources and President Roosevelt's new price, but intransigent in its relations with Ottawa, both quarrelled with the national government. The change from an economy based predominantly on wheat to an economy based on wheat, newsprint, base metals, and tourists caused readjustments between region and region. Mr. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal party, on 19 July 1937 said, in a broadcast, 'Not to have a realization of the many strains and cleavages which are imperilling

Canadian unity is to shut one's eyes to the problem of government in Canada to-day.'

Foreign issues in the past have also been factors of disunity and revealed innate differences of outlook between the races. English-Canadian opinion has been much more 'interventionist' than French-Canadian, but when the Catholic Church is involved French-Canadians respond to the interests of Rome rather as English-Canadians do to those of London. The Papal 'zouaves' who left Montreal to share with Napoleon III's troops in the defence of Rome in 1870 represented an attitude of intervention similar (if in degree quite different) to the English-Canadian attitude of intervention in the South African War. English-Canadian newspapers have shown little interest in the recurring struggles of clericals and anti-clericals in the Latin American States, but French-Canadian papers have been markedly aware of them.

The general Canadian sympathy for the League of Nations varied in degree between the two peoples, and central European minority questions brought before the League had their repercussions among 'New Canadians'. The Spanish civil war had its strong pro-Franco partisans among French-Canadians and Catholics, while English-Canadians, though more divided, were inclined to sympathize with the Republicans. The bitter feud which arose between French and English in Canada at the end of the last war still exerted its influence in Canadian politics.

Canada in 1937, moreover, seemed a very different country from Canada in 1914. Canada in its cohesion is molecular—an arrangement of systems, not atomic—a single system; twenty years had re-formed and changed its arrangement. The proportion of British race in the population had declined. The importance of 'New Canadians' from continental Europe had increased. The new export staples sold in the United States strengthened the American over the Atlantic axis. The improved trade following the Ottawa

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Conference had not seriously changed Canada's predominant interest in American over British imports. The insistent assertion of independence, the stiffening sense of national as against 'imperial' views, the mounting importance of commercial, population, literary, publishing, and broadcasting influences from the United States, all suggested that Canada might remain neutral or enter the war deeply divided. Critics of British foreign policy in the Orient and Europe were influential, and various schools of 'North Americanism', 'Hemisphere unity', and 'Isolation' came into prominence. There seemed much sympathy for the view that 'European troubles are not worth the bones of a Toronto Grenadier'.

Parliament debated foreign issues as rarely as possible. The Government pursued a policy of refusing commitments and avoiding controversy. The discussion of foreign affairs, however, was active and widespread in the Press, through the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, in numerous luncheon clubs, study groups, and lecture societies. The co-operative news service of 89 Canadian daily newspapers, the Canadian Press, cabled thousands of words a day from Europe to its members. If Parliament preferred silence, the public preferred information: whatever may be said of the causes which led Canada into the war, ignorance was not among them.

American broadcasting with its correspondents in the heat of every European turmoil, the great American press services used by the largest Canadian papers, and the large circulation of American magazines added to Canadian sources of information. Indeed, it is almost true to say that the information upon which the Canadian people based their conclusions in 1939 was as much from American as from Canadian and more than from British sources.

Yet the Canadian people in September 1939 drew different conclusions from those of the United States or South America. The United States legislated neutrality; Canada declared war.

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The principles underlying Canadian foreign policy are well established and have remained consistent. That policy is concerned primarily with two great Powers, the United Kingdom and the United States. Relations with the Orient arise from Canada's Pacific position and trade, and are increasing. Relations with South America are few. They are concerned with trade or investment, and Ministers to Argentina and Brazil are about to be appointed. But external affairs largely revolve about relations with and relations between London and Washington. In Europe such a position in geography, in character, trade, and language between two great Powers would not be secure. But it is Canada's happy fortune to share a continent and an ocean with the two gentlest great Powers and the two most generous public opinions in the world. Friendly relations with and between these two Powers is and has been the keystone of Canadian external relations.

Canada, in relation to both these Powers, has striven for the recognition of her political independence and the advancement of her trade and industry. This has involved differences of opinion with both and trade competition with both. However gentle and generous, both Powers have national interests and relations between them superior to Canadian national interests and relations with Canada. The British Government's view of Canada's constitutional position in the Empire differed from the Canadian view in the early Imperial Conferences. Canada had to defend her separate status, and vote in the Covenant of the League of Nations against the American view that Canada's voice was to be heard through English lips. The American tariff against Canadian cattle and other products in the 'twenties and Britain's departure from the gold standard both violently and suddenly struck at Canadian interests.

The fear of absorption into the American people has been a powerful factor at many points in Canadian history. This fear supplied the degree of external pressure apparently

required in the creation of federations. The extension of confederation and the Canadian Pacific Railway across the prairies was a conscious policy of defence against American expansion. In the early years of Canadian history there were several American invasions, and in those conflicts it was British strength and British prestige which protected Canada.

Those years have passed, Canadian self-confidence has grown, the fear of 'annexation' has disappeared with the American groups that advocated it, and no two peoples have such intimate and friendly relations. But power is a fact and Canadian policy in diplomacy, commerce, or strategy must recognize the role of both States in Canadian security. Canada, as indeed the Monroe doctrine of the United States, has been defended from the predatory nations of Europe by Britain's sea power and supremely important strategic island position in the centre of the populated, industrialized land masses of the globe. The Canadian-American defence agreement which had its origins before the war is a recognition of that common danger to North America if British sea power should be weakened. In the Pacific, Canadian security is similarly involved, though less immediately threatened. Canada, like Australasia, is also interested in the Panama Canal and strategic Pacific islands.

When Germany hurled her forces upon Poland in August 1939, Canadian opinion had crystallized in favour of intervention. Indeed, Canadian opinion was reasonably clear in the Commons debates in March 1939 after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. A state of war with Germany was declared by the King on 10 September on the advice of his Canadian Ministers, supported by an almost unanimous Parliament, and soon after by decisive national and provincial elections. National unity was not weakened but again demonstrated as it had been demonstrated during the visit in the previous summer of the King and Queen. Their visit, indeed, was, in Canadian eyes, perhaps more a demonstra-

tion of Canadian than of imperial unity, and the Crown, valued for its constitutional functions in commonwealth and nation alike, assumed also the role of a unifying influence between French and English, Catholic and Protestant, new Canadians and old, east and west.

If the war had come earlier, in 1937 or 1938, the conjunction of forces supporting a united Canadian policy of intervention might well have been less favourable and the unity less complete. By 1939, the issue and the threat to fundamental Canadian national interests were clear. Canada's relations with the North Atlantic power of Britain were at stake, and Canadian intervention would not disrupt the relations with the North American power of the United States. In perhaps two respects, Canada was further influenced by her North American relationships; the Canadian people held stronger but little different views of Germany than the American. But a policy of only 'giving all aid short of war' or limited participation would have had the twofold consequence of emphasizing American against British associations and dividing every province in the Dominion. Any policy but a policy of intervention would have shattered Canadian unity. 'For the sake of unity', said Mr. Lapointe, the French-Canadian leader and Minister of Justice on 9 September, 'we cannot be neutral in Canada.' It was the theme of Mr. Thorson, a Canadian of Icelandic race representing a largely Ukrainian constituency, and it recurred throughout the parliamentary debates from the representatives of every section of the Dominion. Several French-Canadian speakers argued that Canadian interests were not involved and the C.C.F. group of seven members took a stand, which they have not vigorously pressed, that Canada should send no military forces and extend only economic aid. But so few were the opponents of a declaration of war that no vote was called. Hitler had united Canada.

Each race, each group, each section, each religious faith felt the threat of a resurgent Germany. The British-Can-

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dians were influenced by deep sentiments of attachment to Great Britain and to the institutions of Britain. French-Canadians shared none of the racial affinities but felt some of the same attachment to British institutions. The German persecution of the Catholic Church, as well as the invasion of Catholic Poland and the Russian-German agreement uniting the two anti-Catholic forces of Communism and Fascism, strengthened the conviction that other French-Canadian interests were involved. The German menace had its own impact upon Canadians with Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish, or Scandinavian origins. The British and the European associations proved decisive.

Powerful sentiments were operating, but there was a cold and discerning appreciation of the issues and of the consequences of a German domination of Europe. Canadian opinion in the years after the rise of Hitler went through some of the same stages as American opinion is now entering. Canadian opinion, however, has been uninfluenced historically by any tradition of 'no entangling alliances' or of revolutionary separation from Europe, and could more readily appreciate the dependence of America upon British sea power. For an American to state that the fate of the United States is bound up with the fate of Europe and to admit that British sea power is a factor in American security has meant, until recently, opposing a deep-seated American conviction and teaching. For a Canadian, such a statement is an expression of Canadian experience and history.

The imponderables, the 'Britishness', the sense of community with Britain shared by groups dominant in numbers or influence throughout Canada should not be minimized; nor the reasoned, clear-sighted appreciation of solely Canadian national interests. This appreciation of Canadian national interests is, in fact, a projection, not only of Canadian interests, but of the combined national or continental interests of North America. That Canada has felt part of the world and not merely part of the continent or hemisphere may

prove significant beyond estimate now in the development of an international order in which the American continent and hemisphere must ultimately share.

The Canadian people as a whole felt definitely menaced not so much (until the fall of France) by direct aggression as by the threat to the shape of the world in which a Canadian nation could grow: the North Atlantic world embracing both western Europe and America. It is this world which has produced the democratic system of government, the ideals of freedom of thought and peoples, and of social welfare. This world has most richly enlarged the gross and scope of scientific endeavour since the Renaissance. This is the world of the Industrial Revolution and the greatest measure of material progress and international trade. It is now the principal bulwark of Catholicism and Protestantism, of Christendom. The German doctrines of racial supremacy, the war-state, and totalitarian thought struck at each of these. Combined, these formed the world Canadians wished to live in and believe in. The leaders of both the great American political parties and the bulk of the American people have come to the same conclusion.

A war on a less globe-shaking scale or involving less serious national and moral issues would have won no such measure of unity among the Canadian people even if Britain were engaged. The combination of profound national interests and clear moral issues produced a unity that is 'British' not only because Britain is at war but because Britain and Canada share the same world, the same principles, the same dangers.

A Canadian Corps under Lieut.-Gen. A. G. L. McNughton, C.M.G., D.S.O., composed of two divisions with armoured brigades and R.C.A.F. squadrons, is helping to man the threatened shores of Britain. Two more divisions are in Canada, a fifth (armoured) division is forming, and the number in all services approach 400,000. Canada, after one year of war, supports as many divisions as in four years of the last. The Royal Canadian Navy has increased from 15 to 155 ships,

the largest of which are armed merchant cruisers and destroyers, and the personnel will number 20,000 in 1941. The Empire Air Scheme in Canada will train at 120 air stations and schools 25,000 to 50,000 Canadian and other British airmen annually. In the first year, Canada's expenditure for military purposes approached that of the four years of the last war.

The economic contribution is mounting. North American techniques of production and the great resources of hydro-electricity make man-power no sufficient measure of the size of that Canadian contribution. In the number of motor-car units for military purposes, Canada's production of 600 a day exceeds the production of any other country. Three thousand tanks are on order. Early in 1941 every service type of rifle, machine gun, and artillery will be produced in Canada. Aircraft production is of the order of 400 a month—Hurricanes, Bolingbrokes, Lysanders, flying-boats, and training machines—and in the past year the total Canadian aircraft production, though smaller than American, exceeded the export of American aircraft to Britain. Eventually, American war production will quite surpass Canada's, but at the end of the critical year 1940, Canada's war production for Britain exceeded that of the United States. Canada entered the war with even less preparation and no more enthusiasm than Britain, but now her effort is unstinted. The nation that was once the colony of Britain has become her first and principal ally.


History, national self-interest, European associations, and dominating issues as well as skilful, discerning statesmanship brought Canada into this alliance a united nation. Will war and statesmanship confirm that unity or let the problems of peace renew the forces of division? The great forces in Canadian life are to-day working towards new strength and harmony. Will these be lost? External influences of the North Atlantic and of North America 'roll on mixed up together' and mixing together add to the unity of Canada.

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
Will the international or the continental, the European or the American influences shape the policy and determine the measure of Canadian co-operation in the post-war world? The answers rest with the pattern formed by the forces which shaped Canada in the past and united Canada in this war. 'Knowledge insufficient for prediction may be useful as guidance.'

NOTE

FOR further study of Canada reference may be made to: *Canada Looks Abroad* (R. A. Mackay and E. B. Rogers, Oxford, 1938), *Canada, an American Nation* (J. W. Dafoe, New York, 1935), *Canada To-day* (F. R. Scott, Oxford, 2nd ed. 1939), *Canada, America's Problem* (J. MacCormac, London, 1941), *Canada* (A. Brady, London, 1932), and *Le Canada, Puissance Internationale* (André Siegfried, Paris, 1937). For statistics, *The Canada Year Book* (annually, King's Printer, Ottawa). For economics, reference may be made to the volumes of Professor H. A. Innis and in particular to *Problems of Staple Production in Canada* (Toronto, 1933) and *The Fur Trade in Canada* (New Haven, 1930). For government, *Empire and Commonwealth* (Chester Martin, Oxford, 1929) and *The Constitution of Canada* (W. P. M. Kennedy, Oxford, 2nd ed. 1938). For foreign relations, *Canada, Hitler and Europe* (Watson Kirkconnell, London, 1940).



MAP 4. CANADA, POLITICAL DIVISIONS, PHYSIOGRAPHY, AND RAIL COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES



OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

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ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

BY

BARBARA WARD

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K. MAHADEVAN BOOKSELLER, MYLAPORE.

ITALY's performance in the first eighteen months of the war has raised a number of questions: Why did the Italians wait nine months before declaring war? Why did they enter the war against their old allies on the side of an hereditary enemy? Why, above all, now that they are in the war, has their record been one disastrous series of defeats?

It would be impossible in the length of one pamphlet to give an exhaustive study of the Italian position but an attempt is made here to answer these more obvious questions by putting them in their historical perspective. Italy's policy has, on the whole, been remarkably consistent and the failures of her arms and diplomacy to-day were already predictable when she started her career as a great Power some seventy years ago.

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ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Italy achieves Unity

IT was Italy's misfortune to achieve national unity, and with it the possibility of Great Powerhood, in the fiercely competitive, heavily industrialized, imperialistic Europe of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Greatness was measured in railway mileage, in steel mills and coal-mines, in foreign markets, and above all in colonial territory and big battalions. A State which desired to enter the comity of Great Powers had to compete on their terms and Italy, great in her history, growing in her population, and occupying a potentially commanding position in the Mediterranean, was determined to enter the arena in the struggle for national status and aggrandizement. From the first hour of unity in 1870 until to-day dreams of empire have haunted Italian politicians, and expansion in the Mediterranean has been a *Leitmotif* of Italian foreign policy.

Unhappily for Italy's ambitions the country is not naturally equipped for Great Powerhood in the modern sense of the word. She has very little coal, no iron, no oil. Her soil is poor and cannot even support all the Italian people, thousands of whom used until the last war to emigrate year by year to America. Industrialization had barely begun in 1870 and Italy's lack of all the more important raw materials meant that the country was bound to remain predominantly agricultural, and therefore weak from the military point of view.

Besides, the human material was not really suited to Great Powerhood. For other kinds of greatness, yes; but for imperial greatness in the jostling, brutal, militaristic, competitive world of the late nineteenth

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century the Italians were too peaceable, good-natured, and indifferent. Anyone who has lived in Italy will long since have discounted the myth of Italian laziness. Few peoples are so hard-working when they can see the point. But war and aggrandizement seemed rather pointless. There is little reason to suppose that the majority have changed their minds.

The Principles of Foreign Policy

These two aspects of the Italian position—on the one hand, the ambition and expansionism of the few, on the other, the material poverty and emotional indifference of the many—are at the basis of Italian foreign policy. As a late comer in the imperial field, Italy has been a consistently revisionist Power since 1870. The end has not varied. But the means are conditioned by weakness. If possible, Italy would rather obtain her goal without fighting. The Italians are unenthusiastic soldiers, the country has not the reserves for a long war and it is one of the easiest states in Europe to blockade. If fighting there must be, then Italy must have allies; and if allies, preferably those who look in advance as though they can finish the work victoriously, quickly, and without making too great a call on Italian resources. But revision by negotiation or after only a show of force remains the ideal course.

The coming of Fascism has made little difference to the fundamentals of Italian foreign policy. The Duce declared in 1924 that 'foreign policy is never original. It is determined by a certain order of facts, geographical, historical, and economic.' Fascism has perhaps given more vigour and bombast to the ambitions of the few, but the ambitions themselves

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are not really different from those of the Giolitti era. Italian newspapers in the eighties of last century were writing very much in the tone of the newspapers in the thirties of this. To give only one example—from 1885: 'Italy must be ready. The year will decide her fate as a Great Power. It is necessary to feel the responsibility of the new era; to become again strong men afraid of nothing with the sacred love of the fatherland in our hearts.'

Italy enters the Arena

In 1870, when Italy achieved national unity, the Mediterranean, her obvious sphere of influence, was already dominated by the Turkish question, which, until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, was to condition Italian policy. In 1870 the Ottoman Empire had already advanced far towards complete disintegration and the Great Powers were collecting hopefully round its death-bed. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had just given an added and much greater strategic and economic importance to the Levant. Turkey's suzerainty over the lands bordering the Mediterranean was obviously shaken. France already possessed Algeria. There were French and Italian settlers in Tunis. Austria and Russia watched each other jealously across the Balkans. Germany's interest in Austria's Balkan expansion was already apparent. Russia sought to edge down towards the Dardanelles. France had her traditional interest in the Levant. Britain in 1875 bought up shares in the Suez Canal and the importance of the new route to India was beginning to make an indelible mark on her imperial consciousness.

Thus there was no lack of competitors when Italy entered the arena and, since she had neither eco-

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nomic wealth nor military standing, it was hardly surprising that she was shouldered out and came away from the Congress at Berlin in 1878 with clean but empty hands. In 1881 her inferior status was again brought vividly home to her when, with Bismarck's connivance, France seized Tunis which Italy had marked out as her own.

The Triple Alliance of 1882

In 1882 Italy joined Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance. This action was the first example of Italy's alliance policy—an essential part of her diplomacy. By it she recognized, first, that she was not strong enough to obtain any advantages when standing alone. Next, she consciously joined herself to a *bloc* of Powers with whom she was not particularly friendly in order to bring pressure to bear on another Power who, in her view, blocked her path to territorial expansion. In this case the Power was France. It was a procedure which was to be repeated in the following century.

The Alliance achieved its main purposes. It gave Italy a place among the European Powers. Allied with Austria and Germany, she was no longer negligible and she was able to use Germany's diplomatic support in striking a bargain with France. By the turn of the century the relations between the two countries had improved and France had agreed to an Italian occupation of Tripoli, should France decide to move into Morocco. When in 1902 the Triple Alliance was renewed, Italy insisted on Austrian recognition of the project.

In spite of its diplomatic usefulness, the Alliance was fundamentally unstable. Austria and Italy could never be allies, for Austria occupied Italian

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territory—the *terre irredente* ('unredeemed lands') of north Italy—and national unity was thus still incomplete. Since she was too weak to obtain treaty revision by herself, Italy accepted the alliance as an opportunity of keeping a close watch on Austria, but once the diplomatic support of the Central Powers had secured Italy an understanding with France, the Alliance began to drift to dissolution.

War in Tripoli

The effectiveness of Italy's diplomatic balancing act was put to the test when in 1911 the French troops' entry into Morocco set Italy free to invade Tripoli. The campaign showed that her ten years of diplomatic preparation had been sufficient—but only just. The Great Powers looked on with suspicion and when, in the course of the war, she occupied the Dodecanese Islands, they forced her in the Treaty of Ouchy to promise to return them to Turkey. Only the accident of the Balkan wars left them in her possession when the Great War broke out.

In 1914 the balance-sheet of thirty-four years as a near-Great Power was only moderately satisfactory. Italy was still nominally in the Triple Alliance and Trieste and the Trentino were still unredeemed. She had achieved some meagre expansion in the Mediterranean—in Tripoli and the Dodecanese—but only on sufferance from the West. An attempt in the eighties and nineties to 'find the keys of the Mediterranean in the Red Sea' had given Italy the colony of Eritrea, but the episode had ended ingloriously in defeat at the hands of the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896. In the Balkans only Austro-Russian rivalry kept either Power from swallowing

up the whole peninsula and with it any freedom of action for Italy in the area facing her across the Adriatic.

The Great War and the Secret Treaties

Italy remained neutral until May 1915 and in the course of the first winter of the war conducted negotiations with both belligerents. Austria's unwillingness to part with Trieste and the Trentino, and Turkey's intervention on the side of the Central Powers, decided Italy's choice. Negotiations were opened with Britain, France, and Russia, and by the Secret Treaty of London Italy was to receive all that she had demanded of Austria (the *terre irredente* of Trieste and the Trentino) as well as Dalmatia. In addition, if France and Great Britain increased their colonial territories in Africa at Germany's expense, Italy was to have the right to 'equitable compensation', and 'in the case of a total or partial division of Asiatic Turkey, she should obtain an equitable part in the Mediterranean region adjoining the province of Adalia'. Italy accordingly entered the war on the side of the Allies.

One secret treaty, however, was insufficient to settle Italy's claims. In May 1916 Russia, France, and Britain signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement over new principles of division in Anatolia. Italy was not informed of the treaty, and when the news leaked out her anger had to be pacified by fresh negotiations, this time at St. Jean de Maurienne in April 1917, when a fresh treaty was concluded which defined Italy's 'equitable part' as including all south-west Anatolia, with the towns of Adalia, Konia, and Smyrna. Italy, in prospective possession of the second city in Turkey, whose southern approaches

she already commanded in the Dodecanese, bade fair to become the greatest Aegean Power.

The Peace Settlement

Her hopes were to be disappointed at the Peace Conference. The ratification of the St. Jean de Maurienne Treaty had been made conditional upon Russia's signature. But at the end of 1917 Bolshevism replaced Tsarism and the new Government would have none of the 'imperialist' treaty. In the meantime the Greeks had entered the war on the side of the Entente, and Venizelos put forward ethnic claims to the Smyrna district. A small bid-dable Power on the Aegean suited France and Britain far better than the presence of an aggrandized Italy, and, pleading Russia's failure to sign (which the Italians regarded and resented with some justification as a legal quibble), they supported the Greek claim to Smyrna and made it possible, as Mr. Lloyd George tells us, for 'Venizelos to get a Greek force into the town whilst the Italians were still hesitating'.

Italy's opposition to this betrayal of her ambitions might have been more sustained and effective had not the decay of public order at home deprived the Government of the security necessary for a 'forward' policy. But the Italian retreat was not wholly dictated by weakness. Kemal Ataturk had appeared upon the Anatolian scene and the Italians were shrewder than the English in assessing the likelihood of his success. In March 1921 they concluded a secret peace with the Kemalist Government, and when in August Ataturk's troops advanced on Constantinople, the Italian force was hurriedly withdrawn.

In the Treaty of Lausanne signed in July 1923 the Allies wrote *finis* to the chronicle of negotiations, treaties, ambitions, rivalries, violated pledges, and betrayals which had made up the history of the Eastern Mediterranean for the last fifty years. With the coming of Fascism, Italian foreign policy had returned to its old dynamism and the Government insisted on the final annexation of the Dodecanese by Italy. Nevertheless, Mussolini made no effort to retrieve the lost lands in Anatolia and became a signatory to the Straits Convention of 24 July 1923.¹

This moderation was the more surprising in that Italy had reason to feel misused and disgruntled. Her chief gains from the Peace were of course Trieste, the Trentino, and the annexation of South Tirol. But in the sphere of colonial aggrandizement she met nothing but disappointment. Article IX of the Treaty of London covered not only Asiatic Turkey but the entire Ottoman Empire, and the Allies had undertaken to consider Italy's interests should any modification of the territorial *status quo* take place. They emerged from the War, France invested with her Syrian mandate, Great Britain in control in Palestine, Trans-Jordania, and Iraq. The German colonies too were shared between Britain and France while Italy went empty-handed.

Italy's crumb was the final annexation of the Dodecanese, of which she had already been in possession before the War broke out. In other words, Italy's war gains in the colonial sphere amounted only to Jubaland, which Great Britain in 1925 ceded to the Italians in compensation for

¹ This Convention established that, under the control of an international Straits Commission, the commerce of all nations should use the Straits unrestrictedly in peace and war and laid down conditions governing the use of the Straits by warships.

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their colonial claims. At the same time, owing to her military preoccupations in Europe, Italy could not consolidate her hold on the imperfectly conquered provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In 1922 these lands had slipped from her control, and the next ten years were spent in reasserting her sovereignty by methods which, in Cyrenaica at least, left her with an unenviable reputation of brutality.

The Italian Balance-sheet

With the Treaty of Lausanne the shape of the new Europe was virtually complete. The Duce, looking round, did not find it altogether to his liking. It was, of course, a very different continent from the one in which Italy had struggled to unity and then to Great Powerhood. The Central Powers had gone. In their place was a beaten and humiliated Germany and an Austria reduced to a tragic rump-state of six millions, whose strategic value to Italy as a buffer State the Duce was quick to realize. From 1923 until 1937 Italy was consistently opposed to the *Anschluss* and in 1934 threatened Germany with war after the attempted Nazi *coup d'état*.

In the Balkans, the old rivalry between Austria and Russia was dead, but in its place there grew up a new rivalry between Italy and France. The Balkan States which had profited by the War—Jugoslavia and Roumania—turned to France as their natural protector and joined her and Poland and Czechoslovakia in an alliance system designed to safeguard the *status quo*. Italy resented French influence in the Balkans, which she chose to regard as lying within her economic and diplomatic sphere of interest, and Jugoslavia's possession of a long coastline on the Adriatic and various frontier disputes

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over Fiume increased the tension. Only in Albania, which in the next two decades moved from semi-independence to the status of an Italian protectorate under King Zog and finally in 1939 was annexed as a colony to the Italian crown, did Italy feel her dominance to be secure and complete.

In the Eastern Mediterranean the Ottoman Empire was gone. But Kemalist Turkey had taken its place and neither Greece nor Turkey overcame their suspicions of Italy nor their conviction that she wished to expand at their expense. In 1919 the Nitti Ministry had declared that Italy could not disinterest herself in 'the immense resources of raw materials in Asia Minor'. The Turks were angry over Italy's continued possession of the Dodecanese. The Greeks were outraged by the Corfu incident. Relations remained hostile and suspicious until 1928, and even then the efforts at reconciliation barely lasted until the invasion of Abyssinia and Sanctions. For the rest, the Mediterranean was bordered by British and French Mandated, Protected, or Allied States—with the exception of Italy's insecurely held Libyan coastline.

The Duce supports Revision

Thus when Mussolini examined his position in 1923, the fact which emerged most clearly was the extent to which his ambitions were baulked by France and Britain who, the one by policy and the other by indifference, upheld the *status quo*. Nothing had changed in Italy's revisionism. The War with its disappointing settlement had on the whole made her more insistent and ambitious. But whichever way her ambitions turned—to the Balkans, the Mediterranean, or East Africa—the way was blocked

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either by France's *status quo* policy of security and the League or by the actual physical barrier of French and British territory.

The Fascist régime did not, any more than the earlier Liberal Governments, abandon the policy of expansion on account of its inherent difficulties. They set themselves to overcome them. In the first place, the nation was dedicated to imperialism and war. The policy is well summarized in one of the Duce's bouts of oratory—in this case delivered as early as 1927.

'The paramount . . . duty of Fascist Italy is that of putting in a state of preparedness all her armed forces on land, sea, and in the air. We must be in a position . . . to mobilize five million men, and we must be in a position to arm them. Our Navy must be reinforced and our air force must be so numerous that . . . the span of its wings will hide the sun from our country.'

In accordance with this policy Italy greatly strengthened her position in the Mediterranean. By fortifying the island of Pantellaria and developing air and naval bases in Sicily and Tripoli on the one hand and constructing first-class bases at Leros in the Dodecanese and Tobruk in Libya on the other, she claimed to hold two offensive and defensive lines capable of cutting off all connexion between the Western basin of the Mediterranean and the Eastern basin, Suez and the Dardanelles. Her armaments were especially adapted to warfare in enclosed and sheltered waters. Weight was sacrificed to speed, light craft and submarines made up her tonnage rather than capital ships.

Her long duel over naval parity with France is interesting in this context. Although France accepted the principle of naval parity at Washington

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in 1923, she later retreated from her position, realizing that in fact, since Italy had no Atlantic seaboard, parity meant Italian supremacy in the Mediterranean. France therefore claimed that the parity only covered battleships and aircraft carriers. Italy insisted on complete parity, and, after the failures to reach agreement at London in 1930 and Rome in 1931, all attempts to formulate the relationship were abandoned. The relative position¹ appeared to give a marked advantage to Italy on the outbreak of war in 1939.

Italy, nevertheless, remained extremely vulnerable from the point of view of a blockade, and all her efforts since 1929 to achieve autarky have not diminished her dependence upon outside supplies. Before the war, some 85 per cent. of her imports arrived by sea, and, although she was self-sufficient in foodstuffs and a few minerals, and although she had developed her electricity supply and increased her continental coal purchases, the sinews of war still continued to reach her shores from beyond the Mediterranean, and by far the largest proportion (some 50 per cent. of her total imports and 48 per cent. of her petrol) from beyond Gibraltar. Thus in spite of her undoubted growth in stature as a Military Power, there could be no change in her

¹ *The French and Italian Navies in 1939*
(excluding ships under construction)

	Battleships	Heavy Cruisers	Light Cruisers	Aircraft Carriers	Destroyers	Submarines	T.Bs.	M.T.Bs.
Italy .	4	7	14	..	61	204	70	72
France .	7	7	12	3	59	75	12	1

From *Jane's Fighting Ships*.

policy. She still had to try to avoid at all costs a general war and to secure treaty revision and territorial expansion if possible by negotiation. She still needed allies ready and able to reinforce the 'moral pressure' she could put behind treaty revision and bear the brunt of the consequences if the demand for revision led to war.

The Search for Allies

In post-War Europe the search for allies who supported revision was by no means easy. France, Britain, and a string of small Powers were committed to the League, Security, and the *status quo*. The revisionist States in Eastern Europe—Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria—moved closer to Italy and cordial relations with Hungary were established as early as 1926. But these were small fry. Of the Great Powers, Germany was still prostrate. There remained only Russia.

When in February 1924 Mussolini recognized the Soviet Government and concluded a first commercial treaty with the U.S.S.R., he was calling in a new world to redress the balance of the old. By achieving closer relations with Russia he hoped to secure a backing for any claims that he might care to put forward in the Mediterranean against France and, in a more general way, to secure acceptance for his thesis of revision with which Russia was also officially identified.

Differences in ideology presented no difficulty. The Italian Government took the line that the Comintern was dead and that a country's internal régime was its own concern. Fascist extremists even suggested that Russia, cold-shouldered by 'ultra-parliamentary France and ultra-democratic

Britain', was nearer to the Fascist mentality than either of the Western 'pluto-democracies'.

The more tightly France attempted to screw down her own conception of security and the *status quo* upon Europe, the more openly Italy paraded her Russian connexion. The U.S.S.R. had agreed to participate in the preparatory work of the Disarmament Conference. To her chagrin France found Italy, Russia, and Germany united in a common front against her and systematically opposing her view of Security in the preliminary discussions. When in 1930 Briand launched his scheme for a Pan-European Union (on the basis of existing frontiers), Italy insisted that Russia must be invited to participate, an attitude which drew a wail of disgust from the French press.

Indeed about this time (1930-1), when Franco-Italian relations were in a deplorable state (over the naval question and Tunis amongst other things), Italy's flirtation with Russia went to quite serious lengths. Russian statesmen returning from Geneva would break their journey at Milan. Italian industrialists made organized tours in Soviet territory. Russian technicians arrived in great numbers to learn Italian methods. Naval squadrons exchanged visits (this aroused France's particular suspicions) and a really important trade agreement between the two countries came into force during 1931. Italy earnestly hoped to make use of her Russian friendship against France, and France's all too complaisant associate, Britain, and her insistence upon Russian co-operation was at least one of the factors which helped to wreck the attempts of the ultra-conservative French Government to establish their own conception of Security in Europe.

Russia deserts Revisionism

The Russo-Italian idyll (like so many other brief connexions) came to an end as a consequence of the Nazi Revolution. The rise of Hitler to power, combined with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, opened Stalin's eyes to Russia's isolation. And France overcame her prejudices against Bolshevism. The non-aggression pacts signed by Russia and her immediate neighbours during 1933 and her first pact with France were signs of a radical reorientation in Russian policy. Arguing that Germany would demand revision (possibly at her expense) Russia edged away from it. Thus, from the Italian standpoint, the whole value of the Russian connexion began to disappear. If Russia were to adhere to the French conception of Security, the new world, far from redressing the balance of the old, would tilt it down still farther on the side of the *status quo*—in which case, what was to become of Italy's policy of treaty revision to her own advantage?

Mussolini made one last effort in 1933 to secure acceptance of his revisionist thesis. The Four-Power Pact was an attempt to supersede the League (thus sidetracking the French conception of the *status quo*) and to set up a Concert of European Great Powers. It was ominous from the Italian standpoint that Russia associated herself with the protest raised by the States of Eastern Europe at having their affairs settled over their heads. Undismayed, Mussolini made a final effort to retain Russian support for his revisionist attitude by the Italo-Russian Treaty of Friendship which, signed on 2 September 1933, was declared by Italy to

frustrate the attempt made by France and the Little Entente to draw Russia into their camp.

The pact itself was unsensational, and an air of unreality clung to the whole negotiation, for Soviet policy had already acquired a new and decisive bent. In the following year Russia entered the League, in 1935 she signed Treaties of Mutual Assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. In other words, she entered completely and fully into the *status quo* camp.

The Year of Sanctions

In the past Italy had often urged that to insist on Russia's absence from the League was to sin against the light of political realism. But the Russia that she envisaged had been an 'outcast' like herself and not a Russia, 160 million strong, industrialized, militarized, and associated by treaty with the West. Russia's sudden volte-face, which made possible an overwhelming concentration of strength on the side of the *status quo*, left Italy in a quandary. True, this strength was directed and concentrated against Germany, but it could with equal effect oppose treaty revision elsewhere, in the Mediterranean or the Red Sea or even East Africa where preparations for the annexation of Abyssinia were already well advanced. Italy had to change her tactics. The Russian connexion was allowed to slip from her political vocabulary and, for the first time in ten years, articles violently hostile to Russia began to appear in the Italian press.

The alternative of friendship with Germany was still out of the question.¹ Italy therefore tried the expedient of turning to the Western Powers and

¹ Although, by 1935, Mussolini declared that only the question of Austria held them apart.

joining with them at Stresa in their indignant anti-Hitlerian front. In particular she composed her difficulties with France, and there is reason to believe that the negotiations which established their common interest in resisting Nazi aggression¹ also covered a certain degree of French connivance should Italy at last begin to put her revisionism into practice—at the expense of the Abyssinians. France's unwillingness to participate in the application of Sanctions in the autumn of 1935 bears out this conjecture.

In September 1935 Great Britain pledged herself to a policy of Collective Security, and when in October the Italians invaded Abyssinia she led an unwilling France and fifty-one other nations into the application of Sanctions. The attempt proved disastrous, not from any inherent defect in the policy itself but from the deplorable manner in which it was carried out. Laval believed that he had just brought Italy into his anti-German front and found it grotesque and illogical that Britain, so long opposed to Security and the League as a means of keeping Germany in tutelage, should come out as a warm defender of Collective Security now that it would operate not against Germany but against France's new-found ally, Italy. The British statesmen, on their side, were not prepared to push Sanctions to the point of war and the question of an oil sanction was shelved. Thus, between a recalcitrant France and a hesitant Britain, the policy of Sanctions failed in every sense, for it was effective enough to arouse the Italians' deep resentment, but quite insufficient to achieve its purpose and stop the war.

¹ The Laval talks in Rome, January 1935.

The Sanctions episode was a turning-point in Italy's relations with Great Britain and France. Her resentment against their material possessions and *status quo* policy had been gathering strength ever since the Peace Settlement. It was brought to fever pitch by the opposition of the old and successful 'Imperialist' Powers to Italy's young imperialism. At the same time, its abject failure confirmed Italy's suspicions that France and Britain were not so formidable as they seemed, that they might even be 'decadent', and that a territorial revision in the Mediterranean at their expense might be brought about without a major war.

Nevertheless, even if they were showing their first signs of inherent weakness, they still had a powerful ally. France's alliance with Russia covered the *status quo* in Central Europe. In the summer of 1936 a new link was forged by the adherence of Britain, France, Russia, Turkey to the Montreux Convention. Faced with this hostile combination and with the memory of 'Sanctions' still rankling, Italy fell back on the only alternative still left open to her, and in the course of the summer and autumn of 1936 the *rapprochement* between Italy and Germany took place which was to develop, on the battle-fields of Spain, into the close alliance of the Axis.

The Montreux Convention

On 10 April Turkey asked the Powers to agree to the remilitarization of the Straits. A conference assembled at Montreux at the end of June to discuss the question, and although the original Turkish Note had only concerned itself with the militarized zone, Turkey now brought up the whole problem of the Straits and demanded a revision of the

Straits Convention of 1923. Italy, awaiting the repeal of Sanctions, refused to attend the conference, and, even after the League had decided to end the Sanctions débâcle, feelings of prestige and a conviction (which was very mistaken) that no conference concerned with Mediterranean problems could be successfully concluded without her still kept her away. Her abstention was a serious blunder, for on the one hand she increased Turkey's hostility and distrust; on the other, the outcome was considerably more unpalatable to her than it might have been, had she been present.

The new Convention (signed on 20 July) was the result of the combined pressure of Russia, Turkey, and France upon Great Britain to secure acceptance of what was, in fact the Soviet point of view. Great Britain was anxious to introduce no new factor into the Mediterranean balance, but France (governed by a Popular Front government) was now as anxious as Italy had been six years earlier to redress the diplomatic balance by bringing in the new Russian world. If the Russian fleet could secure unrestricted entry into the Mediterranean, then the value to France of the Franco-Soviet Treaty would be enormously increased.

Great Britain, alone in her objections, was overborne and, in fact, the new Convention conformed to Russia's wishes. In times of peace, while limits were placed on the tonnage and number of warships entering the Black Sea, no limit was placed on those of the Black Sea Powers when coming out of the Black Sea, provided that they came out singly. In war, if Turkey were a belligerent, the passage of warships was left to her discretion, if not, no war vessels were to pass except in fulfilment of

obligations under the Covenant or under treaties of mutual assistance registered with the League and binding on Turkey.

This provision caused great consternation in Italy. Fifty-two nations had just imposed Sanctions on her 'in fulfilment of their League obligations'. The implication was obvious—that France could now count on Russian reinforcements in the Mediterranean. Here was a factor upsetting all Italy's careful calculations of naval parity and balance. Germany likewise lodged a protest, for the connexion of the new arrangement with the Franco-Soviet Pact (duly registered with the League) was all too obvious. Neither Power had any specific objection to the U.S.S.R. as such. Hitler had renewed the Treaty of Rapallo; Italy's good relations with Russia we have already followed. But Russia, the fellow 'outcast', was worlds removed from Russia, the powerful ally of the West. Italy and Germany began to feel their way towards new tactics for dealing with this shadow of encirclement lying across Central Europe and the Mediterranean. The need of a policy (which in the course of 1937 was to develop into a full-blooded Anti-Comintern Pact) was reinforced by events in Spain.

The Axis is forged in Spain

General Franco's revolt practically coincided in date with the Montreux Conference. Italy determined to help Franco from the first, and she 'responded to the first call of Franco on 27 July 1936'.¹ When, however, France's fears for her exposed flank and Russia's fears for the security of her French ally induced them to begin inter-

¹ *Informazione Diplomatica*.

vention on their side, Italy and later Germany determined on the counter-measures which forged the Axis, gave the Anti-Comintern Pact its substance, and brought Europe to the brink of war. Two of the Powers supporting the Republican Government in Spain had, against the wishes of Great Britain at Montreux, just secured the free passage of Russian fleets into the Mediterranean. The Italians argued that the defeat of General Franco would have meant the establishment of an anti-Italian *bloc* in the Western Mediterranean at a time when Italy's position in the Eastern basin was already precarious.

Italy and Germany, faced with the same hostile concentration, determined to forge a weapon to break it up. This weapon was the Anti-Comintern Pact. Under the guise of an ideblogical campaign, it was quite simply a policy designed to break the links between Russia and the West. It was *not* directed against the integrity of Soviet territory. How could Italy even interest herself in so remote a possibility? It was directed against the *status quo* (Mediterranean and Continental) established by the West, which France had persuaded Russia to join in guaranteeing.

Had Britain fully supported France's policy, the Axis could hardly have achieved success, but the truth is that the British Government was perturbed at the thought of increased Russian strength in the Mediterranean and was anxious to restore the comparatively friendly relations with Italy which had existed before Sanctions. On Italy's side was the realization that the Axis and Germany's growing military strength held dangers for Italy in the Balkans and eventually, perhaps, in the Mediterranean too. Hence the final division of Europe into

two hostile *blocs* was circumvented and delayed by the series of negotiations between Italy and Britain which achieved first a Gentleman's Agreement in 1937 and then the Anglo-Italian Pact of March 1938, both designed to preserve the *status quo* in the Mediterranean (and thus, indirectly, to keep Russia out).

The Turning-point : Munich

The crisis came to a head in September 1938. Great Britain's unwillingness to commit herself to France's conception of defending the *status quo* in alliance with Russia steadily weakened France's enthusiasm for the policy and the end was hastened by the fall of the Popular Front government in 1937. When the test came over Czechoslovakia, neither the French nor the British were prepared to call on Russia to join them in supporting the Czechs, and at Munich Russia was excluded. Thus the Axis saw the triumph of its policy of destroying Russia's alliance with the West and the guarantee it gave to the European *status quo*.

The repercussions in the Mediterranean were immediate. Italy realized that the hostile combination which had held her spirit in bond for the last three years was shattered. Russia had withdrawn. Significantly the Anti-Comintern campaign disappeared from the Italian press as suddenly as it had arisen, and Italy's rejoicing at the annihilation of the French *status quo* and France's consequent loss of prestige burst out in a clamorous cry for 'Corsica, Tunis, Nice'.

The 'Mediterranean Munich'

It is as well to appreciate Italy's position at the beginning of 1939. Ever since the 'Sanctions' episode,

France and Britain had been in ignominious retreat. At Munich they had acquiesced in an act of revision exactly after the Italians' own heart. Under pressure they had given way on a major point, sooner than risk war. Italy, in close alliance with the power which had forced them to submit, felt strongly that her turn had now come, and throughout the winter of 1938-9 the Italian press was full of confident assertions that now that Hitler had achieved treaty revision in Central Europe, the time had come for a 'Mediterranean Munich', in other words, an abandonment by the West of their positions in favour of Italy. 'Corsica, Tunis, Nice' meant exactly that.

Nevertheless, there was a note of urgency and anxiety in Italy's assertions that the turn of the Mediterranean had come. In the two years of the Axis the German partner had been going from strength to strength. It was Germany who had rescued Italian intervention in Spain from fiasco after Guadalajara and in return Italy had had to sell the Austrian pass into the Balkans—with the result that in every Balkan market and in every Balkan intrigue she had been ousted by the Nazis. It was already all too obvious who was the dominant partner. Italy's cry for a 'Mediterranean Munich' was not a demand but a reminder and a request.

The answer was the occupation of Prague, the seizure of Memel, and the opening of Germany's era of pre-belligerency *vis-à-vis* Poland. The 'Mediterranean Munich' was swept aside in the torrent of Hitler's European advance, and with that advance the conditions for a settlement achieved by pressure politics on the one hand, and weak surrender on the other—a settlement, that is to say, in accordance

with the necessities of Italian policy—disappeared as well, however little the Italians realized it at the time. For Britain the epoch of retreat ended with the guarantee given to Poland, and France was—at least for a time—stirred from her apathy, disunity, and discouragement by the jackal cries for ‘Corsica, Tunis, and Nice.’ The full offensive and defensive alliance signed by the Axis in May 1939 did not—as it was designed to do—intimidate the West, and in September France and Britain took up arms in defence of Poland.

Non-Belligerency

Italy did not enter the war at once. The decisive reason was, of course, Germany’s belief that her ally would be more useful as a ‘non-belligerent’. It is doubtful whether in the first month of the war Hitler took seriously the Allies’ intention to fight to the finish and he may well have expected another patched-up Munich after the destruction of Poland. Italy had proved her metal as an intermediary in 1938. She might fulfil the same function in 1939.

When, however, Hitler’s October ‘peace offensive’ was received with indifference and the belligerents settled down to some six months’ military inactivity, Italy continued to be more valuable as a non-fighting ally. Both France and Britain were anxious to conciliate her and, misled by the analogy of 1915, believed that if sufficient economic concessions were made, Italy would at least remain neutral throughout the conflict and a benevolent neutral at that. Thus Italy was able during the winter of 1939-40 to modify the working of the British blockade and to become Germany’s chief channel to the markets of the world.

The Home Front

The policy of non-intervention suited Italy's needs as well. Economically, militarily, and psychologically she was unprepared for war. Her reserves and equipment had been depleted by the campaigns in Abyssinia and Spain; the dismissal of Guarneri and the appointment of Ricci to the Ministry of Supply in October 1939 covered the discovery of gross inefficiency and even speculation in the vital sphere of military supply; a costly and complicated process of reorganization was hardly completed in the army, and the flow of aircraft to the *Regia Aeronautica* was considered very unsatisfactory. There were apparently insufficient supplies of certain essential raw materials to keep abreast with the newer types. Finally, no amount of propaganda could counteract the intense unpopularity of Germany and the Italian people's fierce dislike of fighting a war in company with their hated ally. When on 16 December 1939 Count Ciano said that Italy was not ready for war he was saying nothing more than the truth.

Italy enters the War

Germany's rapid campaigns in the West in the spring of 1940 brought the period of Italian non-belligerency to an end. With the collapse of the West and the apparently imminent end of the war, Germany no longer needed Italy primarily as a gap in the blockade. And with France stricken and defenceless, Italy at last saw the 'Mediterranean Munich' within her grasp. By entering the struggle it seemed certain that she would secure revision

without the necessity of fighting a costly war. Whether or no the Nazis had planned to see their ally enter the last phase of a victorious war in which they had borne the burden and the heat, nothing could have restrained the Duce at this point, and on 10 June Italy entered the war. Ten days later France was suing for an armistice and Italy seemed to have won the immense gamble of her Axis policy.

The disastrous development of the war for Italy since that day in June springs from the miscalculation which brought her in. Mussolini was convinced that, with the collapse of France, Britain would accept defeat and that the war was over. The Italian nation entered the struggle to triumph and not to fight, and it followed that the military preparations were inadequate. There was no full mobilization, no large reinforcement of the Libyan garrison,¹ and the Duce himself complained in February 1941 that the Italians were caught unawares.

Economically the nation was unprepared. Rationing had barely been introduced, supplies had been passed on to Germany. On the propaganda front matters were even worse. The Italian populace were given nothing but tales of immediate victory and magnificent vistas of easy conquest. There was no hint at first that they would even have to fight. Thus, when, in the grim days of early July, Britain was left stranded, deserted, and outnumbered in the Mediterranean and Egypt, and the Italians might perhaps by a swift and brutal campaign have pressed on to the Suez Canal, they did not stir. They held victory parades in Italy and in Africa waited for the end. Even when weeks had passed and Britain was

¹ Marshal Graziani later attributed his defeat to lack of equipment. There is no reason to suppose that his account was inaccurate.

still in the war, they took the line of least resistance and instead of striking at Egypt took British Somaliland.

Britain holds out

In August the German offensive against Britain opened and German bombers were blasted from the skies. The Nazis needed a diversion to draw off Britain's defenders and Italy by her complete inactivity in the Mediterranean was failing to provide one. Pressure was probably brought to bear on the Duce and he was hardly in a position to resist it. The armistice with France had been couched in moderate terms in order to entice the Bordeaux Government into surrender. There was no mention, for example, of Corsica, Tunis, and Nice nor, while Germany occupied two-thirds of France, was a single Italian soldier allowed to stand on French territory. If Italy hoped to secure her share of the Mediterranean spoils, she would have to take a more active part in settling the conflict. By September there were ominous signs that Hitler was prepared to win Vichy's favours at Italy's expense.

In the Balkans, too, Roumania was dismembered and occupied without reference to Rome, and Balkan statesmen, travelling to Berchtesgaden or Berlin, began to omit the customary visit to Rome. Italy had already lost the substance of her Balkan influence to Germany. Now it looked as though she were to lose the outward seeming too. In September, after judicious warnings in the Italian press that after all the war might last, and the introduction of severe rationing restrictions, Graziani advanced into Egypt. At Sidi Barrani he stopped.

The Need for a Diversion

Meanwhile the battle for London went ill for the Nazis. Britain remained obstinately undefeated. German aircraft littered the English soil and the United States was galvanized into enthusiastic 'non-intervention' by the heroism of millions of anonymous Londoners. For Italy the situation grew daily more awkward. Roumania was now a German province and Nazi infiltration was pushing south. In October Hitler held conversations with Pétain and General Franco at which Italy was not even represented. We may imagine that any attempt on Italy's part to remind the Nazis of her claims was met with a contemptuous reference to the entirely ineffectual part played by the Italian forces. The Italians had to prove themselves, and, against the advice of the entire High Command, Mussolini chose Greece for the experiment.

If the Duce's first miscalculation was his belief that Britain would give up the struggle, he made his second on 19 October, this time in the certainty that the Greeks would not fight. The choice of Greece as a testing-ground for Fascist valour was conditioned in the first place by Germany's insistence that some diversion of Britain's resources must be secured. But the Duce's fear that Hitler would swallow up the whole Balkan peninsula unless Italy staked out her claim must also have played a part.

Disaster

Whatever the reasons which dictated the choice, it was disastrous. Within a month every Italian soldier had been driven from Greek soil and the Greeks were advancing into Albania along the whole front.

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Hard upon this first retreat came the British raid on Taranto in which the Italian navy, after constantly refusing action on the high seas, was battered at anchor in its own base. Then on 7 December the Army of the Nile struck at Sidi Barrani and in a lightning campaign of two months drove Graziani's army not only from Egypt but from the whole province of Cyrenaica. And with the R.A.F. shooting the Italians from the skies above the Channel, Albania, Libya, and the Mediterranean, there was not a front upon which all three branches of the Italian armed forces had not been catastrophically defeated.

The sensational resignations in December of Marshal Badoglio, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and the High Command of the Navy, together with the reports of rioting and unrest from many Italian cities, have led people to canvass the possibility of an internal collapse and of a revolt against the Fascist régime. Germany, however, has provided the answer. The *Luftwaffe* is now doing the work of the Italian Air Force in Sicily and elsewhere, German motorized units have arrived in Africa, and Germany's armed intervention in the Balkans has put an end to the daily scandal of Italy's performance in Albania. We need not doubt that such sweeping efforts to shore up Italy's crumbling military edifice have been undertaken by Germany only at the price of equally sweeping concessions from Italy in the sphere of government and the High Command. Nearly all the principal Fascist ministers have been sent to the front. We do not know, but we may surmise, that it is Hitler's men who have taken their place.


In other words, until Germany's military might

is broken, there will be no collapse in Italy. A man does not fall out of a strait waistcoat into which he has once been securely strapped.

Seventy years' diplomacy as a Great Power have reduced Italy to colonial status as a dependency of the German Reich. The possibility of such a humiliation was always inherent in her policy of seeking aggrandizement without the military strength necessary to secure it single-handed; and it will only be banished in a society in which Great Powerhood ceases to be measured in colonial empire and military strength. In a fully organized European society of nations, Italy could play a leading part. In an international jungle she is condemned to the jackal's part—a hard lesson perhaps, but the disasters of to-day may yet serve a purpose if they bring that lesson home.

Frontiers of States.
Southern Limit of
Flamish Dialects.

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OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

No. 49

HOLLAND AND THE WAR

BY

G. N. CLARK

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

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K. MAHADEVAN BOOKSELLER, MYLAPORE.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands, less correctly but more conveniently known to us as Holland, was, before the Germans invaded it, one of the most prosperous countries in the world. Its democratic institutions and its high standard of civilization made it in many respects a model state. In its relations with its neighbours, including Germany, it did nothing which could have excused an act of aggression. Professor G. N. Clark's pamphlet gives a picture of Holland as she was before the invasion—her economics, her social structure, and her constitution—and against this background describes her foreign policy during recent years, and the circumstances of her entry into the war as Great Britain's ally, an ally with powerful material resources in her East Indian Empire.

Fuller information on Dutch foreign relations will be found in the annual volumes of the *Survey of International Affairs* published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In *The Rape of the Netherlands* (1940) Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, the present Dutch Foreign Minister, has eloquently described the invasion and the course of events before it. The internal history of the country down to 1923 is described in Professor A. J. Barnouw's *Holland under Queen Wilhelmina* (1923); and the same author's book *The Dutch: a Portrait Study of the People of Holland* (1940) gives intimate pictures of many aspects of private and public life. The short articles in the *Annual Register* give the most accessible English accounts of domestic events in the most recent years. For the Netherlands Indies there are full studies on the political side in the second volume of Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino's *Colonial Policy* (1931), and on the economic side in Mr. J. S. Furnivall's *Netherlands India* (1939).

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HOLLAND AND THE WAR

OFFICIALLY the country of our Dutch allies is known as 'the Kingdom of the Netherlands', but we usually call it 'Holland', and this is the most convenient name though, strictly speaking, it is not correct. It is the official name of one part of the country only, the part now divided into the two provinces of North and South Holland; but Dutchmen themselves often use it for the whole country, just as we often say 'England' when we mean the United Kingdom. 'Holland' is a shorter and handier name than 'the Netherlands', and 'the Netherlands' is confusing because the Southern or Spanish or Austrian Netherlands, often mentioned in historical books about former centuries, are the country which we now call Belgium, and scarcely even overlap with the present 'Kingdom of the Netherlands'. 'The Low Countries', which is another way of saying 'the Netherlands', is used more vaguely to describe the whole region, mostly low-lying, which includes Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg.

Before the German invasion Holland was one of the most prosperous countries in the world. For one thing, it had a lower death-rate than any other country. The 'expectation of life' was greater than anywhere else: a girl born in Australia could look forward to a slightly longer life than a Dutch girl, but, with this one exception, Holland took the first place: even the Australian boy had the prospect of a shorter life than the Dutch boy. This was the more remarkable because a low death-rate usually goes with a low birth-rate, but in Holland the birth-rate was high. Another test of prosperity is national income. In average real income per head of population, in the period 1925-34, Holland was amongst the richest

continental countries of Europe. It was one of the five continental countries which were so rich that they had money to lend abroad.

This prosperity was due to good management profiting from natural opportunity.

Economic Geography

The area of the European part of the kingdom is slightly less than that of the six northern counties of England. While these six counties have a population of more than twelve millions, Holland has a little more than eight and a half, but even this makes it one of the most densely populated countries of Europe. The reasons for this close concentration of people are geographical. Holland is a delta-land. Two of the great inland waterways of Europe, the Rhine and the Meuse or Maas, flow through Dutch territory to the sea. Neither of them has a single estuary: they break up into a number of channels, and these are connected with one another, and with the rivers of Belgium, France, and Germany, by a network of canals. These waterways are vital links in the transport system of western Europe, and not only of western Europe but of the world, for Holland lies in the centre of the world's most highly industrialized zone. Rotterdam was the chief inlet for ore and other overseas supplies to the industrial district of the Ruhr, and the chief outlet for the export of its finished products overseas. Amsterdam, connected with the North Sea by a ship canal, shared with Rotterdam the seaborne trade of the vast and populous basins of the Rhine and Meuse and the country bordering the Danube as far as Budapest. The German ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Emden, and the Belgian port of Antwerp, though their chief business was with the areas flanking this hinterland of the Dutch ports, were to a certain extent competitors

within it; but the geographical advantage of the Dutch ports was never overcome either by political measures like tariffs or by expenditure on competing waterways.

For centuries past the Dutch have taken advantage of their geographical opportunities by following the sea, with the result that they had important fisheries, a considerable merchant fleet (the eighth largest in the world), a great shipbuilding industry (the third largest in the world, and in some ways highly specialized), and various subsidiary industries. Their forefathers have handed down to them a great colonial empire, exceeded in population only by those of Great Britain and France, and containing some of the richest of all colonial territories. The Dutch East Indies produce more than one-third of the world's rubber, one-fifth of its palm-oil products, nine-tenths of the cinchona bark from which quinine is made, 30 per cent. of all coco-nut products, 17 per cent. of tea, and a high proportion of tin and mineral oil. Besides these East Indian islands the Dutch have two possessions in the Western Hemisphere, Surinam on the north coast of South America and the island of Curaçao, where the oil from Venezuela is refined. They are vigorous and enlightened colonial administrators, and they have made great contributions to all the sciences on which colonial administration depends—tropical medicine, agriculture and economics, and the studies of the laws, languages, customs, and religions of the East Indian peoples. Their empire provided employment for a surprisingly large proportion of the educated class, and materials for a number of light industries like the cigar-manufacture and the refining or processing of cocoa, sugar, rubber, rice, oil, coffee, and tea. From it was derived a considerable part of the wealth which made Amsterdam a capital-market. The outside world benefited from

the generous open-door policy of the Dutch. The trade of all nations had access to her colonies, and, more than that, foreign capital was welcomed in their development, and foreigners, including many Germans, were appointed to technical and other posts in the Government service there.

Agriculture

After the seaports and waterways and the colonial empire, agriculture was the most decisive factor in Holland's economic position. Dutch agriculture was in many ways like British agriculture. As in England, there is very little forest-land. Dutch agriculture, like British, had to stand up against foreign competition and also against the domestic competition of the towns for labour and investment. It gave employment to about one-fifth of the population, a greater ~~proportion~~ proportion than in Britain, but much less than in Denmark or France, where the proportion was about one-third. There is a class of landless labourers like those of Great Britain, more numerous in proportion than the agricultural 'proletariat' of any other continental country. Dutch, like British, agriculture was very varied. About half the land is cultivated by its owners themselves, and about half rented from landlords. More than half the farms are very small. Holland has to support a far denser rural population than Great Britain: it has four times as many agriculturists per acre of land as Great Britain has. Consequently agriculture was an export industry: in prosperous times about half the agricultural output was sold abroad. Since permanent pasture predominated considerably over arable, there were also food imports, especially of cereals: in the proportion of food imported Holland stood between France and Belgium.

The Dutch farmers were well educated, technically

efficient, and good business men, successful in working co-operative organizations. The chief standing problem was how to maintain the great and growing agricultural population at a satisfactory standard of life. One method of tackling this was the reclamation of land from the sea and lakes, in which the Dutch have been experts for centuries. The draining of the Zuyder Zee, which was begun more than twenty years ago, is the greatest reclamation scheme in the world, and when it is completed it will have added 7 per cent. to the area of the country's agricultural land.

Industry

Until after the war of 1914-18 Dutch industry was relatively unimportant; but in the last twenty years there has been a growth of industry resembling in some ways the industrialization of England south of the Trent. There is, however, this great difference, that Holland has no native mineral resources except coal. The coal-field of Limburg produced in 1937 more than four times as much as in 1917, or slightly less than half the production of Belgium. About half was exported and half kept for home consumption. There were more than 30,000 miners, of whom many were foreign immigrants—Poles, Czechs, and about 8,000 Germans. Some of the mines are State-owned; of the privately owned mines the majority were in French and Belgian hands. Most of the other industries are 'light' industries. Foreign sources supplied the raw materials for the textile industry (mainly cotton, mainly in the district of Twente), and for the manufacture of margarine, electrical supplies, artificial silk, boots and shoes, and glass. The oil and margarine industries were connected with great combinations in which British capital predominated. Assembling plants for aeroplanes employed about 6,000 men; the manufacture of aero engines was begun

only in 1939; there was one assembling factory for motor vehicles.

Economic Policy

A generation ago the Dutch were a free-trade people: both at home and in the colonies they based their economic policy on free imports and sound money. By degrees they have departed from this tradition, but slowly and reluctantly. The decisive steps resulted from the great depression of the nineteen-thirties. The fall in the prices of primary products hit both the colonies and Dutch home agriculture; shipping was laid up as it was everywhere else; the transit trade declined; there was grave unemployment; the revenue from taxation dropped. The State applied, to begin with, the traditional remedies of liberal economics: it cut down government expenditure of all kinds, including that on official salaries; it increased taxation; it provided relief for the unemployed. But the restrictive measures themselves increased the hardships of the population, and the attempts of other states to protect themselves against the depression made matters worse. Great Britain, at that time second only to Germany and later surpassing even Germany as a market for Dutch exports, found herself compelled to restrict agricultural imports by quotas, and this meant that a great part of the demand for Dutch dairy and market-garden produce disappeared. By the Ottawa system again Great Britain granted preferences to her own colonies which restricted the markets of Dutch colonial produce, and, again, when Great Britain left the gold standard Dutch exporters and shipowners suffered a disadvantage. What Great Britain felt compelled to do in these ways was only what the other great nations had begun long before, and continued to do in increasing measure. The Dutch had no

choice but to follow suit. For a comparatively small nation and empire this forced movement towards autarky had none of the attractions which it seemed to offer to greater economic units; the Dutch, in the Treaty of Ouchy of 1932, therefore attempted a mutual lowering of trade barriers with the Belgians, which might have been extended to other countries. It would have required, however, a renunciation on the part of Great Britain and other states of their existing 'most favoured nation' rights, and this they were unwilling to grant. The Dutch consequently had to act alone.

On the monetary side they moved slowly. When Great Britain went off gold, the Dutch kept to the gold standard; but lively controversy went on for several years between those who held the traditional doctrines of sound currency and those who wished to devalue and so to encourage exports and diminish unemployment. In September 1936, however, France and Switzerland gave up the gold standard and Holland too went over to a managed currency.

Commercial policy also was transformed by a series of improvisations which, by 1939, had settled down into a definite system. Imports were subjected to a system of quotas. To encourage colonial exports and to protect Dutch exports to the colonies against foreign, and especially Japanese, competition, the quota-system was applied to the colonial trade. The Dutch colonies participated in the action of the international controls of rubber, tea, sugar, and tin. Home agriculture was drastically controlled. The dairy herd, the pigs, and poultry, and the other exporting branches were reduced, and agricultural exports were heavily subsidized by taxing the home consumer through charging him a higher price. On the other hand, the home production of cereals was expanded in order to lessen the expenditure on imports. Altogether from

1934 to 1936 one-third of their gross receipts was paid to the farmers by the State.

The result of these and similar measures was that at the outbreak of war in 1939 the Dutch economic system was one of controlled capitalism. There was general regimentation by state authorities. This new system brought with it inevitable changes in the structure of industry, especially a tendency to concentration in the hands of large firms. It mitigated, though it did not solve, the problem of unemployment. On the whole it brought the Dutch through the period of crisis with their economy sound and capable of recovery, but at the price of hardships similar to those which Great Britain had to endure in the same period. The Dutch were able to achieve so much while at the same time avoiding acute social strife because their democratic system of government responded to the demands made upon it.

Social Structure

The Dutch nation was socially and politically sounder than any of its continental neighbours; and this soundness had deep roots in history and tradition. Holland, like England, was a business nation, with a rich inheritance of culture and public spirit.

Although there was no hereditary element in the legislature, there was a nobility, but it was neither feudal nor plutocratic. Among the five or six hundred families which enjoy hereditary titles there are a few with ancient countships of the Holy Roman Empire, and a few higher titles have been created by the Dutch Crown; but the majority have the title of Jonkheer which, like the others, descends to all the sons of each of its holders, not, like English titles, only to the eldest son. This title was given, when the Kingdom of the Netherlands was formed in 1814, to

all those who could prove that their ancestors had been for three generations members of the patriciates of the Dutch cities in the former republican days. They were thus members of a governing class but not of a landed class; and in spite of Dutch conservatism the governing class steadily widened through the nineteenth century, very much as it did in England, by the addition of new elements from the world of business and the professions which took their place beside the old hereditary elements. The pathway to employment in official positions was not kept open in the same way as in England. There was no Civil Service Commission, providing equality of opportunity by means of competitive examinations; each government department made its own appointments, and influence, of various kinds, including both social influence and party influence, was useful in getting these appointments; but a high standard of competence was demanded, and the general result was a system not very dissimilar from ours.

Until quite recently the daily intercourse of different classes in Holland was noticeably less familiar than in England: social distinctions were more emphasized; but custom in these matters was altering. The general outward tone of Dutch social life was democratic. There was no servility anywhere, and life in general was free, indeed it was almost free and easy. A great deal of Dutch life was summed up in the fact that among eight million people there were four million bicycles. The roads were flat and many of them had bicycle tracks. People of all classes rode on them for business or pleasure, from workmen going to work to army officers with clips on their bicycles to hold their swords. When petrol was short the Queen herself pedalled through the streets. The democratic push-bike was a symbol of a genuinely democratic society.

Education

The Dutch are one of the most highly educated peoples in the world. As linguists they probably hold the first place in Europe, in the sense that a larger proportion of them than of any other nation read, speak, and write foreign languages. As a small nation surrounded by great nations they need this knowledge if they are to use their opportunities to the full; but they do not learn foreign languages only for utilitarian reasons: they have a correspondingly wide understanding of foreign nations, their literatures and points of view. Not only in language-teaching but in the teaching of all subjects their schools are excellent. The great majority of boys and girls of all classes are educated in day-schools of various grades, many of which are co-educational. Among the Dutch as among ourselves there has been a long series of controversies about religious education. The system now in force is that confessional schools are subsidized by the State in the same way as the neutral schools which, in earlier days, had an exclusive right to state support.

The Dutch regard their universities and their other institutions for higher education with well founded pride. Leyden, the oldest of them, has been since the sixteenth century one of the world's greatest centres of learning and science. The other Dutch universities are worthy of the same traditions. It is natural that they should be specially famous for their Oriental studies; but there is no faculty in which Holland has not some of the living leaders of the world's thought. Utrecht and Groningen, like Leyden, are state universities: and it is characteristic of Dutch freedom that there are side by side with them, in friendly rivalry and co-operation, three private universities, the municipal university of Amsterdam, the Free University of the same city, which is Calvinistic, and the Catholic

University of Nymwegen. The great Technical High School at Delft is a state institution granting degrees in every branch of engineering and industrial technology.

This admirable educational system has a marked effect on the quality of Dutch private and public life. It gives a high standard of general culture and of professional competence. The administrative work of the senior officials of the Dutch ministries, as exemplified, for instance, in their reports and memoranda, strikes everyone who comes into contact with it as extremely well done. The Dutch newspapers before the German invasion were suited to an educated public. They were solid, well informed, and sober in expression.

The Diversity of Dutch Life.

Although Holland is a small country, Dutch life is rich in variety. Influences flow in from the colonial world and from the great neighbouring foreign nations. There is less centralization than in England and France, so that the provinces are less provincial. The seat of the court, the parliament, the government departments, and the highest law-courts is The Hague; but Amsterdam, the greatest city, is nominally the capital, and various activities which in many countries are concentrated in the capital are here spread through other towns.

The diversity of Dutch life does not arise from racial diversity. There is indeed one local linguistic minority: the Frisians have their own language, which though closely akin to Dutch is more closely akin to English, and to the Dutch is a foreign language which they cannot understand. It is spoken by some three hundred thousand country-people in the province of Friesland and by a few thousands in the North Frisian islands, which belong to Germany and Denmark.

These are the remnants of the Frisian people, who once covered a much wider area. There has of late years been a Frisian movement; the language is now taught in rather more than 100 of the elementary schools in Friesland (about one-fifth of the whole number) and consequently it is holding its ground. The Frisian movement is not, however, a political or nationalist movement; the Frisians are good Dutchmen, and to Dutch life generally the province contributes a specially respected element, men with a reputation for uprightness and character. At the present moment both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are Frisians, the former a Frisian-speaker to whom Dutch is a second language, as English is a second language to Mr. Lloyd-George.

Its geographical position and its international commerce have for centuries past attracted many foreign immigrants to Holland, most of whom in the course of time have been absorbed into the native population; but there are two foreign colonies which have not been fully assimilated. The proportion of Jews is higher than in any other country of western Europe. There was not, however, a 'Jewish problem' in the Netherlands except in so far as the refugees created a new problem after 1933. In this respect, and in the relations between the Jews and the rest of the population, Holland was similar to Great Britain: there was no native anti-Semitism of a virulent kind. There was, however, a German problem. The Germans permanently resident in Holland numbered more than a hundred thousand of every class in society; and among them the various official and semi-official organizations for Germans abroad had great numbers of adherents. The more dangerous political activities of the German colony were, however, secret, and few people knew how serious they were.

The other foreign colonies in the country were far

less numerous and are not worth mentioning among the elements of variety in Dutch life. One of the roots of that variety is diversity of religion: there is no western country in which religion has a greater influence on public life. Englishmen often think of the Dutch as a nation of Calvinists; but this is a mistake. The Dutch have official statistics of the numbers of adherents of the several churches. According to these the Netherlands Reformed Church, the largest single body, which was once the established church of the State, includes about one-third of the population. Other Protestant sects, not all of which are Calvinistic, account for about the same number, while more than a third are Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholics are strongest in the southern provinces, North Brabant and Limburg, where they form a great majority of the population, and where they have the Belgian and German Catholics as neighbours. They are a noticeable element in most of the other provinces as well, and as they tend to have larger families they are a growing element. They have maintained themselves ever since the Reformation side by side with the Calvinists in many places, often through local and personal accidents. Of the two famous neighbouring villages where British tourists used to stare at the picturesque costumes of the fisher-folk, Volendam is Catholic and Marken is Protestant. It is only in the northerly provinces of Groningen, Friesland, and Drente that the Catholics are a small minority.

Constitution

Holland was governed by a democratic constitutional monarchy. The position of the monarchy is in general, though not in every detail, similar to that of the British monarchy. The Queen is the symbol of the unity and freedom of the nation. Though they have worn a crown only since 1814, her family gave the

Dutch republic its stadholders, who were its first servants in war and peace, its principal officers throughout almost the whole of its existence from the time when William the Silent stood forward as the hero of their first war of independence.

The legislature is a parliament of the regular western type. The Lower Chamber (which is called, rather confusingly for British readers, the Second Chamber, a name we usually give to the upper chamber of a legislature) has 100 members elected for four years by proportional representation, the whole country forming a single constituency. The First, or Upper, Chamber has fifty members, elected for six years by the states, or local government assemblies, of the eleven provinces, which in turn are chosen every four years by popular vote. Treaties, in consequence of a constitutional amendment of 1922, require the consent of both Chambers. The Ministers are not members of either Chamber and members who become Ministers vacate their seats; but they have the right to sit and speak in either Chamber, so that they answer questions and pilot their business through the parliament in much the same way as ours, though far less of their time is spent in managing parliamentary business.

The Dutch system of government was thus, like our own, parliamentary democracy. The most distinctive features of its practical working arose from the system of proportional representation. This system gave great power to the electoral organizations of the parties. The details of the system were modified after it was first introduced in order to restrain the evil, common to most systems of proportional representation, of the small freak party; but it was not completely freed from this evil, and it made the working of democracy different in various ways from what we are used to here.

Most of the members of the Chambers owe their

importance to their political activities; few of them have, like so many British politicians, a position of their own in the social or business life of the country as prominent as any they can win by a political career. In the Upper Chamber there are a few men of this standing, such as landowners or retired generals, and there the proportion of substantial business men is greater than in the Lower Chamber; but the majority in both are professional men, with characteristic of Holland, some ministers of religion, both Catholic and Protestant. There are both Social Democrats and Catholics of working-class origin; but these, as in other countries, have worked their way up as trade-union officials, political journalists, or party organizers. Altogether the two Chambers consisted of adequate but not very authoritative members.

Parties

Party feeling in the Netherlands ran high, partly because the element of religious difference was involved in it. The parties are many, but they fall into groups of which the first is that of the confessional religious parties. The largest single party is the Roman Catholic party. Like the Catholics in some other countries the Dutch Catholics agree on educational and many other matters, but in social questions are divided into conservatives and a more democratic wing. The party which represents the Dutch Reformed Church is the Christian Historical party, while the nonconforming Protestant sects, strong among the lower middle class, have the Anti-Revolutionary party. The present Prime Minister, Professor Gerbrandy, and his predecessor Dr. Colijn both belong to the Anti-Revolutionary party. The Liberals represent the secularist middle class of professional and business men: they have sunk in numbers to a small fraction of the electorate, but they

still include some of the country's best brains and abilities. The 'Vrijzinnig' (independent) Democrats are a small party of liberals or radicals.

The Social Democratic party, although it had a similar basis in trade unionism, was until recent years both more revolutionary and less practical than the British Labour party. The Dutch are conservative in many ways and particularly in matters affecting property. They have, for instance, never given formal recognition to the Soviet régime in Russia. The distrust of Socialists as advocates of lavish expenditure by the State and by local authorities was very widespread. They were the last nation in western Europe to include Socialist ministers in their cabinet.

The party system under proportional representation necessarily led to complicated coalitions: since that system came into force there has never been a simple one-party government. From 1918 to 1925 there was a Christian coalition, a Roman Catholic prime minister being supported by the orthodox Calvinists; but after 1925 government could be carried on only by non-party cabinets of experts who took charge of the government departments but did not command parliamentary majorities. This unsatisfactory state of things came to an end with the economic depression, the return of the danger of war, and the consequent demand for a national policy. In 1933 Dr. Colijn, a strong man with wide experience in the colonial army, in business and politics, became prime minister at the head of a coalition of all the non-socialist parties. He carried through the changes in economic policy, and set about the task of rearmament; but by the summer of 1939 he was no longer able to hold together in his cabinet the advocates of greater social expenditure and the orthodox liberal economists. A few years earlier the Socialists had virtually dropped their republicanism, and in 1937 they had abandoned

their opposition to all military expenditure. The path to office was thus open to them, and Dr. Colijn made way for the government which is still in office, though in exile. It is a coalition mainly of the Catholics, Socialists, and Christian Historicals: three of the ministers belonged to other parties, but two of them had not had parliamentary careers, and the third, Professor Gerbrandy, who became prime minister in 1940, joined as an individual, without committing his party. The Minister of Defence, Colonel Dijxhoorn, belongs to no party.

National Socialism in Holland

Outside the normal party system are the extremist groups, of Communists and National Socialists. Communism in Holland has gone through the same stages as in other countries, but it has never been strong. The National Socialists have played a ~~more~~ prominent part, though they have never been a factor of first-rate importance in Dutch political life. Apart from some minor dissident formations, they are organized in the N.S.B. (*Nationaal Socialistische Beweging*) which was founded in 1931 by A. A. Mussert, its present Leader. Mussert was a civil engineer who had a respectable position in the Government service. He first took part in politics in 1925-7 as an organizer of the nationalistic opposition to the Treaty with Belgium.¹ As a demagogue he is second-rate. His ablest colleague is the fanatical M. M. Rost van Tonningen, who was financial representative of the League of Nations in Austria from 1931 to 1936. The Germans have put him in charge first of the Dutch labour organizations and now of the Netherlands Bank; but he has the disadvantage, for a National Socialist, of having East-Indian blood. The N.S.B. was organized on the familiar German model

¹ See below, p. 23.

and Mussert worked by propaganda on anti-Semitic and racist lines, by infecting the public services, by creating 'incidents', and by arming and drilling his followers. The popularity of the movement may be judged from its electoral history, which consisted of a rise and a fall. During the depression the N.S.B. was able to exploit the discontent of the peasants, of the lower middle class, and of the youth generally. It obtained financial support from some employers who supposed that in Germany National Socialism was saving capitalism from its enemies; and it appealed to some of the conservative elements of society. Consequently in the elections for the Provincial States in 1935 it obtained 7.9 per cent. of all the votes cast; but it never did so well again. The course of events in Germany was against it. The open militarism of the German Nazis set the pacific and individualist Dutchmen against them; their excesses disgusted both trade unionists and employers. Finally the German aggressions of 1936-9 aroused apprehensions for Dutch independence and led people of all classes to rally to the House of Orange. Consequently the popularity of the movement fell away and in 1939 it won only 3.7 per cent. of the votes for the Provincial Estates. It never had more than four of the hundred seats in the Lower Chamber.

The attitude of the N.S.B. to Dutch independence was cunningly deceptive. Its leaders always professed to be patriots and denounced the internationalism of Catholics and Socialists; but the object of their patriotism was not the Dutch kingdom but the 'Dietsch' race. This race, the existence of which is more than questionable from the point of view of ethnology and history, is that of which the Dutch are said to form a part, the other parts being first the Flemings¹ who live in Belgium and a small corner

¹ The Flemings live in the more northerly parts of Belgium and

of France, and secondly the Dutch of South Africa. The N.S.B. were not the first to use the idea of the Dietsch race in politics. From the 1890's there grew up a sympathy among some Dutchmen, mainly students and 'intellectuals', for Flemish nationalism, and an ill-defined desire for Dutch-Flemish co-operation. This movement, to which at one stage the name of 'the Great Netherlands idea' was given, led to no practical result except that it may have contributed to the gradual realization of Flemish demands in Belgium. Some of its Dutch supporters were liberals in the wider sense of the term: with the rise of the German danger these, as patriotic Dutchmen, became anti-German. The N.S.B. with its cruder appeal took up the Dietsch idea, and used it, as German propaganda did, to support Flemish extremism against Belgian unity, and to attack British imperialism in South Africa. Clear-sighted men knew that the pretence of patriotism was a mere camouflage for pro-German treachery, and in the course of the year 1939 the insolence of the N.S.B. and its association with treasonable activities opened the eyes of some of its dupes. It was not, however, until the German invasion that it came out openly in its true colours.

Frontiers

The modern period of Dutch foreign policy began with the separation of Holland and Belgium, which were united under a Dutch king from 1814 until the Belgians revolted and proclaimed their independence in 1831. It was not until 1839 that the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Great Powers finally agreed on the terms of the separation. It was in this settlement that their language is Dutch, but it is spoken in a variety of dialects. In 1930 43 per cent. of the population of Belgium spoke only Flemish, 38 per cent. only French, and 13 per cent. both languages. The dividing line between the two languages is shown on the map: Brussels, the capital, is a town of mixed speech.

Holland got her present southern frontiers. Her frontiers do not follow prominent geographical features; they cut across the great rivers; but that does not mean that they are artificial. They are historic and national. Their course was determined by events which happened centuries ago, and by the simple fact that, because of their history, the people on one side of the line are Dutchmen while the people on the other side are Germans or Belgians. From the North Sea to the River Waal the frontier was laid down, though it was not a new line even then, in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The frontier with Belgium is practically the same as it was in 1790 (before the French revolutionary wars); and except in one part this frontier of 1790 had been the same since 1648 and earlier.

Two points about this Dutch-Belgian frontier need ~~to be~~ explained. There is a small isolated piece of Dutch territory, Dutch Flanders, on the left bank of the mouth of the Scheldt. This is very important strategically because it means that the Scheldt at its mouth runs through Dutch territorial waters. But there is nothing accidental or anomalous about Dutch Flanders. Its population is completely Dutch, and it has been Dutch for more than three centuries. The other part of the frontier that looks odd on the map is the 'Limburg appendix'. This piece of Dutch territory running down between Belgium and Germany on the right bank of the River Maas is about twenty-five miles long from north to south and at its narrowest point only about four miles wide. It bars some of the routes between Belgium and Germany; but the Dutch could not possibly defend it unless they were in alliance with either the Belgians or the Germans. It is Dutch because the town of Maastricht, at the principal crossing of the Maas in this region, has been Dutch since 1648, but until 1831 was an isolated

enclave, and, at the separation from Belgium the rest of Limburg had to be divided between the Belgians and the Dutch. The Dutch king was also Grand Duke of Luxemburg.¹ He handed over part of his Luxemburg duchy to the Belgians and in exchange received as a territorial indemnity part of the Belgian province of Limburg. In sentiment this is now completely Dutch.

Relations with Belgium

Holland and Belgium are neighbours and part of their boundary is the River Scheldt. A régime for this waterway was agreed upon in 1839; but no such agreement could last for ever without revision. When Belgium was released from compulsory neutrality in the Treaty of Versailles adjustments were needed, and there was a negotiation on the whole question of old and new waterways which was broken off by the Belgians in 1920. It was afterwards resumed and agreement was reached in 1925; but the Dutch Upper Chamber refused its consent, fearing that the treaty would give Antwerp advantages to the detriment of Rotterdam. It was not until Belgian policy towards the Great Powers fell into line with that of Holland² that the two nations came closer together. As the fear of German aggression grew, their mutual relations improved, and the exchange of royal visits in 1938 and 1939, to celebrate the completion of a hundred years of peace after the separation, marked a real political friendship.

Foreign Policy

Throughout the modern period until 1940 Holland constantly followed a policy of which the main prin-

¹ The personal union with Luxemburg came to an end at the accession of the present Queen of the Netherlands in 1890.

² See below, p. 26.

ciple was neutrality in the quarrels of the Great Powers. Holland was not compelled by treaty to be neutral, like Belgium or Switzerland. The neutrality of Belgium was imposed by the Powers at the time of the separation and was accompanied by the guarantee which Germany broke in 1914; but, Holland, although her geographical position was almost as dangerous as Belgium's, remained free to make alliances and received no guarantee. There never was a time, however, when Dutch statesmen were seriously tempted to make an alliance with any of the three Great Powers concerned. Great Britain was not a military power on the Continent before 1914 and could offer the Dutch no assistance by land if they were attacked. She was indeed a great naval power, and the Dutch navy was not strong enough to defend the Dutch Indies against a Great Power, but this was no reason for an English alliance. On the one hand, no one ever imagined that Great Britain would covet the Dutch Indies, while, on the other hand, it was certain that Great Britain for her own reasons, without any treaty of alliance, would come to the defence of the Dutch Indies if any other Power were to attack them, for the Dutch Indies lay on the flank of her route from India to China and made a line of stepping-stones from Singapore to Australia. At the Washington Conference of 1921 the Great Powers interested in the Pacific did indeed undertake to respect the rights of the Dutch in the East Indies; but this promise given to the Dutch did not amount to a guarantee.

The rivalry of France and Prussia was the one great fact of continental power politics which overshadowed Holland from near at hand, and Dutch neutrality meant first and foremost that the Dutch would not take sides in this dispute. After the war of 1870 the danger of aggression came from the side of Germany,

and the Dutch recognized this fact when they fortified their eastern frontier and modernized their system of defence by inundations shortly after that time; but there were strong reasons why they should not seek their safety in a defensive alliance with the French. For one thing France was not their immediate neighbour and could not give them help by land except through Belgium, which was bound to neutrality. For another thing Holland depended for a great part of its livelihood on German trade, and so on German friendship. The ambitions of German expansionists threatened the small states of Europe; and pan-Germans often spoke of the Dutch as a kindred people very suitable for absorption in greater Germany. But the Dutch believed that the best way to escape this danger was not to obtain guarantees but to behave with absolute fairness and correctness to all the Great Powers.

The policy of neutrality was interpreted differently by different schools of Dutch thinkers. Some thought that it was a positive contribution to the peace of Europe and the improvement of international relations; and they contrasted the pacific internationalism of the Dutch with the warlike rivalries of the Great Powers. Others thought that it was a regrettable but necessary consequence of Dutch weakness. But there was overwhelming agreement that there was no practical alternative; and Dutch governments, in times of peace, meticulously avoided even the appearance of serving the interests of any other state.

In the war of 1914-18 both sides kept their promises to respect Dutch neutrality on land. The Dutch army was mobilized throughout the war to prevent any violation of the territory, but it never went into action because neither side did violate Dutch soil. At the end of the war there was for a short time some fear that the victorious Powers might reward the Belgians and

punish the Dutch for their neutrality by settling in Belgium's favour some of the complicated disputes over waterways or even by handing over Dutch Limburg and Dutch Flanders. Great Britain, the United States, and France, however, had no such intention, and it seemed that Dutch neutrality during the war had succeeded. The Dutch had undergone economic hardships from the blockade and counter-blockade, but they had been spared what the Belgians had suffered. They did, however, at this time depart from their policy of neutrality by becoming members of the League of Nations. The League was intended to be not an alliance against any state but a general association of states; and its attempt to organize European security offered the same promise to the Dutch as to the rest of Europe.

In the twenty years which followed the League, as an organization for European security, gradually broke down. The Dutch in League matters took the same general line as the other small western and northern states. From a very early stage their confidence in collective security was qualified by anxiety for themselves. After the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the breakdown of sanctions against Italy these small Powers lost faith in the League's ability to protect them and by 1938 the Dutch Government, with others, no longer held itself bound either to take part in collective action or to permit the passage of troops which were to enforce the Covenant. This was a full return to the old policy of neutrality; but neutrality now did not seem to mean such complete isolation as that of 1914-18. In the first place, Belgium, which had been released in 1919 from its obligatory neutrality, had in 1935 abandoned its policy of alliance with France and announced a neutrality policy on the Dutch model; so that Holland would not stand alone but would have another neutral as neighbour. Secondly, these two

states were loosely associated with the four northern states, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. As early as 1930 some of these states had met at Oslo and formed the 'Oslo Group' which held common deliberations, sometimes joined also by Switzerland, on questions relating to their economic affairs and the law and practice of neutrality.

Neutrality seemed less lonely; but the grim fact of German power taught the Dutch that they, like all the threatened states, must look to their armaments. They were much more exposed to the danger of a German attack than in 1914. The eastern frontier of Belgium had in the meantime been heavily fortified; and if the Germans wanted to turn the left flank of the French and British armies it would be much harder to do it by attacking only Belgium, so that there was a far greater inducement than in 1914 to attack Holland as well. Unfortunately, Dr. Colijn's government had at the same time to cope with the economic depression, and rearmament was tied up with the division of opinion over saving or spending. When a European war was seen to be imminent in 1939, the Dutch, in conjunction with the other Oslo states, appealed to the consciences of the Great Powers. The group held a one-day conference at Brussels on the 23rd of August, and King Leopold of the Belgians on their behalf broadcast an appeal for peace that evening. By that time, however, war was certain. The German minister at The Hague gave, with unusual emphasis, an assurance that Germany would respect the sanctity and integrity of Dutch soil. Preparations for the defence of neutrality were pushed on. Mobilization was ordered, between three and four hundred thousand men were called up. Economic regulations, for ensuring stocks of food and raw materials, were put into force. As a last attempt King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina on the 28th offered their good offices to Germany,

France, Great Britain, Italy, and Poland; but in vain.

For the first eight months of the war the Dutch followed with absolute consistency the policy so begun. When Poland was beaten Hitler made a speech which was described by the Germans as a peace offer: the Dutch Government thought that it might lead to a settlement, and therefore on the 7th of November the Queen, again in conjunction with the King of the Belgians, made a second tender of good offices; but again without success. Holland could now do no more than look after the welfare of its own people and avoid giving just cause of complaint to either side. The economic problem at home was difficult: blockade and counter-blockade imposed restrictions which had to be met by the strengthening of controls at home, and by fresh government expenditure on supplies and on relief for the growing numbers of unemployed. In asserting their trading rights, in protesting against flights of belligerent aircraft over their territories, in protesting against the sinking of their ships, the Dutch punctiliously fulfilled the duties of neutrals under international law. It is true that they had far more to complain of against the Germans than against the French and British: while one side confiscated contraband, the other committed wholesale murder on the high seas and, in the Venlo incident of November 1939, violated their territory by land. In every case, however, the Dutch Government behaved correctly to both sides. As the weeks went on it became more and more clear that correctness could not exorcise the German danger. Three times news was received which led to preparations for resisting an immediate invasion. Each of these alarms blew over; and we do not yet know how much there was behind them; but besides these alarms there was a general worsening of the attitude of Germany. There were

threats and complaints in the German press; there were spies everywhere; traitors had to be arrested; the N.S.B. was ominously busy.

The Invasion and the War

At dawn on the 10th of May the Germans invaded Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France by land and air. The Dutch did their duty and did it bravely; but their resistance was battered down by an enormous preponderance of force, and, as we all remember, by the surprise of parachutists and the ubiquitous treachery of Germans behind the front. A mechanized column pushed northwards across the Moerdijk Bridge, taking the main defences, the line of inundations between the Zuyder Zee and the Waal, in the rear. When the Dutch air force had been practically annihilated the German bombers perpetrated the crime of Rotterdam. With French and British help resistance was maintained for a few days in Zeeland; but the main Dutch forces had no choice but surrender. The Queen and her Government moved to London.

From there they are directing the war effort of the Dutch navy, of the colonies, and of free Dutchmen all over the world. In Great Britain there is a Dutch Legion consisting of the troops which escaped from Holland, and the recruits who have been added by the conscription of Dutchmen resident here. The Dutch navy, as we hear from time to time when its exploits are reported, is co-operating with the British. The Dutch merchant fleet is an important factor in the Allied effort at sea. The economic resources of the Dutch empire, with its great fund of organizing ability, are thrown into the struggle.

The German Occupation

German occupation is much the same in all countries; the chief difference is the order in which the

various forms of oppression come in. In Holland there was at first a pretence of mildness. From the first the press was controlled and there were wholesale requisitions; but no quisling government has been set up, if only because the N.S.B. cannot muster sufficient men of experience and ability to man a large municipality, let alone a government. At the head of each department of state is its 'Secretary-General', in normal times the official permanent head under the Minister. The Secretaries-General are now under Seyss-Inquart, the German Governor-General. The pretence of mildness did not last long. When the Germans saw that there was no response to their clumsy blandishments, they brought in their familiar devices, the Gestapo, wholesale internments in concentration camps, compulsory transference of workmen to Germany, closing of universities, permission for the N.S.B. to form storm-troops, anti-Semitic laws, provocations which ended in street fights and led on to repression. Members or supporters of the N.S.B. have been made governors of the provinces of Limburg and Utrecht, and burgomasters of Amsterdam and other towns where there were strikes or disturbances. Huge financial exactions and the plundering of food and raw materials have made the country poor and wretched.

The Dutch people have never loved the Germans and now they hate them. Some bold spirits have secretly organized resistance, and fifteen were executed in March 1941, on what evidence we do not know. The time when open resistance can bring success has not yet come; but courageous protests against injustices have been made by the churches. There is proof that the nation is loyal to the House of Orange and refuses to be convinced by German propaganda.

Since the parliament cannot sit, and since the people have gone through and are still going through terrible experiences, there is a widespread desire for discus-

sion and the expression of political ideals. This has led to the formation of the Netherlands Union (*Nederlandsche Unie*), which began in July 1940 and is said to have attained the astonishing membership of more than half a million. The great majority of the members of the Union seem to have joined it as a demonstration of patriotic feeling, and in some of their statements its leaders have stood out boldly against germanization; but they have made mistakes which savour of political inexperience, for instance, in hoping to press on with social reforms during the occupation, and some of their statements do not match well with the parliamentary tradition. In a recent broadcast the Queen expressed the true national view: 'It is not open to any doubt that our political order will have to take into account the changed circumstances and the experiences of recent times. As soon as possible after our liberation the first cuttings for this will have to be planted.' But not till then.

Holland's Aims in the War

The neutrality which had given Holland a hundred years of peace was destroyed by the Germans on the 10th of May, 1940. Germany had obtained such a lead in armaments, especially in mechanized troops and aircraft, that no Dutch armaments would have been adequate to keep the invader out of the country. The first purpose of the Dutch resistance is to win back the freedom of the country, but Dutch war aims are not confined to this one point. Although they came into the war by an entirely different road from ourselves, and although they are making their contribution as a fully independent ally, not as a satellite state, still they are fighting for the wider aim of the Allies, a just and stable international order. As Lord Halifax said in New York: 'It is not possible now to draw detailed plans for the future structure of the

community of nations. These must naturally await discussion in free council by those concerned.' One of the questions for that discussion is this: how can the small nations enjoy their independence without continual danger not only to themselves but also to their neighbours, even their greater neighbours, from the menace of the aggressors?

The freedom of the Netherlands is valuable to us not merely on strategic grounds. It has been of immense value to the civilization of all Europe and all the world. Dutch independence has been the foundation of the greatness of Dutchmen in many generations who have given to the world new and living thoughts and experiences and beliefs. For nearly four hundred years, the Dutch people have stood up for their freedom against the tyranny of successive invaders; and the free nations who have welcomed them as Allies recognize that the world needs them as a free nation. Just as their freedom must be restored by the joint effort of the Allies, so its preservation, once it is restored, must depend on the collective strength and wisdom of the friends of justice. In a recent speech Prince Bernhard, the Queen's soldier son-in-law, expressed his heartfelt wish that the close ties of friendship and co-operation which now linked Great Britain and the Netherlands might always be maintained. He said: 'Many great responsibilities we share, and I believe that the influence of our present brotherhood in arms may reach far beyond the war issue of the moment.'

OXFORD BOOKS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

THE best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Vol. 14. of the *Oxford History of England*. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.).

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. 6d. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines in evidence to-day.

The outbreak of the present war is described and discussed in the lectures by H. A. L. Fisher, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray, R. C. K. Ensor, Harold Nicolson, and J. L. Brierly, collected and published in one volume under the title *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.). The deeper issues at stake are summed up in Lord Halifax's famous Oxford address, *The Challenge to Liberty* (3d.), which is included in the volume of his *Speeches on Foreign Policy* (10s. 6d.).

The economics of 'total' warfare are described in Mr. Geoffrey Crowther's *Ways and Means of War* (2s. 6d.), an enlargement of his two Oxford Pamphlets (Nos. 23 and 25).

The prices quoted above are net and held good in March 1941, but are liable to alteration without notice.



AMERICA BETWEEN THE OCEANS

Sea routes in nautical miles. The distance between Davao and Natal is about 1630 nautical miles.

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No. 50

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

BY

D. W. BROGAN

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Not only the winning of the war, but the future of civilization depends upon some kind of collaboration between the United States and the British Empire, and the meeting in August 1941 of President and Prime Minister on the waters of the Atlantic, that both divides and joins America and Britain, symbolizes the supreme importance of this collaboration.

When two democratic groups go into partnership, the foundations must be laid on mutual understanding and knowledge of each other by the people of each group. Nowhere is this knowledge more necessary—or the lack of it more likely to lead to misunderstanding—than in the field of foreign policy. In this pamphlet Professor Brogan describes the traditional outlook of America on world affairs, the policy which she has followed in recent years, and the machinery by which that policy is carried out. He clears up many difficulties for the British reader—such as the real meaning (or meanings, for it has varied from time to time) of the Monroe Doctrine; the reason why America has time and again renounced all participation in European affairs, but is time and again drawn back into them; the nature of Pan-Americanism; the occasional striking apparent discrepancy between the high moral line taken in foreign affairs by American public opinion, and the much more ‘realistic’ attitude of the State Department. Particular attention is devoted to the development of policy since 1918 and the gradual weakening of the extreme isolationist position, and the most controversial subjects, such as the League of Nations, War Debts, and the Neutrality legislation, are dealt with with admirable detachment.

Professor Brogan is the author of *The U.S.A.: An Outline of the Country, its People and Institutions* in ‘The World To-day’ series.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The United States and the World

IT is not a mere accident of language that in American speech 'frontier' means not the area bordering on neighbouring states, but an ever-changing internal area, the region won in any generation from the wilderness and the Indian and, in a more general way, the whole process of settling and civilizing the vast empty areas of the North American continent. Nor is it unimportant that of the two wars that have left an abiding mark on the American national memory, the first, which the British call 'the War of Independence', is known to the Americans as 'the Revolutionary War', while the second is known to all the world (except the South) as 'the American Civil War'.¹ Other wars have created military reputations or have provided political issues, but no war, not fought on the present territory of the United States, has left a permanent mark on American life, has really entered into the national tradition. This is true of the wars with Mexico and Spain and even of the American share in the World War of 1914-18. There is in the American attitude to these conflicts something of the spectator's attitude, something of the attitude, too, of the man who regrets a youthful folly. Few Americans feel the equivalent of Rupert Brooke's 'corner of a foreign field that is for ever England' and the main effort of American piety after the last war was not to create great war cemeteries in France, but to bring back to America the bodies of her dead.

For the greater part of its history, the United States has been able to ignore the power politics of less fortunate regions. It has no near neighbours who are in the least

¹ In the South it is known as 'the War Between the States'.

degree formidable to it. It is not only that until very modern times the United States had no need to fear any but naval power, but that no European power, no matter what its character and ambitions, could risk the immense extension of its ambitions across the Atlantic or Pacific, because no power was sufficiently secure at home to dare turn its back to Europe or Asia and bring into its own orbit any part of the New World. Without being conscious of it, the United States benefited from a balance of power that kept Europe disunited and left the United States potentially the strongest power in the world—and gave it time, if need be, to turn that potentiality into actual fact.

It was natural, then, for American statesmen, and still more for American public opinion, to regard foreign policy as something of a luxury. American diplomatic history, save for brief moments like the period of the Civil War, does not consist of elaborate manœuvres, of treaties and alliances, but of claims for compensation for injury to American citizens in Russia, China, Ireland, in disputes over the admission of pork to the German market, or Japanese to California. The American minister or ambassador was by definition a wall-flower. He watched the diplomatic dance, he did not join in it.

The composite character of the American population helped to make this attitude part of American political tradition. There were too many emotional links between various American and European groups to make it prudent for the United States to take a line in world politics which would lead to the reproduction, in America, of the age-old feuds of Europe, and for many a reasonable and generous American, one of the worst results of American intervention in the last war was the bitterness it bred between German-Americans and other Americans. To the average American, an active and continuous foreign policy has the same repellent quality as a rigorous and long-continued health regime has to a normally robust man.

The U.S. as Missionary of Freedom

Yet there are certain permanent characteristics of American foreign policy and of American public sentiment towards questions of foreign policy. Deeply engraved on the American mind is the belief that 'righteousness exalteth a nation' and if the sin that is 'a reproach to any people' is more easily imputed by Americans to other nations than to themselves, that is merely to say that Americans are human. But there always has been in the United States, ever since its foundation, a constantly vigilant minority, becoming from time to time a majority, that has criticized, opposed and altered the policy of the Union. In the long run, no policy that is merely self-regarding, merely prudential, has commanded continuous American support and whether the alleged victims of American oppression have been Indians a century ago or Nicaraguans in the last twenty years, the conscience of America has been aroused by men and women convinced that the United States owes the world a higher standard than the mere pursuit of the maximum advantages made possible by her position and her power.

This view of the United States as, in a special sense, a trustee for the hopes of mankind, a force making for progress and enlightenment, dates in part from the Puritan founders of New England, but more directly from the makers of the Republic. They, or the democratic section of them, were convinced that the new nation had a great role as a teacher by example. The old bad days of tyranny and darkness were over in the United States and the vision of America as the home of 'liberty enlightening the world was early cherished'—and not only in America but in Europe as well.

It was this belief that America was the great exemplar of liberty, of democracy, that is the basis of Lincoln's most famous speech. If the Union fails, so ran his brief argument at Gettysburg, the possibility of the survival of

a nation 'conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal' will be held to be disproved. For democracy, the belief in equality, is the American political religion. He who in Europe or in Britain makes these matters of little moment, talks of mere 'idiosyncrasies' of political behaviour, cuts himself off from the living waters of American life. For that life is based on Jefferson's belief that the day had come when it was evident in America that 'the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favoured few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others.'

No 'Entangling Alliances'

This view of the United States as a missionary of freedom is, at first sight, incompatible with another equally strong American tradition, the doctrine preached by Washington in his Farewell Address. 'The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.'¹ But the circumstances of the age explain Washington's attitude well enough. He was concerned to warn his countrymen against the dangers of their taking sides, passionately, in the great controversies over the French Revolution. His warning was as much addressed to the dangers of what we call a 'Fifth Column' as against too active a foreign policy. But it was undoubtedly a warning against too great concern with the then remote continent of Europe which had 'a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation'. That the United States was not strong enough, or united enough, to play a part in European politics was the judgment of all the Founding Fathers. She grew stronger, but she did not, in this field, neces-

¹ It is almost universally believed that Washington warned his countrymen against 'entangling alliances'. That phrase is Jefferson's.

sarily grow much more united. And Europe, torn with dynastic and national feuds, was not a theatre in which America could act naturally or with ease. American opinion was puzzled and angered by the apparently endless tale of blood, and grateful that 3,000 miles and sound political institutions separated her from the incorrigible continent.

American Sympathy with Democracy

Yet this political reserve was, not incompatible with sympathy with democratic movements. Greeks, Hungarians, Italians, Poles,* Irish, Armenians, Chinese—all the peoples whom American ways of thought identified with the good fight—got sympathy and aid and comfort from Americans, if not from the United States. It was not only the realization of how deep was the gulf between the imperial German government and the United States that made it possible for Wilson to lead the American people into the war in 1917, but the collapse of the Tsardom, the symbol for most Americans of dynastic tyranny and corruption.

On the plane of sentiment, American public opinion and American policy have swung from realization of her geographical remoteness and ignorance to passionate sympathy with those who spoke or seemed to speak her political language. If the pendulum has usually swung back to an isolationist policy, which, it is asserted, is sanctified by the advice of Washington, it has done so because Americans have been pained and disillusioned to discover that a community of ideals is not enough, that there must be a community of interest and of continuing effort. For as Chesterton pointed out after the last war, 'The world will never be made safe' for democracy; it is a dangerous trade.' *Eternal* vigilance is the price of liberty and, like other peoples, the Americans are tempted to lie back and regard as permanently won the victory that each generation must win over again, the victory of liberty and

law. When it has become plain that the battle has to be fought again, the American people has remembered its charter, the Declaration of Independence, which declares for all men, not merely for Americans, the right to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'.

The Machinery of American Foreign Policy

The American constitution, too, imposes special obstacles to diplomacy. In the words of the Constitution the President has 'power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur'. The framers of the Constitution in 1787 thought it possible that the Senate would act as a kind of Privy Council, that it would both propose treaties to the President and advise him during the course of negotiations; but although both have been done, in normal practice the Senate's control over foreign policy becomes operative only when the President has negotiated a treaty and demands its ratification.¹ That is, the division of power between an executive, the President (whom Congress cannot get rid of) and the legislature, Congress (which the President cannot dissolve), is carried over to the field of foreign affairs. The Constitution, by forbidding cabinet officers to sit in Congress, has made it necessary to find other means of collaboration. Therefore the Secretary of State² has constantly to deal with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and especially with its Chairman.

This provision of the American constitution can be defended to-day for the same reasons that caused its adoption in 1787. To grant unlimited power of treaty-making to the President would be to abandon a large part

¹ The consent of the Senate is also required for the appointment of ambassadors, ministers, etc., but this power is seldom used to control policy.

² The American Foreign Office is known as the Department of State. Although its work is almost exclusively diplomatic, it has a few formal functions in domestic affairs.

of the legislative power to him, for treaties, like ordinary federal statutes, are part of 'the supreme law of the land'. It was so evident that such a grant was contrary to the separation of powers of the federal constitution, that it was originally proposed to exclude the President from treaty-making altogether. But so much diplomatic business must, in fact, be executive in character, that this plan was recognized as equally impracticable; the conjunction of the Senate and the President in treaty-making was thus inevitable.¹

More difficult to justify is the requirement of a special, two-thirds majority for the ratification of treaties. As each State has the same representation in the Senate, regardless of its size and population, the one-third plus one that may veto a treaty may represent a great deal less than a third of the American people. Quite a small minority can block an international policy desired by a large majority. Yet the two-thirds rule can be justified. It reflects the fact that the United States is very large, very diversified and that a foreign policy that has not a very wide backing, fairly distributed over the whole union, is dangerous.

Yet American constitutional rules make American diplomatic action very difficult. A President negotiating a treaty may bear in mind the probable reactions of the Senate; he may consult leading Senators; he may use them as negotiators; but he can never be sure that the most carefully drafted treaty will not be so altered in the Senate that he will be unprepared to act on it, or the foreign nation will refuse to accept the senatorial amendments, or the Senate will itself refuse to ratify the treaty in any version. As amendments can be made by simple majorities, it is possible for a succession of amendments to

¹ When treaties involve the expenditure of money, in addition to senatorial ratification of the treaty it is necessary to have a Bill voting the money passed by a majority of each House. In such cases, it is difficult to prevent the merits of the Treaty itself being debated in the House of Representatives, without whose action the Treaty would in effect remain a dead letter.

be passed which produce a final version of the treaty so inconsistent or so unworkable that the necessary two-thirds majority cannot be found.

Then, as in all congressional business, the role of the relevant committee is of great importance. It is in the Committee of Foreign Relations that the treaty is first debated and amended or rejected. That committee may be filled with Senators of the party opposed to the President or by dissident members of his own party. Its members have not the pressure of responsibility for action that drives Presidents to seek to do something; reasons for not doing anything are not hard to come by. On the other hand, most members of this committee go on to it because they are interested in foreign affairs; membership has prestige value but is not of immediate political importance in domestic affairs. Normally weight in the Committee goes by length of service, which ensures that the leading members have had a long experience of diplomatic business. On the other hand, mere seniority may bring to the chairmanship of the Committee a Senator who is unfit for his job, or bitterly hostile to the President.

Lastly, the constitutional control of foreign affairs by the Senate encourages debate on all issues of foreign policy. Petitions, delegations, public-opinion polls, even interruptions from the gallery, even picketing of Senators whose views are disliked by any organized group, ensure that Senators will not forget that they are representatives of the people, not irresponsible legislators. The barrage of appeal and counter-appeal may intimidate some Senators and baffle others and it ensures that foreign policy is discussed in an atmosphere of heat which, in some cases, almost more than outweighs the advantage that it is discussed in the light.

Areas of Special Interest : The Pacific

It is natural that we should think of American foreign policy in terms of European conflict, but, in fact,

American policy has been far more concerned with what in America is called 'the Orient' and with the rest of the American continents than it has been concerned with Europe.

American interest in the Pacific dates from the early days of the Republic, when the American merchant and sailor found in China one of their most profitable fields of action. Soon there was added the great missionary interest which, in political and emotional power, came to eclipse any purely commercial connection. By making over its share of the indemnity imposed on China after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to a fund for educating Chinese in America, the United States further tightened the bonds between herself and the new China. The Chinese Revolution of 1912 was in great part the work of American-trained Chinese and still more has the personnel of the Kuomintang party been under American influence. For China, millions of Americans feel a moral responsibility and a moral interest they do not feel for any other country.

Although it was an American squadron that forced open the gates of Japan in 1853 and although there have always been important business connections with Japan, American opinion has never been as sympathetic to the island Empire as to the great continental agglomeration. The only Oriental state to become a great power, Japan was in a position to deal with the United States on equal terms. Despite the limitations accepted at the Washington Conference of 1921, the Japanese Navy in its home waters was a match for the American Navy. It was both because of reliance on the permanence of British control of the Atlantic and because of a realization that it was probably in the Pacific that American physical power might have to support moral influence, that the main American fleet was moved to the Pacific bases and that Honolulu became the chief American fortress. Yet American opinion was far behind naval opinion in its

appreciation of the realities of power politics in the Pacific. It was in agreement with the policy of ending American control of the Philippines, acquired in 1898 from Spain. It opposed the fortification of Guam: and it was content with a defence policy based on Hawaii, a policy that gave Japan, strategically, a free hand in the Asiatic half of the Pacific.

When, despite its treaty obligations, Japan took advantage of this free hand to seize Manchuria in 1931, American public opinion was indignant, but its reaction was confused. Mr. Hoover's Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson,¹ was anxious to oppose, with all the means in his power, the Japanese aggression. But it was not very clear (given American public opinion) what means were in his power. And informed American opinion was less angered by British hesitation to launch out on a bold policy in which the Hoover administration might not be able to follow, than distressed by the forensic skill and, indeed, by something that might almost be called warmth, with which the then British Foreign Secretary² put the Japanese case. As the Manchuria 'incident' has developed into the 'China incident', that is, into a first-class war, American opinion has become increasingly hostile to Japan, prepared to support lavish economic aid for China, but still holding off from any steps that might make a move from moral and economic to military support inevitable or even likely.

Yet American interest in China is deep and genuine. There was probably more real indignation over the bestialities that followed Japanese victories in China than over formally more provocative acts like the bombing of the American gunboat *Panay* in the Yangtse (1937). As the European situation has got more critical, the implications of the Axis for American security have become

¹ Now Mr Roosevelt's Secretary of War.

² Lord (then Sir John) Simon.

clearer; the nuisance value to Germany of Japanese threats has been noted and resented; and the decision to build a 'two-ocean' navy reveals the death of the illusion that, in the contemporary world, moral example or aid are enough in themselves.

Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine

Even more involved in American emotions, historical traditions and economic and strategic interests, is the rest of the American continents. Canada can be dismissed in a few words. It is hardly regarded as a foreign country, though the odd illusion that it is 'owned' by Britain still survives. All but a few cranks admit that the protection of Canada is a fundamental interest of the United States. Less easy to define or illustrate is the attitude of the United States to Latin-America, that mass of traditions, policies, precedents, interests covered by the magic term 'the Monroe Doctrine'

According to American legend, an apparently respectable citizen was about to be lynched despite his frenzied protests. He was rescued by the Sheriff who asked what was his offence. 'He said that he didn't believe in the Monroe Doctrine'. 'It's untrue. I love the Monroe Doctrine; I admire the Monroe Doctrine; I'd die for the Monroe Doctrine. All I said was that I didn't know what it was.'

Indeed, the Monroe Doctrine has not merely meant different things at different times; it has never meant to the average citizen anything very concrete; it has been rather an attitude than a policy; while, for the rulers of America, it has been a useful phrase, respectable and emotionally potent, which could be used to cover up a realistic and utilitarian policy whose utility the man in the street might not have been able to appreciate, had the policy not been guaranteed by its identification with the mysterious dogma.

Historically, the message of President Monroe of

2 December 1823 was directed against schemes deemed dangerous to the interests and sentiments of the American government. It was directed against a revival of European projects of expansion on the north American continent; here the immediately dangerous power was Russia, which was advancing down the Pacific coast to California from Alaska. The United States had a good reason to dislike claim-staking of this kind, for not wishing any part of the American continents '... [to] be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers'. In North America, at least, the United States was resolved to be the dominant power and to be the universal legatee for all collapsing empires. In less than a generation after Russia had been politely requested to stay out of California, the United States had conquered and annexed that remote dependency of the young Mexican Republic. The Monroe Doctrine was in no sense a self-denying ordinance, although the valid claims of existing European powers in the Americas were excepted from the Doctrine's ban.

The message of President Monroe was an announcement to all whom it might concern that the United States had an interest in the *status quo*, including in that *status* the independence of the newly-established States of Latin America. But it did not, in its first form, guarantee these States against aggression from the United States. The first generation, at least, of the Doctrine was also the age of 'Manifest Destiny', the belief that as the strongest, most energetic, most progressive power in America, the United States would be only anticipating the inevitable march of history if she abolished such anomalies as the survival of British rule in Canada and Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Nor was this all. As Mexico passed through revolution after revolution, it came to be widely accepted that American power 'and therefore rights' could and should be extended to cover all North America down to Darien, as it was taken as in the nature of things

that when the time came to build a canal across the isthmus of Panama, the United States would do it.

Yet it must be pointed out that the United States resisted several tempting opportunities to annex Cuba; that when she occupied Cuba she carried out her promise to make the island independent; and that her rule in Puerto Rico has been financially generous and as humane and tolerant as the permanently unsatisfactory economic condition of that over-crowded island permits. The United States did make war on Mexico in 1846, but she imposed terms of peace far less rigorous than the prostrate Mexicans could have been forced to accept, and one result of that moderation is that to this day the greatest of American western rivers, the Colorado, enters the sea through Mexican territory, which is highly inconvenient to the United States. In the long run, it was the United States which built the Panama Canal, but she was generous to the heirs of the French pioneers, and if she insisted on being freed from the shackles of the old treaties that tied her hands, President Wilson was able to induce Congress to repeal legislation giving American shipping preferential rights in the canal built by American money and American skill.

The second aspect of the Monroe Doctrine was vaguer, more ideological. Alarmed by hints conveyed by the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, the American government protested against designs attributed to conservative European powers, 'the Holy Alliance', of restoring Spanish rule in the revolted States of South America by means of a French expeditionary force. The United States in 1823 was not powerful enough to have prevented a French fleet and army being transported to Buenos Aires, a region more remote from New York than from Cherbourg. But there was no serious intention of sending such an expedition, and it was natural that a strong United States should, in later generations, have exaggerated the effect of this declaration of sentiment into a potent affirmation of policy.

This historical exaggeration soon acquired independent historical force. It became an accepted maxim of American policy that the independence of the Latin-American States and their territorial integrity was a major interest of the United States, which had a right—and a duty—to protect them against aggression from European enemies, but not from each other or from the United States.

This policy could have been attacked on narrowly prudential grounds. The southern nations of South America were remote in space, in institutions, in culture and in sentiment from the United States. It was a mere accident of nomenclature that they and the United States were located on two continents, each of which bore the name America, and which were physically joined by a narrow isthmus. Nor did economic interest furnish links that history and geography had neglected to provide. In all but mere geographical nomenclature, Argentina had more links with Britain than with the United States. The mental habit of looking at maps designed to be read from north to south, rather than looking at maps designed to be read from east to west, reinforced a political attitude that was, until the twentieth century, prophetic rather than actual. In objecting to British or French or Spanish aggression in Mexico or in the Caribbean, the United States was acting as a great power normally does. In talking as if her interest in the quarrels between Peru and Chile or the diplomatic difficulties of Venezuela and Britain were interests of the same kind as those arising from Mexican or Cuban revolutions, the United States was acting romantically. Yet it should be remembered, that had there not been this romantic sense of Pan-American duty, of the relation of a big brother to weak and foolish youngsters, there would not only have been less well-meaning interference in the remoter parts of South America, but, probably, less willingness to recognize that what went on in such close neighbours as Cuba and

Mexico *was* the business of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine was a window, a stained-glass and deceptive window, through which the United States looked out on the world. But without the Doctrine, she might not have looked out at all.

With the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 and the outbreak of the first Great War, the Monroe Doctrine acquired a new realistic character. The canal brought the Pacific nations closer to the seat of power in the United States, the Atlantic seaboard. The war, by destroying German and crippling British business activity in South America, gave an opportunity to American business, which it took. The political course of the war made the United States, for a time, the most courted and feared of the great powers and made her permanently one of the two great naval powers, and the dominating naval power in the western Atlantic and the Pacific. Compared with any of her American neighbours, even with Brazil, the United States was a colossus, and the long tradition that made her, in the eyes of the American people, especially the guardian of the weaker American nations, ensured that, at a time when any activity in foreign affairs was condemned by American public opinion, the magic formula 'Monroe Doctrine' would justify activities that, without the cover of the formula, could not have been attempted at all.

The 'Good-Neighbour' Policy

In the decades following the armistice of 1918, United States policy evolved from the friendly but patronizing attitude of an overwhelmingly powerful uncle, into what was to be called by President Franklin D. Roosevelt the 'good-neighbour' policy. Latin-American opinion had been roused to suspicion and hostility at the beginning of the century largely by the activities of President Theodore Roosevelt, above all by the support given to the Panama Revolution of 1903, a revolution that freed the United

States from the necessity of coming to terms with Colombia in order to build the Panama Canal, a convenience paid for in the suspicion and ironical scepticism that was aroused in Latin-America. Intervention in Central American and Caribbean republics to 'restore order' added to the *malaise*. President Wilson had disclaimed all annexationist intentions, and although years of Mexican revolution and counter-revolution gave the United States many legitimate grievances and many opportunities of armed intervention, Latin-America remembered General Pershing's pursuit into Mexico of the 'patriot' or bandit Pancho Villa, who had raided an American town (1916) and the less defensible occupation of Vera Cruz (1914), which was a means of bringing pressure to bear against the Mexican dictator, Huerta, whose methods of attaining power had shocked President Wilson. What was—given the immense preponderance in power of the United States and the provocations offered by various Mexican warring factions—extraordinary moderation, was not seen as such by proud and fearful Latin-Americans. 'Dollar diplomacy', the forcible collection of the external debts of ill-governed and bankrupt little republics, continued to make for bad blood. Yet American opinion, in this as in every other sphere of foreign relations, was increasingly pacific and negative. The Coolidge administration (1923-29) came to terms with Mexico; the Hoover administration (1929-33) carried farther the liquidation of all direct political commitments; and the Roosevelt administration both gave up the special rights it had in Cuba¹ (which had been freed by American arms) and abandoned the high moralistic position of the Wilson administration which had refused to recognize governments which came into power by a revolution.

The way was psychologically prepared for a more genuine 'Pan-American' policy than had been possible in

¹ Generally known, from the Senator who sponsored the limitations on Cuban sovereignty, as 'the Platt amendment'.

the past. A series of conferences, at Montevideo (1933), Lima (1938), special conference of foreign ministers at Panama (1939) and Havana (1940) sought to tighten the political and economic relations between the American powers; and the last two, held in the shadow of the new world war, tried to develop a common defence policy. But even as late as 1939, the Panama Conference was content with declaring that American waters (roughly 300 miles from the shore) were to be freed from belligerent activity. But there was no corresponding willingness to take action to enforce this declaration, and in fact there took place almost at once, in these waters, the first serious naval action of the war, the destruction of the *Graf Spee*.

In this policy there was implicit the belief that, whatever the course of war in Europe, the territorial and strategic *status quo* in the Americas was not in danger. The Roosevelt administration and American public opinion did not, indeed, display indifference to the results of the war, but it was possible to believe before May, 1940, that 'river stay away from my door' was a practical policy.

European Possessions in the Western Hemisphere

The collapse of France made a long neglected aspect of the Monroe Doctrine suddenly come to the front. Were the spoils of France to include French possessions in the western hemisphere? The American chargé d'affaires informed the German government that the U.S.A. 'would not recognize any transfer of a geographical region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power'. The German reply was not comforting; it pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine so interpreted 'would amount to conferring upon some European countries the right to possess territories in the Western Hemisphere and not to other European countries'. The American reply, in effect, agreed that this

was so; the Monroe Doctrine accepted the *status quo* of 1823, but that was all. It opposed any change in the existing territorial system of the western hemisphere as far as it affected the territories of European powers and it was designed to 'make impossible any further extension to this hemisphere of any non-American system of government imposed from without'. Germany would not be allowed to step into the shoes of France, first because European powers were regarded as mere life-tenants of their American holdings, with no powers of transfer and no non-American heirs, and because the potential heir of France, in this case, was not merely geographically but politically alien to America. Both the territorial and the ideological sides of the Doctrine barred German acquisitions in the Americas.

A generation before, the United States might have undertaken to impose this ban by her own strength alone. But although now stronger, absolutely at least, she preferred to develop the 'good-neighbour' policy, and to associate in a common policy all the American republics. So the Act of Havana (29 July 1940) provided that 'when American islands or areas at present held by non-American nations are in danger of becoming the subject-matter of exchange of territories or sovereignty, the American republics, having in mind the security of the continent and the opinion of the inhabitants of such islands or areas, may establish regions of provisional administration'. There were provisions for the establishment of an 'emergency committee' to decide on action, but with a prudent regard for the speed of events it was laid down that 'if necessity for emergency action be deemed so urgent as to make it impossible to await action of the committee, any of the American republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in a manner required for its defence or the defence of the continent'. And as an indication of the abandonment by the United States of any aggressive tendencies she may

have had in the past, it was laid down that as 'the peoples of this continent have a right to self-determination, such territories shall either be organized into autonomous territories, should they appear capable of constituting or maintaining themselves in such a state, or be reinstated to the former situation'.

Destroyers exchanged for Bases

This self-denying ordinance was not enough for some ardent spirits who demanded the immediate seizure of European possessions in the West Indies as payment of the defaulted war debts or on general grounds of safety first. The American government and public opinion refused to imitate Hitler. But the dangers implicit in the situation were not wholly met by a declared readiness to prevent the seizure of Martinique. For the effective defence of the western hemisphere necessitated the use of the outer bastions of the continents. Fortunately for the United States, all these bastions were in the hands of nations either at war with Germany (Britain and Holland), or occupied by Germany and helpless (like Denmark and France).¹ These powers could not resist American demands and, in the case of Britain and Holland, had not the slightest wish to do so.

The acceptance from Britain of the right to build bases in British territory in return for the transfer of fifty American destroyers was a legitimate development of American policy. The fortification of West Indian bases was to the advantage of the United States and so was the transfer of the destroyers, for they increased British power of resistance and so, at the lowest estimate, gave the United States time to prepare her new defensive positions. But it was significant that the transfer was made by presidential action, without consultation of either house of

¹ I have treated Greenland as politically part of the West Indies and ignored the legally worthless protests of the Copenhagen Government against the agreement made in Washington in 1941 by the Danish minister.

Congress. Critics of the transfer who confined their criticism to this point, revealed their pedantry rather than their wisdom, for no one doubted that the American people wanted the transfer or that if it were put up to Congress, the will of the people would only be carried out after a long and dangerous delay. More substantial was the criticism which insisted that the transfer was an unneutral act. By American precedent it was. If it was a breach of neutrality for the British government to allow a private shipbuilding firm surreptitiously to build a warship for the South in the Civil War, what was it for the American government openly to transfer fifty of its own warships? But it was realised that neutrality in the old sense was gone; without any formal breach with Germany, the United States was aiding Germany's enemies. Whether this was or was not a belligerent act would depend, not on American, but on German policy—and German policy would ignore American actions as long as it suited German interests and German needs.

It is generally realized in the United States that until the 'two-ocean' navy is built (which will not be before 1946), the power of the United States to implement the Monroe Doctrine is limited. It is also realized that fleet-building is a game that two can play at, and that Hitler, in undisturbed command of the resources of Europe, could, with his Japanese partner, outbuild the United States. The Roosevelt administration and the majority of the American people accept this truth and draw the conclusion that Hitler must not be allowed to get undisturbed command of the resources of Europe, above all of Britain. They support, that is, the extension of aid to Britain to carry on the war against Hitlerism as at worst the buying of time and at best the buying of relief from this nightmare. But although most isolationists deny the danger, some are more candid and consistent. They admit that, faced with a victorious Axis, the United States could not help China, or the Dutch East Indies, or even the great

republics of South America. The United States would be forced to retire within her new island barriers, make the great economic readjustments necessary and, armed to the teeth, make of North America a new ark, waiting if necessary for generations before it would be possible to send out the dove of peace and get something back other than a heavy bomber.

The United States and the World Crisis

In their attitude to the developing crisis in Europe, the American people revealed their belief that history could and did repeat itself, but that it could be prevented from doing so by skilful legislation. Over all American foreign policy, from 1920 to 1933, lay the shadow of the national disillusionment with the results of the war fought to 'make the world safe for democracy'. Being human, the American people did not assess very objectively the share their own refusal to enter the League of Nations had in this break-down. They were easily made victims of the same type of German propaganda against the territorial settlement that had so great a success with the sentimental and ignorant of all classes in Britain. They were also impressed by the more reasonable criticism that was directed against the economic results of the Peace of Versailles—and, at the same time, reluctant to see that by putting a stop to immigration, by going back to a system of high tariffs and by insisting on the payment of Europe's debts, the United States was contributing at least as much to the economic misery and so to the political instability of Europe as the peace-makers of Versailles had done.

Not only did the United States refuse to enter the League, she refused (or the Senate refused to permit her) to join the World Court, despite the recommendations of every President from Harding to Roosevelt. Not until the Roosevelt administration came to office in 1933 did she even risk joining the International Labour Office.

The War Debts

One of the chief links uniting America to the post-war Europe was that of the war debts. Altogether, the United States lent its associates nearly \$13,000,000,000, a sum whose psychological importance may be grasped when it is remembered that it is more than thirteen times the total American national debt when the United States entered the war in 1917. No attempt was ever made to collect the whole sum, or to exact interest rates on an actuarial basis. Congress authorized the negotiation of separate debt settlements with the various countries involved, settlements based on ability to pay, a statesman-like move which had, from the point of view of Britain, the awkward consequence that she had to pay interest on 80% of her debt, while, at the other extreme, Italy had only to pay on 25% of her debt. Nor was this all, Britain was a debtor of the United States but a creditor of the other Allies and, of course, a creditor of Germany for reparations. To British public opinion it seemed plain that all these debts were linked, politically and economically, if not legally. This point of view was put forward in the unfortunately worded Balfour Note of 1922 which tentatively offered to forgive British debtors provided that we were forgiven our debts. The Balfour note was angrily received in America as an attempt to impose the odium of debt-collecting on the United States. The American attitude, summed up in the famous words of President Coolidge, 'they hired the money, didn't they?' was taken in Britain to show American ignorance of the true nature of international trade and international debt and, especially, the difference between debts arising from genuine commercial transactions and those arising from so completely uneconomic an enterprise as war.

The war debt settlement, based as it was on sixty-two yearly payments, was as unrealistic as any other part of the post-war settlement could be said to be. It assumed a

political and economic fixity which the extraordinary changes in the price-level, if nothing else, made it impossible to believe in. Indeed, while the last war-debt agreements were being made, the United States was indirectly sponsoring the first of the revisions of the economic terms of Versailles, called, after the American ambassador in London, the Dawes Plan. Five years later another and 'final' readjustment was again made which bore the name of its chief American sponsor, the Young Plan. Nor was this all. Although the average American did not understand what was happening, American capital was financing the recovery of Europe, or, more specifically, the recovery of Germany, which borrowed in the United States all the money she paid as reparations and a good deal more. Other countries borrowed too.

In effect, the payments made by Europe, whether for war or commercial debts, were transformed into new loans to Europe until the boom and smash of 1929, by cutting off supplies from America, brought about the economic collapse of Germany. This became evident, and President Hoover took the bold step in 1931 of offering a suspension of the current year's war-debt payments for a suspension of the reparations payments for the same period. This lifebelt was grasped at with eagerness by Britain and Germany, with less enthusiasm by France, and all European powers knew that reparations payments, once suspended, would never be resumed. This truth was admitted by the European creditors of Germany, but with an election coming no American President or presidential candidate could admit the corollary, evident to all Europeans, that it was politically impossible for the late associates of the United States to go on paying interest on the war debts while the late enemy of the United States was excused all reparations payments.

Under various disguises, the European debtors of the United States ceased to pay, and American opinion was further confirmed in its judgement that power politics was

a game in which it was bound to be swindled. The last chance of restoring the old economic order in Europe, the Economic Conference of 1933, was destroyed by the refusal of the new Roosevelt administration to consent to a general currency stabilization, and, with that refusal, the last tie binding America to Europe's troubles seemed to have been cut. The Johnson Act of 1934, forbidding the raising of public or private loans in the United States by the defaulting war debt powers, was intended not only as a rebuke, but as a proof that, at last, the United States had got free from the results of 'entangling alliances'.

America and Hitler

But the world in which this policy was realistic was already dead. Herr Hitler came into office two months before Mr. Roosevelt. From the beginning American opinion saw the Hitler regime as it was. It was not misled (as British opinion was) by the testimony of doubtless well-meaning persons who were able to see the bright side of the darkness that had descended on Germany. The basic German doctrine of race loyalty was seen to be profoundly dangerous for a country so mixed in origin as America. If people of German or Italian origin owed a special loyalty and duty to the country of their birth or ancestry, the internal security of the United States was threatened. Nor was the true character of the Nazi regime easily hidden from a people that had its own gangsters. At the most, the American 'appeasers' argued that it was foolish to ignore the fact that Hitler was there and seemed likely to stay; a prudent business man in Chicago in 1930 had to deal with Al Capone; no nation could afford to keep too tender a conscience. Yet even this view was not widely popular and its exponents found their motives misunderstood—or understood.

American opinion was bitterly hostile to Hitler, but at first not willing to do much about it. For, to the American, the case was simple. Largely thanks to American

aid, the western powers had secured overwhelming military superiority over Germany as a result of the first world war. Now that Germany was palpably threatening to renew the war, why not act while there was yet time?

As it became more and more evident that the western powers would not act while there was yet time, American opinion became pre-occupied with the problem of how to keep America out of the war that was coming. Mr. Roosevelt tried to prevent or delay, by diplomatic pressure, the outbreak of war; Congress tried by legislation to prevent America getting into war if it came.

As is usual in human affairs, the motives for this policy were mixed. Much was due to the human reluctance to endure the risks and losses of another war. Although by European standards, American losses in the last world war had been slight, they had occurred far from home and for a cause which the results of the war seemed to show had been betrayed. The world had not been made safe for democracy.

Isolationism and Neutrality Legislation

Propagandists, most of them honest and zealous, some of them emotionally or personally linked with the German cause or with the minority which had opposed entrance into the last war, helped to spread the view not only that America and the world had gained nothing from the last war, but that the ostensible motives for American intervention were not the real ones. A Senate committee investigating the munitions industry not only discredited the 'Merchants of Death' who were still active, but attempted to show that it was as a result of the activities of the munitions industry between 1914 and 1917 that America had been led to the disastrous step of intervention in a quarrel which was none of hers. It was the contention of Senator Nye that one of the main causes of American intervention was the creation of a great vested interest in Allied victory. The great crime of the Wilson

administration had been to allow American industry to become geared up to the Allied war machine. If the United States had not entered the war in 1917, so the argument ran, the Allies would have been unable to continue their purchases and there would have been an immediate and catastrophic slump. That this consideration had any effect on Wilson's policy in the critical months before the final breach with Germany is not only not proved but, as far as a negative can be proved, is disproved. But it should be noted that side by side with a warm and, sometimes, sentimental appreciation of moral ideas, there is present in the American mind a kind of moral diffidence. To admit that the United States entered the last war for non-material interests would be to admit that the United States is often not narrowly realist in her attitudes, and many Americans would rather appear as dupes or cynics than as crusaders. Finally, it was to the interest of those parties and sections which wished to cause America to withdraw from European commitments to belittle the moral claims of the cause for which the United States fought in 1917 and 1918.

A practical consequence of this 'hard-boiled' view of the cause of American intervention in 1917 was the adoption of legislative policies that were designed to prevent America being dragged into a new war by the same forces that, it was asserted, had dragged her into the last world war.

If law laid down in advance that America should not supply belligerents with munitions, European powers would not be encouraged to fight by the thought that they could draw on America, and America would be saved, in advance, from the temptation of the fairy gold of munitions profits. Legislation beginning in 1935 and given final form in 1937 imposed an embargo on the export of munitions when war broke out. Combined with the Johnson Act of 1934, which forbade public or private loans to countries defaulting on their war debts to the

United States, this legislation was designed to keep America out of war as far as destroying financial interest in the success of one belligerent could do so. It ignored, of course, the serious financial interest that the United States might have in the victory of one belligerent rather than the other, quite apart from war loans or munitions contracts.

It was not this consideration, however, that shook American faith in this legislation. The Spanish Civil War provided the first test and, although the original legislation did not deal with civil wars, the Roosevelt administration, following a British lead, induced Congress to amend the law to apply the embargo to Spain. This was an administration triumph that later plagued the victors, but it was significant that some of the warmest supporters of the general arms embargo did not wish it applied to Spain. More serious was the growing realization that a great crisis was coming in Europe or had, in fact, begun. The mass of American opinion was in favour of 'standing up to Hitler', was opposed to appeasement, was highly critical of the Munich policy, and yet it was realized that the readiness of the western powers to stand up to Hitler was likely to be greatly increased if they could be sure that they could rely on their superior naval and financial strength to draw supplies, especially aircraft, from the United States.

The Roosevelt administration made a determined effort in the summer of 1939 to secure the repeal of the embargo but unsuccessfully. Many Senators preferred to believe Senator Borah when he asserted that his information, which was better than that of the President, showed that there would be no war.

The 'Cash and Carry' Policy

When war came, the President imposed the embargo and again appealed to Congress for an alteration of the law. After a lengthy and bitter debate, the Administra-

tion scored a victory, but not an unconditional victory. The new neutrality law was designed, said a wit, 'to keep the United States out of the war of 1914'. It allowed the export of arms but on rigorous conditions. Before they could be delivered to the European purchaser, every American claim on them must have been extinguished. This was the so-called 'cash and carry' policy. Munitions had to be paid for in cash (and the purchasing governments under the Johnson act could not borrow). More than that, no American ship could sail with any kind of cargo to ports in the belligerent countries and the President was authorized to extend the prohibited zone by naming 'combat areas'. Technically neutral ports close to the actual belligerents were thus debarred to American shipping. On the other hand, some technically belligerent ports in America, Africa and Asia were not debarred to American ships though they were not to carry munitions to them.¹

American ships, since they would be kept out of areas where fighting was going on, would be safe from attack. American citizens in general were debarred from travelling on belligerent ships. So, it was asserted, American ships and American citizens would not be sunk or drowned and the 'incidents' that had given a moral covering to the economic commitments of the munition industry of 1914-1917 could not occur.

Against this was set the new freedom to export munitions in belligerent vessels, a change in the law of the United States which certain legal purists held was profoundly unneutral. But this charge had no great effect on the American public mind, for in 1939, unlike 1914, the vast majority of the American people made up their minds at once. Germany was the aggressor. A German defeat was to the interest of the United States and the world. In 1914, President Wilson had asked the American people to

¹ Certain Canadian ports were excluded from this relaxation of the ban.

be neutral in thought as well as in action. President Roosevelt made no such appeal in 1939; neither he nor the majority of the American people concealed their preferences or their hopes.

Yet some illusions survived the outbreak of the war. Its early character enabled the isolationists who had declared that there would be no war, to declare that this was a 'phoney' war. The invasion of Norway, followed by the invasion of Holland, was a great shock to many Americans, who had believed that neutrality was a happy state to which any nation could attain by wishing for it. It had long been asserted that in the last war, Holland and Norway had shown that, by a rigid neutrality, it was possible to stay out of war. Each new aggression by Hitler, down to and including the invasion of Russia, drove deeper home the truth that neutrality was a state that lasted as long as it suited Germany and not a day longer.


Support to the Democracies

But even more important than the destruction of the legal house of cards of neutrality was the collapse of the strategic house of cards of American immunity. The majority of the American people not only wanted the Allies to win, but expected them to win. The collapse of France suddenly brought them face to face with the disturbing possibility of a Hitlerized Europe. It was under the threat of this event that they accepted peace-time conscription, that they disregarded the protests of the purists against the transfer of destroyers to Great Britain in return for the right to fortify bases on British West Indian islands, that public opinion forced Mr. Wendell Willkie on the Republican party as its presidential candidate, and that breaking one of the most sacred of American political traditions, President Roosevelt was elected for a third term.

Once re-elected, President Roosevelt cut loose from the

timid legalities of the neutrality legislation and in his 'lease-and-lend' policy accepted the fact that the defence of Britain was the defence of America. Industrial production was speeded up, greater and greater power over the national life was taken, more and more the American people revealed its willingness to take whatever measures were necessary to defeat Hitlerism. They still shrink from war, but they realize that the decision as to war and peace is not necessarily in their hands, that at any time war may be thrust on them by the ruler of Germany. And they realize that now, as much as in the crisis of the Civil War, on their action it depends whether 'government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth'.

2





OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS
No. 51

NORWAY AND THE WAR

BY
G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY

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1941

AMONGST the victims of German aggression, Norway has gained an honourable pre-eminence for the persistence, courage and skill of the resistance which her people continue to offer to the enemy and for the fewness of those who have, willingly or otherwise, collaborated with Germany. It is unfortunate in this respect that the name of Quisling should have gained such notoriety. Mr. Gathorne-Hardy points out that treachery played a much smaller part than surprise and confusion in securing German success, and that the Norwegians have received insufficient credit for the toughness of their resistance. In this Pamphlet he analyses the geographical and historical factors which have developed to an almost unparalleled degree individualism, independence and love of liberty in the Norwegian people; gives a brief account of their political and economic development, and explains their foreign policy in the present century. He makes an interesting comparison between the Baltic power Sweden and the Atlantic power Norway, and emphasizes the unique importance of the sea to the Norwegians, whose remote valleys are often inaccessible to one another by land, but to whom the sea is a natural element, and whose merchant navy is among the most important in the world. He suggests that their present experiences may lead Norwegians, after the war, to seek security in closer association with the maritime power of the British Empire and the U.S.A., rather than with any Continental bloc or with a purely Scandinavian grouping.

Mr. Gathorne-Hardy's knowledge of Norway extends over forty years, and he is the author of a standard book on *Norway* in the Modern World Series. He is also the author of *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938*, published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, of which he was for several years the honorary secretary, and of Oxford Pamphlet No. 6, *The Fourteen Points and the Treaty of Versailles*.

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NORWAY AND THE WAR

Physical Characteristics of Norway

THE Norwegian people are to a remarkable extent the logical product of their geographical environment and the physical peculiarities of their country. As one of their archæologists—Professor A. W. Brøgger—has expressed it: "From the very first moment when human beings came to Norway, the natural conditions of the country were bound to turn them into Norwegians." These conditions, from the earliest times, have dictated the distribution and density of the population, prescribed its way of life, influenced its political and economic development, and given to the national character its peculiar features, both of strength and weakness.

About three-quarters of the land area is occupied by the barren plateaus of the high fjeld and other almost equally inhospitable features. The inhabited and habitable regions, broadly speaking, are limited to the sea coast, and to deep-cut, walled-in valleys. Along these valleys run, and have always run, practically all the main lines of communication. Two of these natural highways were brought into special prominence in the course of the military operations of 1940. One is actually continuous from the North Sea to the Oslo fjord, the other very nearly so. From one end of Lesjeskogen lake the Rauma river runs north-west through Romsdal into the Molde fjord near Andalsnes; from the other end the Laagen flows south-east down Gudbrandsdal to the Mjøsen lake, whence it emerges under a different name to join the Glommen, which debouches near the entrance of the Oslo fjord. The whole of Norway to the south-west of this cleft is, I suppose, by definition an island, being completely surrounded by water. The second of these routes

follows the Glommen itself through Østerdal, and from its source almost immediately reaches the headwaters of the Gula, which flows through Guldal to Trondheim. Such convenient continuity is, however, exceptional. For the most part, the land communication between one district and another is far more complicated, and many valleys are practically cut off from their nearest neighbours, except by sea.

The actual distances separating some parts of Norway from others are also an important consideration. The length of the country is altogether disproportionate to its area, which is not much larger than that of the British Isles (124,500 sq. miles as against 122,800). The part of Norway north of the head of the Trondheim fjord is in breadth little more than a coastal strip, yet it extends over more than seven degrees of latitude, which is equivalent to the difference between Southampton and Genoa. A resident in Kristiansand, in the extreme south of Norway, is about as far from a compatriot in Hammerfest, in the north, as he is from Rome or Moscow.

The sea which washes the Norwegian coast has always been quite as important a topographical factor as the land, and has exerted an even profounder influence on the national development. The deeply channelled formation which characterizes the mainland is repeated in the territorial waters of Norway. Submerged valleys in the shape of narrow fjords penetrate to the heart of the country again and again throughout its length, in some instances to a depth of over 100 miles, producing a coast-line which, straightened out, would reach nearly half-way round the world. Separated from the mainland and from one another by an intricate network of narrow channels, a fringe of islands provides a nearly continuous sheltered route along practically the whole western face of the country

In spite of the fact that the greater part of the coast-line lies as far north as Greenland or Baffin Land, and that nearly half of it is within the Arctic Circle, the whole of these waters, and the ports situated upon them, are kept by warm currents ice-free throughout the year. It is therefore appropriate that the land should have derived its name from this natural line of communication—the Northern Way, since it was the use of the sea which gave to Norway its late and gradual realization of a national unity. It is in fact a peculiarity of Norway that the land divides and the sea unites: this element has therefore been regarded, from the earliest times, not as a barrier but as a highway. Trained to intimate familiarity with it from the dawn of their civilization, it is not surprising that Norwegians should have made their first appearance on the stage of history as a formidable maritime race. The development of overseas communications may indeed be traced to a period long antecedent to the Viking age. There is evidence of traffic with the British Isles at least as far back as the Bronze Age, and the reports of Pytheas of Marseilles indicate that the route from Norway to the Shetland Isles must have been known in the fourth century B.C.

Resources : (a) The Sea

Until the beginning of the present century, the livelihood of the people was for the most part provided by the natural resources of the country, including the sea which washes its coasts. Maritime activities have naturally played the most important part. The principal towns, and indeed the bulk of the population, are to be found upon the coast, while the inland valleys in which the rest of the nation live also debouch upon the sea. It is therefore not surprising that, from a world standpoint, Norway derives its special import-

ance from its shipping industry. In the Viking age, Norwegians were the pioneers of transoceanic as opposed to coastwise navigation, and they long anticipated Columbus in the discovery of the Western Hemisphere. In spite, however, of her possession of ships and seamen, Norway was badly situated and equipped for a trading centre, and this fact, combined with other circumstances, enabled her maritime importance to be eclipsed, first by the German Hansa, and later by the Dutch. Nevertheless, even during these periods, the natural affinity of the people for the sea continued, and Norwegians, even though employed under a foreign flag, still made a notable contribution to the ranks of the world's seamen. During the union between Norway and Denmark, the outstanding figures in the Danish navy were Norwegians, while the Dutch merchant service in the seventeenth century was also largely manned by sailors from Norway.

The rise of the modern Norwegian merchant fleet, however, dates from the more or less general abandonment of the earlier 'flag-discrimination' policy by the nations of the world, and especially from the repeal of the British Navigation Act in 1849. From that time shipping in Norway has advanced, almost steadily, to a position altogether unique in relation to the size of her population. At the outset of the present war, the Norwegian merchant fleet was the fourth largest in the world, being surpassed only by Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. It totalled more than 4,000,000 tons, and in the proportion of tonnage to the head of population it stood easily first. It held an impressive share of the tramp trade of the world, and was particularly rich in oil-tankers, a fact which makes its transfer to the service of Great Britain and her allies in the present war a matter of peculiar importance.

The sea has also provided Norway with two more of her most lucrative sources of revenue—her fishing and whaling industries. The most important fisheries are in the Lofoten Islands and northern Norway; whaling has been from ancient times an activity in which Norwegians have been prominent, and is one in which they have now achieved something approaching a monopoly, though this industry is now mainly carried on in distant seas, particularly the Antarctic. Apart from food supplies, Norwegian fisheries and whalers produce large quantities of valuable oils and fats, which become of special importance in war-time conditions.

Resources : (b) The Land

In spite of the limited area suitable for cultivation, farming has also been an activity in which a large proportion of the population has always engaged. Even at the present time, about 30 per cent. of the population are farmers, while during the greater part of Norwegian history agriculture was the staple occupation of the vast majority of the population. Most of the farms are now freehold. Farms with a cultivable area of more than 25 acres are, however, extremely rare, and the average is not more than about $9\frac{1}{4}$ acres. In spite, therefore, of the large proportion of the population engaged in agriculture, this activity is not important from the point of view of international trade. The livestock and dairy produce are mainly home-consumed, and the crops raised are mostly used to feed the cattle. Many Norwegian farms, however, include forest land, the owners of which have a direct interest in forestry. The timber of Norway has always been an important article of export, though at the present day the secondary products—pulp, cellulose, and paper—have become even more

important than the timber itself. On the coast, farmers are also frequently concerned in the fishing industry.

The mineral resources of the country are by no means negligible, and mining is a Norwegian industry of respectable age, the silver mines of Kongsberg and the copper mines of Røros having been in existence since the seventeenth century. The mineral products of the country, however, acquire special importance in time of war, when such things as pyrites, copper, molybdenum and nickel, all of which occur, are particularly sought after. The important iron deposits of Sydvaranger, in the extreme north, which began to be exploited early in the present century, had a rather chequered history during the period between the present war and the last, but are unlikely to become neglected in present circumstances.

Since about the beginning of the present century, the whole economic life of the country has been profoundly affected by an industrial development which, in Norway, was very late in arising. Norway was unable to play an important part in industrial manufacture so long as this was dependent upon coal, in which she is entirely deficient, though since 1920 she has enjoyed the sovereignty over Spitzbergen (Svalbard), which contains important deposits of this mineral. On the other hand, Norway is peculiarly rich in sources of water-power, which, originally exploited in a modest way to work sawmills, etc., acquired a totally new value with the development of electricity. Electrical energy produced by the harnessing of waterfalls has already gone far to revolutionize life in Norway, and though the country has suffered a good deal from the disturbances occasioned by so sudden a change in the traditional habits of the people, numbers of new industries have been born of the change, which are of value in the present and of even

greater promise in the future. The suddenness and lateness of the industrial revolution in Norway have, however, had important reactions on the relations between capital and labour.

The People

The population, even at the present day, numbers under 3,000,000, or less than the figure accommodated by the West Riding of Yorkshire. As late as the beginning of the nineteenth century it was no more than 977,000. So sparse a population, distributed over great distances, and strung out along narrow and mutually inaccessible clefts, at once suggests a nation wherein the individual is paramount, rather than the community. This conclusion turns out to be correct. A passion for individual liberty and independence is, and has always been, the dominant characteristic of the Norwegian people. The typical Norwegian leads an isolated life, and this form of existence has endowed him, as it did Robinson Crusoe and for the same reason, with remarkable personal qualities of self-reliance, resourcefulness, and versatility. Even if he lives in a town, or has benefited by recent improvements in means of communication, he is likely to have inherited these gifts from a long line of less gregarious ancestors. But, above all, he treasures jealously his individual liberty—his right to lead his own life, and to think his own thoughts, in his own way, independent of external control or dictation.

Even the solitary uniting influence of the Norwegian's environment—the sea—has not served to modify, but has rather encouraged, this pronounced individualism. For it has been not only a way of communication, but a way of escape, of which his countrymen, when threatened with an unwelcome control, have made conspicuous use throughout their

history. The colonization of Iceland (in the ninth century) was carried out by men who took to their ships and sailed abroad rather than submit to the sovereignty of Harald Fairhair, and Norse settlements in the Faroes, the Orkneys and Shetlands, and the Scottish Hebrides were stimulated by the same desire for freedom from interference. At a later date, the same way of escape was utilized by Norwegian sailors to achieve freedom from the oppressive rule of the Danish administrators of their country in the seventeenth century. 'The best seamen belonging to the King of Denmark,' says an English writer in 1692, 'are the Norwegians; but most of these are in the service of the Dutch, and have their families established in Holland; from whence it is scarce likely they will ever return home, unless the Dutch use them worse, or the Danes better.' The Norwegian, in fact, dearly as he loves his beautiful country, has always shown that he prefers exile to the loss of his cherished personal independence.

The natural conditions, however, which have produced the desirable qualities of independence and versatility, have been equally responsible for some less admirable results. The obstacles which they present to national unity are evident. The nation was indeed a late and as it were an artificial growth; even after its development was superficially complete, it was only on the rarest occasions found possible to provide a focus of united resistance to external domination, and traces of local cleavage persist even at the present time. Different regions frequently display striking differences of outlook and sympathy: in particular, there is a still imperfectly bridged gulf between the urban and rural communities. They do not even speak an identical language, though the two forms of speech current in town and country are

being increasingly approximated, both as a natural development and as the result of deliberate legislative action.

The Danish Union

Partly as a result of this lack of national cohesion, the insistence on individual freedom which has characterized the people has not given to Norway a proportionate measure of *political* independence. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, the kingdom of Norway was united to that of Denmark, under conditions amounting to virtual subordination, and from 1814 to 1905 the independence of Norway was limited by the conditions of her union with Sweden. For experience of sovereign independence, the country has to look either to a remote or a very recent page of her history.

During the period of Danish rule, administrative officials and the clergy were drawn predominantly from Denmark, which was also the seat of all higher education. Danish became the official and cultural language, with results which persisted long after the connexion between the two countries was severed, and indeed are not entirely eradicated at the present day. The native aristocracy became merged indistinguishably in the mass of the population. Nevertheless, the Danish nobility failed to reduce the people of Norway to the deplorable condition of semi-servitude to which the peasantry of Denmark were subjected. A sixteenth-century writer calls the Norwegians 'a hard, refractory, obstinate and riotous, turbulent, rebellious and bloodthirsty people,' by which accumulation of epithets he expresses a Danish recognition of the fact that their resolute defence of their individual liberties remained impregnable.

Indeed, in comparison with the lot of their brethren

across the Skager Rak, the freedom of the Norwegian 'bonde'¹ was so conspicuous that the conception of Norway as *par excellence* the land of liberty is continually stressed in contemporary literature.

'Thou art in Paradise, and Eden's garden tillest,
Where grief is buried deep beneath the soil thou turnest;
Of Adam ere his fall the blissful place thou fillest,
While freedom's helm and shield in honoured wage thou
earnest.'

In such terms of hyperbole does a contemporary of Holberg, about 1720, address the Norwegian farmer. This evidence is the more remarkable since the author, Povel Juel, was fully conscious of the *political* subjection of his country, and was ultimately beheaded for promoting a plot to throw off the Danish yoke. The same note emphasizing *individual* freedom is constantly repeated by eighteenth century Norwegian versifiers, during the worst period of Danish absolutism. The fact was that the same natural conditions which made Norway incapable of united resistance made it at the same time almost impossible to control individuals. 'Frederik may be King in Denmark, but I am King in Bjerkreim,' boasted the Norwegian 'bonde,' Trond Lauperak, in 1762.

The Swedish Union, 1814-1905

Though the connexion between Denmark and Norway nominally lasted until 1814, it was really broken some years earlier, by circumstances which disclosed a vital discrepancy of national interest between the two countries. As the late Foreign Minister of the Norwegian Government, Dr. Koht, has expressed it: 'When Denmark finally, in 1807,

¹ An untranslatable word, which is not synonymous with 'peasant'—the conventional rendering. Approximately = 'yeoman farmer,' but includes more aristocratic elements.

was forced to abandon her neutrality, and chose to side with France, it was a necessary consequence that she must lose Norway. For the strongest Norwegian interests drew this country to the English side.' From this date, practically all direct connexion between Denmark and Norway was severed by the British blockade, and the government of the latter country had to be entrusted to a Regency Commission. But the actual breach occurred when, on January 14, 1814, the King of Denmark renounced, in the Treaty of Kiel, his sovereignty over Norway in favour of the King of Sweden. The Norwegian people asserted the right to settle their own destinies, and in pursuance of this convened a representative Assembly at Eidsvoll, which, in defiance of Sweden, prepared the independent democratic constitution which Norway has since enjoyed, and adopted an alternative candidate for the throne. In view, however, of the support given to the Swedish claim by all the great Powers of Europe, it was impossible for the people of Norway to escape altogether from the union with Sweden, which, indeed, was favoured by a considerable party within the Eidsvoll Assembly itself. They succeeded, however, in reducing it, under the Convention of Moss, to a personal union under a common King, retaining the independent political organization provided for in the Eidsvoll constitution.

There was thus, from the first, a state of tension created by the divergent aspirations of the two parties to the agreement. Sweden continued to hope and work for an ultimate solution more nearly approximating to that 'annexation of the Kingdom of Norway as an integral part of the Kingdom of Sweden' of which the treaties concluded with the great Powers had spoken; she continued instinctively to regard the Treaty of Kiel, rather than the Convention of Moss,

as the operative document in the case. But every move taken or suspected, which had as its object a more intimate union, excited the obdurate resistance of the Norwegian people. Apart from this cause of friction, the union was constantly subjected to strain by the difference between the external interests of the two countries. It was an anomaly of the situation that Norway, with the predominant overseas interests created by her great merchant fleet and her world-wide trade connexions, had no say in matters of external policy. She had not even separate consuls to look after her interests abroad. Besides this, the line of thought which had suggested union between the two nations was thoroughly superficial. Norway is an Atlantic, Sweden a Baltic country, and the peoples of the two kingdoms are actually separated by physical obstacles, across which run remarkably few lines of communication. As Dr. Koht has pointed out, moreover, Sweden was thinking in terms of power and strategic unity of control, while the interest of Norway was in independence and democratic self-government. For these reasons, the union remained an uneasy partnership, with increasing tension, until its final dissolution in 1905.

Norwegian Democracy

A characteristic of the nation which is of special importance, and which may be traced to the same natural causes which have produced other salient Norwegian traits, is its remarkable qualification for popular self-government. In modern Norway, with its marked absence of class distinctions and high standard of general education, this characteristic is indeed generally recognized. It is not, however, so fully appreciated that in the earliest stages of Norwegian history the conditions of life led to the adoption

of a considerable element of democracy. In primitive communities, it is war which begets the king and the aristocracy, but the settlement of the Norwegian valleys was not the work of military conquerors, but was a gradual process of expansion from the scattered estates of a few families, whose occupation of their farms ran back into immemorial antiquity, and which were more or less in a condition of social equality. The odal¹ system of inheritance to land, which originated and still persists in Norway, made the tenure of these families practically inviolable. In such a community, the function of the local kings and chieftains was mainly limited to the military defence of the territory, and, though marked differences of social standing eventually developed, the principal legislative, administrative, and judicial business of the districts was conducted in periodical 'things' or public meetings, in which all the free population took part on a theoretically equal footing.

The viking age, which appears to give Norway a singularly aggressive stamp, represents really the work of a minority, the overflow from a country incapable of supporting a large population, and, though raids of a similar kind no doubt took place in earlier times between district and district, these must have been mainly confined to the coast, while the farmers of the inaccessible interior were mostly able to lead their lives comparatively undisturbed. Hence kings and the militant aristocracy did not acquire sufficient importance to enable them to enjoy an unchallenged authority. The idea that the person of a king is inviolable, or that he can do no wrong, is so

¹ A system which vests the succession to landed property in the family rather than the individual, and gives to members of the family rights of pre-emption and redemption in the event of sale. This ancient system is specially preserved by § 107 of the Norwegian constitution.

foreign to the notions embodied in the oldest Norwegian laws that we find it, on the contrary, enjoined as a duty to kill or expel a monarch who infringes the personal rights of his subjects. Except for a comparatively short period of less than two centuries, from the date when the work of national consolidation was completed by King Sverre and his successors to the time when the crown passed into foreign hands, the power of the community of free bönder was always formidable and generally decisive during the time of Norway's sovereign independence.

As to the modern epoch, which begins with the enactment of the present constitution, on May 17, 1814, the very fact that the Danish rule, in the intervening period, had so largely superseded the local leaders with foreign officials not only made democracy almost the only conceivable system of government, but actually rendered the population unusually capable of the tasks of self-government. Though the official class in the towns attempted for a time to maintain its position, the bulk of the country population formed a remarkably homogeneous community, free from marked class distinctions, which nevertheless held latent within it that element with capacity for leadership which had been ousted from its natural share in administration by the rule of foreign officials.

The constitution drawn up at Eidsvoll in 1814, which remains the fundamental law of the Norwegian State, was, moreover, profoundly influenced by that of the United States of America, and by the ideas of the French Revolution. Hence, in spite of the temporary survival of officials of the old school, it was so profoundly democratic in spirit that the course was irrevocably set.

'Government of the people, by the people, for the people' has indeed not been practised so long, so

thoroughly, and so continuously in any other part of Europe. The parliamentary system laid down in the constitution is virtually single-chamber government, since the Lagting, the nearest approach to an Upper House, is actually a committee elected by the Storting from its own members. The royal veto on its legislation ceased to be operative, under the constitution of 1814, if a measure was passed unaltered by three successive Stortings. The rights and liberties of individuals are most jealously safeguarded by the constitution, which also provides expressly for the liberty of the press, and lays down that 'everyone shall be free to speak his mind frankly on the administration of the State and any other subject whatever.'

External Relations : (a) Scandinavia

In spite of the somewhat unfortunate experience of Norway during her periods of association with her two sister nations, it was natural that the idea of some degree of Scandinavian fellowship should persist. The three countries enjoy such a geographical remoteness from the main centres of European disturbance that, whether as friends or foes, they have been far more intimately concerned with one another than with the rest of the world, throughout the greater part of their history, and they share a similarity of race, tradition, and language calculated to inspire a sense of brotherhood. It is, moreover, particularly natural that three countries with a joint population of less than thirteen millions should consider the enhancement of their power and prestige which they might attain in combination. The weak point of this argument, however, lies in the fact that, from a military standpoint, even this combination is not strikingly formidable, while the extreme weakness of the individual units makes each one of them reluctant to face,

without further extraneous support, the responsibilities of war, when it comes to the point. War has therefore always disappointed the advocates of Scandinavianism. The failure of Norway and Sweden to support Denmark in 1864, which drove Ibsen into disgusted exile and inspired him to biting satire in *Brand* and *Peer Gynt*, was an early illustration of the weakness of Scandinavian unity. But war or the threat of it has on later occasions exhibited the same fundamental truth—that the co-operation of the northern peoples, while it can be close in time of peace, and especially under conditions of complete political independence, cannot be relied on to operate in times of war. In fact, its failure in these crises leads to regrettable recriminations and a feeling of bitterness which would not arise if the sense of kinship were less strongly felt, and the policy to be pursued were merely a matter of the joint and several interests of the parties.

In the war of 1914-18 there were numerous consultations between the three Scandinavian Governments, and in minor points their attitudes were harmonized to a considerable extent, yet it cannot be denied that Norway, Sweden, and Denmark faced problems of the struggle with considerable differences of outlook and policy.

During the earlier years of the post-war period, the ideal of Scandinavian co-operation was largely merged in the wider association of the League of Nations. In Fridtjof Nansen, Norway contributed to this body one of its most outstanding figures, and the policy of the Scandinavian States was based on faith in the system of collective security envisaged in the covenant. Within this comprehensive association, the Scandinavian group also enlarged its limits to include Belgium and the Netherlands, and this regional subdivision

within the broader framework of the League became generally known as 'the Oslo Powers,' from the place where the earliest of the conferences between the members of the group was held, in 1930. At a later date Finland also took part in these deliberations, and this country has, in recent years, come to be generally included in the term Scandinavia. The ties of interest uniting this wider grouping were, however, even more tenuous than those which had previously failed to co-ordinate the policy of Scandinavia proper.

Thus, when in May 1939 Denmark was persuaded to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany, her example was not followed by any of her Scandinavian associates. Though Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland drew up in concert, in May 1938, the rules to be applied in the event of war to implement the policy of neutrality to which they had reverted, Holland and Belgium, while adopting a similar policy, did so independently and in terms which were not identical. Though the Juridical Committee of the whole Oslo group met in November 1939, consultation between the strictly Scandinavian members was, after the outbreak of the present war, far more frequent and intimate.

The outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war at the end of November 1939 revealed even greater divergences of policy between Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. While all these countries showed a considerable measure of public sympathy with Finland, the extent to which each of them was prepared to lend practical assistance differed materially. In Sweden, nearly everything short of open and official belligerency was permitted and encouraged; in Norway, in spite of a strong popular agitation in favour of intervention, a much more strict policy of neutrality was followed by the Government, and open appeals for volunteers.

which were freely made in posters and in the press in Sweden, were officially forbidden; while Denmark, though sympathetic, was less directly interested. Finally, the attack by Germany upon Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940, led to an almost complete breakdown of Scandinavian co-operation; Sweden retired into herself and preserved neutrality, Denmark capitulated without a struggle, and Norway alone resisted.

(b) Relations with other Powers

Outside the Scandinavian group, the countries with which Norway has been most closely connected are Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and the United States. The connexion with the U.S.A. is due to the large number of Norwegian emigrants who, during the last century, have settled in that country. The interest felt in Russia has been due to less satisfactory reasons. There have been recurrent periods of nervousness, when Russia has been suspected of coveting an ice-free port in northern Norway, from which, during the years when she controlled Finland, she was only separated by some twenty miles. This situation led in 1855 to the so-called 'November Treaty' with Great Britain and France, by which Norway was guaranteed assistance against any attempt at Russian encroachment in this direction. The possible designs of Russia were also a topic of popular interest in Norway in the early years of the present century, when stories of Russian spies, mostly improbable, were everywhere in circulation. From the date of the separation from Sweden, however, these fears diminished, and they were for the time being removed, after the war of 1914-18, by the creation of an independent Finland; but the international aims of Bolshevism took their place as a bugbear, particu-

larly in capitalist circles, whose anxieties were increased by the growth of the Norwegian Labour Party, and the prevalence of serious industrial disputes which accompanied the rapid revolution then taking place in the economic life of the nation.

The foreign countries, however, which have been of the greatest importance to Norway have been Great Britain and Germany. These two countries, in recent years, have absorbed the largest share of the trade of Norway; Germany taking the first place as a source of Norwegian imports, and Great Britain standing first as a market for the exports of the country. Both countries have also for many years provided a large proportion of the visitors to Norway, though the German contingent has consisted for the most part of transitory tourists, who could not establish those intimate relations with the rural inhabitants which have resulted from the annual migration of numbers of British salmon-fishers, who made of many a Norwegian valley a permanent summer and autumn resort, where they became familiar figures. German penetration, in recent years, made progress in the towns, especially in Oslo and the south-eastern districts, but feeling along the western coast-line has been generally pro-British. The appeal of Germany has been strongest in scientific and technical circles: that of England has been more widespread, based on a marked similarity of outlook, the ties of the sea, and long association of many kinds. Until the war of 1914-18, however, the claims of both countries on Norwegian friendship did not seriously conflict; indeed, the dream of the great Norwegian poet-politician, Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, was of a wide association of Teutonic peoples, in which both England and Germany were to be included.

Norway and War : the Policy of Neutrality

On the outbreak of war in 1914 it was therefore natural, and almost a matter of course, that Norway should take her place among the neutrals. While the sympathies of the majority were on the side of Great Britain and her allies, Norway appeared to have no direct interest in the issues involved; indeed, her experience of foreign policy was at that time so short that there was very little intelligent interest taken in the affairs of Europe, and Norwegians were in the habit of congratulating themselves on occupying a detached situation, where the struggles of the Continent did not concern them. From a military and naval standpoint, the power of Norway was too slight to lead either belligerent to seek to enlist her as an ally, and in the early stages of the war, the traditional conception of the rights of a neutral to carry on her normal trading activities with but few restrictions was still generally held. Up to the time when America entered the war, these rights had a zealous and powerful champion in the United States.

In spite of this, the conditions of modern warfare soon led to a revolutionary interpretation of the hitherto accepted doctrines of international law in relation to neutral rights, and the growing importance of blockade as a factor in the defeat of Germany led to negotiations as a result of which Norway, by the end of the war, though ostensibly still neutral, was actually rendering great services to the cause of the Allies, particularly through the contribution afforded by her merchant-fleet, which indeed suffered heavy casualties in the course of the campaign. Nevertheless, it proved possible for Norway to preserve her technical neutrality to the end, and even to derive considerable profit from the policy which she pursued.

It was therefore probably inevitable that, when the collapse of the sanctions policy in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and the rapid darkening of the international outlook had destroyed the faith temporarily reposed in the alternative of collective security under the League of Nations, Norway should revert, as she did in 1938, to her traditional policy of neutrality.

The situation now facing the country, however, differed in important respects from that of 1914. Encroachment by belligerents on the traditional rights of neutrals was likely to begin at the stage which it only reached towards the end of the former war, and the small neutral Powers would no longer enjoy the powerful protection of the United States, since that country's neutrality policy was no longer based on a claim to trade freely with both belligerents, but on an avoidance of possible entanglements by keeping its ships clear of the theatres of war. The whole status of a neutral had, moreover, suffered in prestige from the fact that it involved, in most cases, a repudiation, however pardonable, of obligations solemnly assumed by the signatories of the League Covenant. Apart from these considerations, the whole of Hitler's progress during the years immediately preceding the resumption of hostilities had made it clear that no considerations of respect for international obligations would deter Germany from any steps which were deemed advantageous to her interests.

Norway and Nazism

The fundamental difference was, however, that Norway was now in fact directly interested in the issue of the war. It will be clear from what has already been written that Norwegian thought, with its passionate insistence on individual liberty, free speech,

and parliamentary democracy, was diametrically opposed to the totalitarian ideology. Yet the present struggle is essentially ideological in character. A German victory would mean the triumph of a conception of life and world organization in which not only would all that Norway cherished be ruthlessly suppressed, but small States like Norway would survive, if at all, as mere helots subordinated to the interests of a German 'Herrenvolk.' The victory of Great Britain and her allies involved no such threat to the small Powers. Norway was therefore bound to hope and pray for such a result, and her neutrality had no spiritual basis.

Even in the days when German Nazism first asserted the claim—which, after a short interlude, it has now revived—to be Europe's bulwark against Bolshevism, and when the rapid rise of a Marxist Labour Party induced acute alarm in a certain section of the Norwegian population, the defence against Communism was generally felt to lie rather in reliance on democracy than in the adoption of an alternative form of dictatorship. More recently, the fears which might have encouraged sympathy with Nazism had been considerably reduced. When the Labour Party first came into power in Norway, in January 1928, the consequent panic in moneyed circles led to such a flight of capital that the Government was forced to relinquish office in about a fortnight. But since 1933 the Labour Party has been continuously in power, where it has shown, under the responsibilities of office, an unexpected moderation, which has established it increasingly in the confidence of the country. Finally, the German-Soviet agreement which immediately preceded the outbreak of war removed for a time the only hope which had so far commended Hitler to the sympathy of a limited circle in Norway, and the propaganda value

of the recent reversal of German policy towards Russia is weakened by the completely cynical lack of principle which it disclosed.

Quisling

Sympathy for Hitler's régime had indeed been confined for the most part to the very young, and a small minority of capitalists: Nazism in Norway had never had any political importance. This fact is clearly illustrated by the failure of its leading exponent in Norway—Major Vidkun Quisling. This man, indeed, until his sensational reappearance after the German invasion, was generally regarded with pitying contempt. He had showed promise as a young man, and was employed by Dr. Nansen on relief work in Russia, and subsequently attached to the Norwegian Legation in Moscow, whence he returned to Norway an avowed Bolshevik. Failing to enlist the confidence of Norwegian Labour, he next changed his allegiance to the Agrarian Party, who made him Minister of Defence in the Government which they formed in 1931. An incident occurring at this time led to serious doubts as to his mental condition, and his general lack of balance has since been attributed by the charitable to the effects of malaria contracted in Russia. In 1933 he started an independent party in the closest imitation of Hitler's National Socialists, incorporating indeed the same initials in the title—'Nasjonal Samling' or National Union. The initials were in fact more descriptive than the name, since the only union which he effected was that of all other parties in the State against his own. In successive elections he failed consistently to obtain sufficient support to entitle his party to a single seat in the Storting.

Attitude of the Belligerents

A further difference distinguishing the situation in 1939 from that of 1914 lay in the fact that, whereas on the earlier occasion neither side had desired to involve Norway in the war, Norwegian neutrality was, in 1939, unsatisfactory to both. It was early foreseen by Mr. Churchill that no declaration of neutrality would keep Hitler from extending the war to any country whenever it suited his purpose, and control of Norway would bring him a strategic advantage in at least two ways: by subjecting Sweden to the pressure of virtual encirclement, and by providing Germany with a greatly extended base of operations against Great Britain and her sea-borne supplies. Meanwhile, our economic warfare was severely handicapped through the existence of a continuous navigable highway of some 800 miles through Norwegian territorial waters. This protection the ships serving Germany were permitted to enjoy, in spite of the fact that they were all the time flagrantly disregarding international law by their attacks upon neutral shipping. Mr. Churchill, therefore, made no secret of his dislike of Norway's reliance on a neutrality which was unlikely to provide her with a permanent safeguard. In a broadcast speech on January 20, 1940, he issued a prophetic warning of the futility of such reliance.

'All hope that the storm will pass before their turn comes to be devoured. But the storm will not pass. It will rage and roar, ever more loudly—ever more widely. It will spread to the South: *It will spread to the North.* There is no chance of a speedy end except through united action.'

Between two belligerents, one of whom could be relied on to leave Norway free to determine her own policy while the other could not, the application of a

policy of neutrality became increasingly one-sided. Eventually, therefore, on April 8, 1940, the British and French Governments announced that they had taken steps to interfere with a privilege which Germany had ceased to deserve, by laying mines at certain defined points within Norwegian territorial waters.

The German Invasion

It is abundantly clear that before this date Hitler had determined to put into effect the strategic plans which he had long prepared and which he has since carried through successfully.

The invasion of Denmark and Norway, which took place on April 9, showed clear signs of long and careful preparation. The troops selected for the operation had been chosen from men familiar with Norway and the Norwegian language. A number of them were Austrians to whom, as children, the Norwegians had given hospitality in the hard times following the previous Great War. The operation itself must have started before the allied mine-laying which was its ostensible pretext. During the night of April 8-9, German forces effected the occupation of all the principal Norwegian ports, including Trondheim and Narvik, points which it was physically impossible to reach within the time which had elapsed after the British operation in Norwegian territorial waters had taken place. Earlier than this, there had been significant indications of what was in the wind. About the middle of March a Norwegian fishing skipper, meeting a German U-boat just outside territorial waters, was informed by her commander that submarines would soon be as numerous as fishing boats off the Norwegian coast, and a few days later a U-boat actually stranded in a small inlet, and was interned. Particular significance can now be seen to attach to a

careful and comprehensive reconnaissance carried out by a German aeroplane on April 4, embracing the greater part of the western coastal districts of Norway, from Haugesund to the head of the Trondheim fjord inclusive. A final straw in the wind, which like other indications failed to arouse suspicion at the time, was connected with Quisling's Nazi organ, *Fritt Folk*. This paper, which had been long reduced by lack of public support from a daily to a weekly publication, developed, a short time before the invasion, a mysterious and inexplicable prosperity, and resumed, at the end of March, its original form as a daily. Such indications as these, however, are naturally easier to interpret after the event, and in fact the German invasion came as a complete surprise, while the confusion was increased by its coincidence in time with the action taken by Great Britain in Norwegian waters.

It is necessary to emphasize, in view of a contrary impression which still prevails in certain quarters, the important part played by confusion in the situation, and the negligible influence of deliberate treachery. The name of Quisling had an unfortunate fascination for British and foreign journalists, and has since been added to the vocabulary of most languages, including German, as a synonym for a particular kind of traitor. Hence an impression was created, which has since proved most difficult to eradicate, that the kind of 'fifth column' activity associated with this form of treason was particularly widespread in Norway. This false impression is even reported to have led to an unfortunate distrust, on the part of the Allies in the campaign, of intelligence reaching them from Norwegian military sources, and a disinclination to engage in frank consultations. The notion, however, that Quisling was in any way a typical or influential figure

is the precise opposite of the truth. His influence was negligible, his treason very nearly unique, and in fact the support which Hitler insisted on bestowing on this crazed, despised, and solitary personality played an important and even perhaps a decisive part in stiffening resistance against the invaders.

Norwegians, in fact, have earned a credit which so far has not sufficiently been realized for the toughness of the resistance which they displayed in a singularly desperate situation. All their arsenals, military stores, aerodromes and mobilisation centres, except in the remote north, fell at once under German control: Germany, in possession of the radio, was in a position to increase the confusion which in any case must have prevailed; qualified military opinion for the most part regarded the position as hopeless, and it needed rare courage and determination to fight a series of delaying actions with improvised and ill-equipped forces, in the hope of playing out time till the arrival of reinforcements from the Allies. General Ruge, who commanded this forlorn hope, has drawn a vivid picture of the way in which the forces used were formed by individuals, who escaped from the capital, coalesced into larger units, and thus carried on the unequal struggle with epic courage and determination. In spite of the early loss of the whole of southern Norway, this struggle was maintained for some three months; hope was never abandoned, and the eventual defeat reflects no shadow of discredit on the Norwegians themselves, being attributable to the inevitable withdrawal of allied support, rendered necessary by developments in other fields, and in particular by the unexpected and disastrous collapse of France.

The German Occupation

The withdrawal of the King and the Government from Norway, with the unanimous sanction of the Storting, removed out of reach of German control the only administration which could claim constitutional authority; so long as this remained in being, it was impossible for the conquerors to substitute, with any pretence of legality, an alternative puppet régime to serve as their tools, or to claim international recognition for it. Nor could they claim that such an alternative was rendered practically necessary if the day-to-day tasks of internal administration were to be carried on; since for such purposes an Administrative Council had been early set up, on the motion of the Norwegian Supreme Court of Justice, composed of individuals of undoubted loyalty, whose work was recognized and appreciated by the King, but who did not claim in any way to supplant the constitutional Government. The latter remained in being, recognized by the world at large as the sovereign power of Norway. In these circumstances, the efforts of the Germans were directed to the removal of this obstacle, either by voluntary abdication or by the more questionable expedient of a vote of the Storting, though the latter, in the circumstances, could not have been convincingly represented to be an expression of the free will of the Norwegian people. To secure their ends, two main attempts were made, in June and in September. On the first occasion, which was adroitly chosen at the moment when the collapse of French resistance had reduced the hopes of Norway to the lowest ebb, a combination of threats and trickery induced the Presidential Board of the Storting, a body without legislative or constitutional authority, to write to the King requesting his abdication, for himself and

his family, and the resignation of the elected Government. The members of this board were also prevailed on to sign a pledge that they would endeavour to secure Parliamentary support for the deposition of the King and the removal of the existing Government, if a voluntary abdication proved unobtainable. After the King had replied to this request by a dignified and reasoned refusal, a lull ensued for some months, during which the spirit of the nation had an opportunity of rallying, and of declaring itself emphatically against the proposal. In this situation, when the Germans renewed their political offensive in September, with the object of obtaining the endorsement of their demands by the Storting, the negotiations broke down before being placed before that assembly, which would in any case have been practically certain to have rejected the proposals. On September 25, therefore, Terboven, the Reichskommissar, issued decrees on his own authority, abolishing all political parties in Norway, with the exception of Quisling's Nasjonal Samling, and appointing a number of his own nominees from that faction to take charge, under German control, of the various Ministerial Departments of State. This cutting of the Gordian knot, which could claim, of course, no shadow of constitutional authority, has served only to exacerbate the public opinion of the country to a hostility towards the puppets and their masters, which, at the time of writing, shows signs of reaching a dangerous intensity. Even more effective than the spontaneous hostility shown by the general public have been such manifestations of responsible disapproval as were shown in the resignation of the Norwegian Supreme Court in December 1940, and in the pastoral letter circulated by the Bishops of Norway to their congregations in February of this year. But, however manifested, the

irreconcilable and courageous opposition of the Norwegian people to their German oppressors and the traitors who serve them has won the admiration of all free peoples who have had occasion to follow developments in this and other occupied countries.

Future Outlook

The experience of the present war seems to be producing a certain reorientation in the sphere of Norwegian foreign policy. Isolated neutrality and Scandinavian collaboration have both been found to provide insufficient security in time of trouble. The wider co-operation envisaged in the League of Nations has also been found wanting, perhaps because it was too wide to be linked by a bond of real community of interest. There are signs that the statesmen of Norway are inclined to look in a fresh direction for the support which their country is seen to require. In a striking speech delivered in December 1940, the present Foreign Minister, Mr. Tryggve Lie, suggested that Norway, while not ignoring the claims of Scandinavian kinship, or the help of any of the free peoples of Europe, should look mainly to and across the ocean. As an Atlantic and seafaring nation, for whom inclusion in a Teutonic continental bloc meant nothing but economic ruin and political subordination, Norway should look for help and collaboration mainly to the free nations overseas—the British Empire and the United States of America. Such an orientation seems indeed to promise an association peculiarly congenial to the spirit of Norway, in which her salient characteristics would find free scope for development.

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BRITAIN'S FOOD
IN WARTIME

BY
SIR JOHN RUSSELL

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1942

OUR food-supply is a subject which interests every inhabitant of these islands, and this pamphlet is designed to answer some of the many questions which the subject provokes: What proportion of our food do we produce at home in peace-time? Of the balance, how much comes from the Empire and how much from other sources? How does the position in this war compare with that in the last? How did our peace-time dietary compare with that of other countries (for instance, Germany), and how must it be altered to meet war conditions? How far have we been able to increase our supply of home-grown food, and how much further are we likely to be able to increase it? In what direction is the greatest effort needed? These and other questions are dealt with by Sir John Russell, Director of the Rothamsted Experimental Station and of the Imperial Bureau of Soil Science, and author of many standard works on Agriculture and Soil Fertility.

Mrs. Barbara Callow's *Good Health on Wartime Food* (Oxford University Press, 1941, 6d. net) describes how the best use may be made of Britain's wartime dietary.

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BRITAIN'S FOOD IN WARTIME

The Setting of the Problem

BEFORE 1914 practically all civilized countries were striving to improve the conditions of life for their growing populations. The demand for food increased greatly, and this called forth a corresponding increase in food production in North and South America and in the British Empire. The Secretary for Agriculture for the United States wrote with exuberant enthusiasm in 1904 of the 'unthinkable aggregate value' of American agricultural produce; land had risen in value and the farmers' bank deposits had recently doubled, or trebled. In Canada the production of wheat was shooting upwards, and strenuous efforts were made to persuade men from the British Islands and from Western Europe to go out and earn the fortunes awaiting them. New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa all greatly increased their production of food.

The immediate effect of the war of 1914-18 was a still further expansion of food-producing activities in the Empire and the United States. A great change set in when peace returned. Much of the wartime expansion in the United States and the Empire became redundant. Migrants were no longer invited from Europe; quotas and barriers were set up.

A severe setback was in any case inevitable after so long and devastating a struggle, but it was later intensified by the new direction given to their national life by the Axis Powers. Germany and Italy deliberately refrained from importing foodstuffs; they

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produced what they could and went without many of the foods that would have had to be imported. 'Guns before butter' was only a newspaper headline in Great Britain, but it became the rule of life for millions of people in Central Europe. This imposed a similar rule on some of the neighbouring countries, which had to spend a large part of their national income on armaments instead of on food. The higher standard of living associated with peace was thus deliberately renounced in favour of a lower one that permitted preparation for war. Overseas farmers found themselves shut off from markets in Europe and with only those of the British Isles available to them. Their power of agricultural production was increasing continuously; more and more food could be and was being produced. But a large part of the world deliberately decided not to buy, and in consequence the producers were left with food on their hands. The Australian representatives, Mr. Bruce and Mr. McDougall, raised the matter at Geneva in 1935; a Committee was appointed and issued a very valuable report,¹ showing that Europe really needed the food; but nothing happened. The United Kingdom remained the one large market open to food producers, and in consequence received a flood of produce from all the old sources and considerable quantities from some of the new countries set up after the last war, such as Poland, Estonia, and others. The British market was their one hope.

Meanwhile in Britain the attitude of the general public to agriculture was gradually changing. During the war much had been done to foster agriculture and

¹ *The Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture, and Economic Policy*, Geneva.

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definite arrangements were made about prices and supplies of wheat. After the war these were abandoned and the Corn Production Act was repealed in 1921. It speaks volumes for the attitude of farmers to science that their big organization, the National Farmers' Union, accepted as part compensation a payment by the Government to the Development Fund of £1,000,000 to foster agricultural research. Then in 1929 came the financial crisis, and British farming became extremely depressed; soil fertility could no longer be fully maintained, land went out of cultivation and many workers left. The position began to resemble that of the 1880's and 1890's when a high official of the Board of Agriculture had declared that British agriculture was dead and the business of the Board was to bury it decently. Britain was drifting into a policy of importing food rather than growing it, and of paying for it by exports of manufactured articles.

Then came ominous rumblings of the war machine on the Continent, and gradually it was realized that if war should come, Britain would be in a worse position in regard to food production than she had been in 1914. Steps were taken from 1932 onwards to prevent prices of certain things, especially wheat, potatoes, sugar beet, and milk, from continuing to fall, and to keep them at a level ensuring a minimum production of 15 per cent. of the requirement of wheat and about 25 per cent. of the requirement of sugar. The Land Fertility Scheme of September 1937 encouraged the application of lime and basic slag to land that needed it; proposals were made for helping with drainage. These various steps prevented matters getting worse and allowed of rather better wages so

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that men could be kept on the land. But much harm had been done, and when war broke out in September 1939 the United Kingdom had $2\frac{1}{2}$ million acres less land in agricultural use, the area under the plough had decreased by $4\frac{1}{2}$ million acres; and we had $6\frac{3}{4}$ million more people to feed, than in 1917.

Against this, however, were several favourable factors. British farmers and the surviving farm-workers had been steadily improving their efficiency, and had indeed a larger output per man than any others in Europe. The number of tractors available had risen considerably, and the advisory and research services were and had been for some time in full working order, so that the expert staffs had acquired valuable local knowledge of both men and conditions. Finally, both farmers and workers had organized themselves into great Unions which had worked together for some years on the Agricultural Wages Boards and had acquired the habit of fruitful and sympathetic co-operation.

Britain's Peace-time Dietary

The peace-time dietary of Great Britain as shown by various official inquiries is set out in Table I. Its most noticeable features were its variety and richness; the continued increase in the consumption of meat, fruit, vegetables, eggs, butter, and sugar; a steadily maintained consumption of potatoes and a slight fall in the consumption of bread; and a more widespread consumption of luxury foods like grapes, pears, melons, asparagus, which had little nutritive value but were nevertheless very attractive.

These changes came about partly as the result of

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TABLE I

*Food Consumption (Lb. per Head per Annum)
in Great Britain*

(J. B. Orr ¹)

	1909-13	1924-28	1934	1937-38
Wheat (as flour) . . .	211	198	197	212 ²
Potatoes . . .	208	194	210	221
Meat . . .	135	134	143	137 ³
Fish . . .	42	42	43	46
Vegetables . . .	60	78	98	208
Fruit . . .	61	91	115	
Sugar . . .	79	87	94	103
Butter . . .	16	16	25	25
Cheese . . .	7	9	10	9
Margarine . . .	6	12	8	16
Eggs (no.) . . .	104	120	152	234
Fresh milk (gal.) . . .	22	22	19	25 ⁴
Calories per head per day . . .	3057	3139	3246	3105
Protein per head per day (grams) . . .	86	85	87	87
(Animal protein (grams)) . . .	43	43	46	47
Fat per head per day (grams) . . .	99	110	124	115

¹ *Food, Health, and Income*, J. B. Orr (Macmillan, 1936); *Feeding the People in Wartime*, J. B. Orr and D. Lubbock (Macmillan, 1940).

² Wheat only, up to 1934; all cereals in 1937-38.

³ Animal lard included up to 1934, but grouped with margarine in 1937-38.

⁴ Liquid milk only, up to 1934; condensed milk included in 1937-38, worked out to liquid equivalents.

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better education in nutrition (although many of the mothers of the nineteenth century had a remarkable empirical knowledge of the feeding of children), but probably more because people liked these things and could afford to buy them. But they had no relation whatsoever to the power of producing the foods at home, and there was no thought of what would happen in time of war. It would have been quite impossible to produce this dietary on the fields of the United Kingdom. At average British yields, about 1.7 acres of land would be needed per head of population; at this rate the 32 million acres of cultivated land of the United Kingdom could have fed 19 million people, and there are about 47 million. The amount produced was 40 per cent. of the total food consumed, measured by money value, which was the most convenient measure in peace-time.¹ Part of this, however, was dependent on imported animal feeding-stuffs; only about 28 per cent. of the total was wholly produced at home. Had it been deemed worth while the 40 per cent. could have been raised to 50 per cent., perhaps without much increase in cost, but above this it would have been difficult to go. Large importations of cheap food were essential to the dietary.

The imported 60 per cent. came from many different countries. At first the imports had been unregulated; anyone could send any food from anywhere and it would be admitted to our markets. Even before the last war there were critics of this method, and after

¹ The calorie value is less easy to estimate, but was probably less: it has been put at 30-35 per cent. On the other hand, on basis of actual weight the proportion was greater, and was estimated by Sir John Orr at 60 per cent.

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the last war it was altered; trade agreements were set up, especially with the various countries of the Empire, and these had the effect of directing the trade into more definite channels and particularly of increasing the Empire's share. In 1931, before these arrangements were instituted, the Empire had supplied about half the imports of wheat and dairy produce, about a third of the imported fruit and meat, a quarter of the poultry and eggs, and a fifth of the fish: in all about 38 per cent. of total imports of food. In 1938 the Empire supplied about two-thirds of the imported wheat and one-half of the imported fruit, but still supplied only about a third of the meat and half the dairy produce: about 50 per cent. of the total imports.¹

Wheat.—The Empire wheat came mostly from Canada, with Australia second;² a much smaller quantity came from India. The relative positions of the other supplying countries varied greatly from year to year, but the chief were usually the Argentine, the United States, Roumania, and in some seasons the Soviet Union and France.

Meat.—The meat came chiefly from the Southern Hemisphere. Beef is well known to be the Englishman's favourite dish, and its imports, 13.3 million cwt. in 1938, far exceeded those of all other kinds of meat put together. But 75 per cent. of it came from countries outside the Empire. Chilled beef was the most popular and nearly 60 per cent. came from the Argentine. This virtual monopoly arose from the fact that chilling could at first be maintained only over a rather short voyage, and the Argentine was sufficiently

¹ *Trade and Navigation Returns, 1938*; also *Fifth Supplement to Britain's Food Imports*, Inst. Research Agric. Econ., Oxford.

² In 1938 Australia was actually first, though this was exceptional.

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near to ensure safe delivery on the British markets. But the method was improved and Australia and New Zealand both put up a stout and increasing competition. Certain regions in North Queensland are suitable for raising the necessary animals. The older product, frozen beef, was never very popular in Britain.

The imports of lamb and mutton amounted in 1938 to 7.2 million cwt., little more than half those of beef, and of these lamb was by far the more important. New Zealand had started this industry and steadily sent us some 2.5 million cwt. each year, but Australia's contribution was slowly creeping up and rose from less than 1 million cwt. in 1933 to 1.5 million cwt. in 1938. New Zealand was the chief source of mutton, but South America, especially the Argentine, sent considerable amounts, just over 1 million cwt.

Bacon came from completely different sources and only 25 per cent. was from the Empire. Half the total import was from Denmark—it had indeed been more—about one-fifth was from Canada, and the remainder was supplied chiefly by Eire, Poland, and the Netherlands, with lesser amounts from Sweden and Lithuania.

Fish.—Fresh and frozen fish came mainly from Norway and Denmark, but a large amount of canned salmon was also imported. The Empire contribution was less than 10 per cent., mainly from Canada, Newfoundland, and Eire.

Butter.—About half the imported butter was, in 1938, from the Empire (4.7 million cwt. out of 9.5), mostly from New Zealand which supplied more than half the Empire's contribution, and from Australia which followed closely. Eire came third, supplying 0.3 million cwt.; Canada and the Union of South

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Africa sent smaller quantities. Of non-Empire sources Denmark was easily first, supplying almost as much as New Zealand; then came the Netherlands, sending about one-third of the Danish amount, and the Baltic countries, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden.

Cheese came almost entirely from the Empire—2.5 million out of 2.9 million cwt.—more than half was from New Zealand and about a quarter from Canada; Australia was steadily increasing her supply. The small amount of non-Empire cheese came mainly from the Netherlands, but some from Italy.

Eggs.—Over 80 per cent. came from countries outside the Empire, chiefly Denmark and the Netherlands, with smaller supplies from Finland, Sweden, and Poland. Of the Empire countries *Eire* was a long way first and Australia second. A special product, liquid eggs, representing about 20 per cent. of the value of the whole import, was almost the monopoly of China.

Sugar.—Two-thirds of the imported sugar was from the Empire, Australia sending most, then Mauritius; South Africa and the West Indies came next, then Fiji and British Guiana. Of non-Empire sources Cuba was first, supplying nearly as much as Mauritius and Australia together. St. Domingo came second, followed by the Dutch East Indies and Peru.

Fruit.—The greatly increased fruit consumption shown in Table I was the result almost entirely of cheap importations. Oranges were the most popular; more than half came from the Empire and mandated territories, Palestine being easily first and South Africa second; of non-Empire sources the chief were Spain, Brazil, and in some years the United States. Grape-

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fruit was steadily advancing in favour; Palestine was the chief source, sending about half the supplies; South Africa came second and the United States third. Lemons, on the other hand, came mainly from Italy and to a smaller extent from Spain.

Apples came second to oranges, and no less than three-quarters of the imports were from the Empire, Canada coming first and Australia second, with New Zealand further down the list. The only important non-Empire source was the United States.

Bananas, the third favourite fruit of Great Britain, came mainly (about 30 per cent.) from the West Indies; the small amount of non-Empire supplies were chiefly from Brazil and Colombia.

The only other fruits that need be mentioned are grapes, 30 per cent. of which came from the Empire, mainly South Africa, with Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands as the chief non-Empire sources; and pears, of which also about a third came from the Empire, chiefly Australia and South Africa, but more than half came from the United States.

Vegetables and other Foods.—Half the imports of tomatoes came from the Channel Islands and almost as much from the Canary Islands, the rest came from the Netherlands. The Channel Islands also supplied about half the early potatoes, the rest were mainly from Spain and the Canaries. Onions came mainly from the Netherlands, Egypt, and in normal times Spain. Then there were nuts, fruits dried, crystallized, or otherwise preserved, spices and many other foods.

Of the beverages, nearly 90 per cent. of the tea came from India and Ceylon, the Dutch East Indies and British East Africa sending most of the rest; about 1 per cent. was from China—which raises the question

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for an Honours Geography student: where does China tea come from? Cocoa, next in importance, came almost entirely from British West Africa, while coffee was mainly from Costa Rica and British East Africa; a smaller amount came from British India, and about 1 per cent. of our total import from Brazil.

Even more remarkable than the large number of countries involved was the smoothness of supply. The smallest village shop had its full demands met with the utmost regularity. A village schoolmaster used to obtain permission for his geography class to survey the sources of supply of all the various stores in the village shop; almost the whole world was represented.

Britain's peace-time dietary thus required a delicately balanced and smoothly working international trading system, and, of course it postulated peace. The machinery continued to function during the first year both of the last war and of this one, but it then ceased and a new dietary became necessary.

How the Germans solved the Problem

The Germans adopted an entirely different method and one which from the wartime point of view was much more effective than the British. The dietary was not determined by what people liked to eat or by what they could afford to buy, but by what the German farmer could produce. Naturally it had to be physiologically adequate, and the German Hausfrau had the task of making it as appetizing and attractive as possible.

So far as can be seen the result has been successful, and some 85 per cent. of self-sufficiency was attained

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before the war. The agricultural system is very simple and can stand indefinitely the strain of war so long as abundance of cheap labour is available—whether forced or not does not matter. Fertilizer supplies are assured: nitrogen fertilizers are produced synthetically in the factories; potash is extensively mined in Germany and Alsace; and phosphates can be supplied by France.

The dietary is given in Table II. For comparison the data for France, Denmark, and Switzerland are

TABLE II

Food Consumption (Lb. per Head per Annum) in Germany and other European Countries as compared with Great Britain

(P. Lamartine Yates) (1934-38)

	Germany	France	Switzerland	Denmark	Great Britain
Bread and flour ¹	222	280	200	198	197
Potatoes . . .	398	400	198	264	210
Sugar . . .	56	56	97	120	109
Beef and veal . .	34	46	55	53	66
Pork . . .	65	20	48	72	48
All meat . . .	100	74	108	125	143
Milk (gal.) . . .	21 ²	23	58	36	20
Butter . . .	16.4	13.3	14.3	17.2	22
Margarine . . .	15.5	45	8
Cheese . . .	12.6	12.5	18.5	12.1	9.5
Eggs (No.) . . .	126	149	156	90	153

The figures for Great Britain do not all agree with those in Table I because the periods are not quite the same.

¹ In terms of flour.

² In wartime the milk is skimmed to make butter.

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included. Compared with that of Great Britain the German dietary had one-third less meat, only half as much beef but more pork, only half as much sugar, less butter and fewer eggs, but more bread, more cheese and margarine, and twice as much potatoes. But as a wartime dietary it had the great advantage that it could nearly all be produced in Germany and the surrounding countries, though with some shortage of fat, and it required only 1 acre of land per head of population instead of 1.6 or 1.7 acres.

More Home-grown Food for the British Wartime Dietary

Obviously Britain cannot maintain her peace-time dietary: she has neither the land to produce it at home nor the ships to import it from overseas. A new dietary had to be worked out which should be physiologically adequate and producible to a large extent at home. Fortunately the experience of the last war helps here. Arable land produces considerably more human food than grass land, and by ploughing up the grass and growing instead wheat, oats, and potatoes, far more people can be fed than on the peace-time system. This method had been adopted in the spring of 1917 to meet the submarine campaign then developing: its success was such that by the harvest of 1918 the United Kingdom output of wheat had increased by 55 per cent. over that of the ten-year period 1904-13, of oats by 38 per cent. and of potatoes by 40 per cent. There had, however, been a fall of 21 per cent. in the production of milk and of 17 per cent. in the production of meat. Only a part of these reductions could be attributed to the ploughing up, most

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was due to the shortage of imported feeding-stuffs and of labour. Put in actual figures the losses and gains in the United Kingdom had been: ¹

<i>Gains</i>	<i>Losses</i>
Wheat . 1·015 million tons.	Meat . 171 thousand tons.
Oats . 1·421 „ „	Milk . 390 million gallons.
Potatoes . 2·631 „ „	

3·38 million acres of grass land had been ploughed up, of which 2·14 million had been permanent and 1·24 million temporary grass.

It is not unreasonable to hope for improvement on the 1918 results and that the additional corn and potatoes could be secured without the loss of so much milk, although the full production of meat could not be maintained.

It is necessary, however, to think not only of the human beings but of the animals, and the ploughing up of grass land involves a loss of food for them, especially of protein, even after account is taken of the food supplied by the arable crops. Part of the loss may be made good by improving the remaining grass, much of which offers considerable scope for improvement.

In 1938 Great Britain had 20·8 million acres of grass and 8·5 million acres of arable crops: of the grass 17·4 million acres were permanent and 3·4 million acres temporary. Assuming 4 million acres were ploughed up, the productivity of the remainder would need to be

¹ T. H. Middleton, *Food Production in War*, Clarendon Press, 1923.

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increased by some 25 per cent. in order to keep up the supplies of grass for animals. That might be possible but would certainly not be easy.

Another source of food can be further exploited. Great Britain has no less than 16 million acres of land classed as 'rough grazings,' 5.4 million in England and Wales and 10.6 million in Scotland. Most of this is little better than waste, though some of it has in the past been cultivated, and could be used again.

When all this is done, however, it is improbable that all the animals can be 'fed.' No less than 23 per cent. of their 'starch equivalent' (*i.e.* fat-forming and energy-supplying food) and 27 per cent. of their 'protein equivalent' were imported in peace-time, and these imports have been drastically curtailed. The additional arable land will furnish additional food for the livestock, which will receive some of the oats and barley and much of the straw, the sugar-beet tops, the small potatoes, any mangolds or swedes; and after two or three years some at any rate of the ploughed-out land must go back to a clover ley in order to maintain fertility. But it is not possible to replace all the imported food, and many of the animals must be slaughtered before they are properly finished; the meat will be less 'prime,' tougher, and will need special treatment in cooking.

Britain's Wartime Dietary : What should it include ?

Medical authorities must fix the dietary, and the agriculturist do his best to produce it. In the last war the aim was to furnish a minimum daily ration of 100 grams ($3\frac{1}{2}$ oz.) of protein, 100 grams of fat, and

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500 grams of carbohydrate, furnishing approximately 3400 calories of 'food as purchased' per 'unit' of population, the 'units' being reckoned as 77 per cent. of the total. Different workers have different needs; according to accepted standards a sedentary worker can do with 2250-2500 calories; a manual worker needs 3500, while a soldier needs 4000. The old estimate of protein requirements is now regarded as too high; the more ascetic school of modern physiologists puts the figure at about 70 grams per day, of which, however, half should be animal protein or protein of equal physiological value.¹

From the published tables of analyses of our British foods² it is possible to work out various dietaries to see how far they supply the necessary requirements. Table III shows one given solely for illustration, not as a model.

Vegetables and fruits supply both calories and protein but not as a rule much; they are therefore left out of account.

¹ 'Calories' are heat units, and measure the relative values of foods for supplying the energy needed to do all our bodily work. Proteins are complex organic substances supplying certain nitrogen compounds called amino-acids which are indispensable for the building up of the body and also for its efficient working. Different proteins differ in value according to the nature and amounts of the various amino-acids they supply; the better animal proteins are superior to those present in grains or pulses. Vitamins are also organic compounds, but simpler in their make-up; they are essential for health and normal functioning of the body. They differ from fats, carbohydrates and proteins in that they are needed in small amounts only, yet they are absolutely indispensable; also they are not interchangeable, so that lack of one sort cannot be made good by excess of another. Minerals are inorganic salts needed for many purposes, and likewise not interchangeable.

² *Chemical Composition of Foods*, R. A. McCance and E. M. Widdowson, Medical Research Council, 1940.

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TABLE III

*Calories and Protein furnished by one week's food
for one person*

(For illustration purposes only)

Food	Quantity per Week, oz.	Calories	Protein grams
Flour ¹ . . .	40	4,400	125
Oatmeal . . .	12	1,500	45
Potatoes . . .	80	2,160	48
Bacon . . .	4	600	16
Beef and mutton . . .	12	600	70
Butter and fats . . .	8	1,800	..
Suet . . .	2	520	..
Sugar . . .	8	900	..
Milk (3½ pints) . . .	70	1,300	65
Cheese . . .	1	120	7
Eggs (2) . . .	4	200	14
		14,100	390
Required: Sedentary worker . . .		15,750- 17,500	490-700 (250 of first class)
Manual „ . . .		24,500	

Other foods are required to supply the calories and protein still needed. These might, for example, be

¹ Including bread. 3 lb. of flour makes approximately 4 lb. of bread.

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made up as follows where the foods were available:—

	Oz. per Week	Calories	Protein, grams
Other meats	8	600	20
Fish	8	250	40
Jam, honey, etc.	2	200	..
Dried-peas	8	600	50
Cocoa and milk preparations	4	400	12
Cake	4	500	6
Beer	4 pints	1000	..
		3550	128

A larger number of calories would be needed by a manual worker; but these could come from an increased consumption of flour, oatmeal, and potatoes.

All sorts of other possibilities present themselves, and any housewife who will take the trouble to plan a dietary will get a good deal of interest out of it. A practicable dietary usually supplies enough calories but not always enough protein, and this needs careful watching, especially to ensure sufficient first-class protein. A tough cut of meat is not as valuable as a tender cut.

Whatever practicable dietary one adopts, wheat stands pre-eminent as a source of calories and protein.

Britain's Wheat Supply

This might become the determining factor in the war situation. Wheat is the chief source of calories, of protein (though not of the first class), and nowadays

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of vitamin B₁; no other food in the wartime dietary begins to approach it in importance. The peace-time requirements were about 300 lb. of wheat grain per head; this yielded about 200 lb. of flour, which made about 300 lb. of bread: the wheat thus gave approximately its own weight of bread. The wartime consumption is likely to be higher than this owing partly to the reduced quantities of other foods, partly also to the increased number of people at work and therefore needing more than if they were idle. Wheat has a particularly high sentimental value as the 'staff of life, and the thought of bread queues and bread riots in this country would send a shudder down one's back. Happily this contingency will not arise so long as ships can cross the Atlantic, for Canada has enormous stocks, and Australia, South America, and the United States can also be drawn on. Wheat is one of the easiest of all foodstuffs to transport: a single shipload can provide the entire needs of a town of 40,000 inhabitants for a whole year. Unfortunately Britain's storage accommodation is not so good as it was: in the old days large numbers of medium-sized mills were scattered all over the country and these could have held and ground large quantities of wheat. In the period of peace the mills at the ports flourished and crushed out the country mills; now, however, they are themselves in danger of air raids.

Had the country mills been kept going, the position in regard to handling the wheat supplies would now be much better. Here the Germans are more happily situated; instead of having a few large mills that make easy targets they have numbers of small mills scattered over the countryside, thus safeguarding the manufacture of their flour.

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In 1938 the area under wheat in Great Britain was just under 2 million acres and this provided about 20 per cent. of Britain's needs. Since the war three steps have been taken to add to the bread output:

(1) The area under wheat has been increased by ploughing up grass land; (2) yields are being pushed up by the greater use of sulphate of ammonia as top dressing; (3) the milling is done more closely: in peace-time 70 to 72 per cent. of the grain goes into the flour and the remaining 28 or 30 per cent. is fed to live stock: in wartime 75 per cent. of the grain goes into the flour, on Government orders. There seems little point in going beyond 85 per cent., as the residue contains a good deal of fibre and is neither particularly digestible nor particularly nutritious.

It is difficult to say how far Britain could go in the direction of self-sufficiency. If the wheat area could be pushed up to some 6 million acres, about 70-75 per cent. of the needs could be provided. The additional 4 million acres of wheat would mean the addition of some 8 or 10 million acres at least to the ploughed land because of the practical difficulties of devoting land entirely to wheat: it can be done, but there is risk of disease and of weed infestation.

Some economy in wheat consumption could be effected by fostering an increased consumption of oatmeal so far as milling facilities allow. The whole oat is generally milled, the germ with all its valuable food stuffs being left in.

The 2.4 million acres of oats in the United Kingdom in peace-time furnished some 80 per cent. of the requirements, but a greater area is now available.

Potatoes

Potatoes come next in importance to wheat as sources of energy, and indeed an acre of potatoes supplies more energy than an acre of any other crop: double, for example, that supplied by wheat or oats. The United Kingdom in peace-time had about 0.73 million acres in potatoes, in addition to those grown in gardens and allotments: these supplied all our needs except for some of the earlies which came from the Canaries, Spain, etc. Here the loss of the Channel Islands has been unfortunate, as many of our earlies were obtained from them. It would be comparatively easy to increase considerably the area under potatoes, and doubling the consumption would still only mean the addition of another million acres. Transport, however, presents a serious problem, because most of the potatoes are grown in the eastern part of England and Scotland, and in certain pockets in the west, *e.g.* in Cheshire, around Ormskirk, etc. Increased areas in other parts of the country, especially in the neighbourhood of towns, are greatly needed, so as to save transport.

A certain amount of propaganda and, still more important, informed action, will be necessary to induce the public to consume more potatoes. They can be dried at central factories and added to flour, thereby making supplies of flour go further. They are reckoned as a starchy food and this is true, but their protein has higher physiological value than that of grain, and they are a good source of vitamin C. If supplies of wheat and potatoes can be kept up it will be possible to maintain the energy requirements of the population.

Milk and Butter

Milk is another of the key-foods, particularly important as complementary to bread and potatoes. The peace-time consumption was lower than in many other countries and for some time had been fairly steady at about 20 gallons per head per annum, then a drive was made and this figure was pushed up. In 1938 there were some 3·4 million cows in milk or in calf and heifers in calf, out of a total population of 8·9 million cattle in the United Kingdom, these figures being higher than ever before. A fair proportion of their food, including the larger part of their concentrated foods, was imported and has since been cut off; it is therefore necessary to change the dietary, making more use of home-grown foods, silage, etc. The Government has given priority of purchased feeding-stuffs to dairy cows; this is justified by the urgent necessity for maintaining milk supplies and by the high efficiency of the dairy cow in transforming fodder into milk. Most of the milk is sold as liquid, but some is made into cheese and other products. One gallon of milk makes 1 lb. of cheese, but much nutritive value remains in the whey, which should be properly dried and used as food.

Butter is the most concentrated source of energy; 1 lb. supplies 3600 calories, against only 1600 given by 1 lb. of flour. Further, it is one of the best sources of vitamins A and D. Even during peace-time it was not economical to make butter in Great Britain; it is even less so during wartime. No less than 25 lb. of milk are needed to make 1 lb. of butter, and the by-products, skimmed milk and butter milk, are awkward to handle though they contain much

good food. As it is so concentrated, a single shipload getting in from New Zealand or Australia serves the needs of a very large population.

Margarine is practically equal to butter in nutritive value, but unfortunately competes with high explosives for its raw materials. Careful balancing of requirements has therefore to be made.

Meat

It is the restriction of the meat supply that the average man feels most. When consumption had to be reduced two courses were possible: the German peace-time dietary could have been adopted, which would have meant a heavy curtailment of lamb, mutton, and beef supplies but an increase in the pork; or all four could have been kept on the list but the pork reduced more heavily than the others. Actually the second method was adopted.

Beef has always been the Englishman's favourite meat, and to have lost it altogether would have been a very sad blow. It is extravagant to produce, for the bullock is a poor transformer of food into flesh, and still worse when he is making the prime beef of peace-time. Sheep are better transformers, but the pig is the best of all. Considered merely as a machine for making meat the pig wins easily. But she (pigs are mostly feminine or neuter) suffers from one fatal defect: she is much nearer the human being in structure and in food requirements than are cows or sheep: she has only one stomach, is not well adapted to feed on grass and on what farmers call 'roughage,' i.e. straw, hay, etc., but needs grain if she is to do well, and of course some green food. She does well on steamed potatoes

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with a certain quantity of meat or fish-meal. In short, she eats the same foods as we do although she accepts lower standards of quality. This makes her useful for clearing up kitchen waste, but it also means that she competes with us for grain. Cows and sheep, on the other hand, have an entirely different digestive system: they have what amounts to four stomachs; unlike ourselves and pigs they can deal with 'roughage,' and their common fodder crops, mangolds, marrow stem kale, vetches, etc., are quite unsuited to human consumption. They do not compete for human food; but the pig does, and so is at present under a cloud. The hen is also in disfavour for exactly the same reason. But a strong case can be made for both of them.

Great efforts are made to keep up supplies of beef, lamb, and mutton, and of course to feed the pigs. The beef is produced mainly on grass with such concentrated feeding-stuffs as can be spared. So are the lamb and the mutton, but increasing use is made of fodder crops grown and eaten on arable land: sugar-beet tops, roots, marrow stem kale, vetches, etc. This arrangement not only saves lifting the crop, but it much enriches the land and is indeed one of the surest ways of maintaining fertility of light soils and loams. In recent years methods of lamb production have been greatly improved.

Fish

Fish is a valuable supplement to the meat ration, and the fat fish have a special value as sources both of fat and of vitamin D.

It is unfortunate that the supply of freshwater fish and eels has not been more fully developed.

Sugar

The position as regards sugar is better now than in the last war, when most of the sugar had to be imported. Thanks to the devoted efforts of a small band of enthusiasts, the production of sugar from sugar-beet in Great Britain has greatly increased. The chief fertilizers needed for the crop can be supplied from home resources, and if enough seed can be obtained the present output can be expanded considerably. The home production in peace-time had risen to about half a pound per head per week, but expansion is necessarily slow, so that a diminution in direct supply of sugar and, more important, in jam and marmalade is inevitable.

Fruit and Vegetables

Since the imports of fruit cannot be maintained, the people of Britain must go without most of their oranges, bananas, and a good many of their apples. This will necessitate more care of the home supplies, of which in the past there has been much waste, especially of wind-fall and non-keeping apples and plums. All possibilities in the way of preservation—bottling, jam-making, drying, etc.—must be adopted.

Fruit is important not only for its flavouring value, which gives the character to the indispensable second or third course at dinner, but also as source of vitamins, particularly C, and of mineral matter. Happily vegetables supply these same constituents.

Fortunately, the present supplies of vegetables can be not only maintained but increased, and they may be expected to play an increasing part in the British dietary in providing much-needed flavouring,

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mineral matter, and vitamins, and to a much less extent as sources of energy and nitrogen. Hitherto they have been mainly produced in certain regions such as Kent, Bedfordshire, Worcestershire, etc., and transported to the centres of population. In war-time transport is apt to be slowed down, and some of the vegetables, especially the green ones, lose part of their value if they are not quite fresh. The war-time problem is therefore twofold: to increase production and to spread out the production, so as to reduce the need for transport and to ensure freshness. Hence the great urge to more vegetable production in gardens and allotments; every household that can become self-supporting in vegetables and potatoes is not only benefiting itself but relieving transport and labour difficulties.

A further important problem arises in connexion with local surplus produce, and here much careful organization is needed. It is impossible to arrange for full production without incurring the risk of a surplus if the season turns out favourable or if insect or fungus pests should spare the crops; and this surplus, if it materializes, must be fully utilized. Unfortunately the British housewife is nothing like so well equipped to preserve vegetables as to preserve fruit. There is little difficulty with carrots, parsnips, beetroots, and onions, which can be stored, or with leeks and winter green vegetables that can remain in the ground till wanted. Green beans can be salted, but the bottling of peas and other vegetables requires a higher temperature than that of fruit—240° F. in a steam retort is recommended, except where lemon juice or citric acid can be added to bring down the pH¹ to

¹ A scale measuring acidity, just as °F. measure temperature.

4·5, when boiling temperature suffices. Bottling, of course, could be done at central stations or by travelling preserving-vans, as also could drying. Unfortunately wastage of green vegetables—cabbage of various kinds, sprouting broccoli, etc.—occurs every year; the art of making sauerkraut has never been learned, and drying, while effective, requires appliances and training.

As the war goes on the flavouring value of vegetables will assume more importance. Cereals and potatoes will be eaten in larger quantity to supply energy and protein, but both are uninteresting and will need livening up with vegetables. In planning the garden, therefore, attractive vegetables should be included whether they have much nutritive value or not. So, in planning the dietary, asparagus, mushrooms, and other tasty dishes if obtainable should not be rejected simply because they are poor in food constituents.

The chief value of vegetables, however, is that in default of fruit they are the main source of supply of vitamins A and C, and mineral matter, especially iron and calcium. For both vitamins broccoli tops and watercress stand pre-eminent, followed closely by mustard and cress, brussels sprouts and spinach; for A, tomatoes, lettuce, and carrots are good; and for C (but not A), cabbage, cauliflower, and turnips followed by peas, radishes, parsnips, and potatoes.

As sources of iron the best are mustard and cress, spinach, leeks, radishes, with peas and broccoli tops as good seconds. Vegetables lose some of their valuable qualities unless they are used fresh and are properly cooked. This question is one of the most important in our whole wartime economy but lies outside the subject of this pamphlet.

The Contribution of the Small Producer

Food production in Great Britain is of necessity largely in the hands of farmers and market gardeners, but much remains that the small producer can do. Poultry, ducks, pigs, rabbits, bees, goats can all add something to food supplies, and one or more of these should be attached to the garden whenever possible; there is always something unusable by human beings which they can convert into valuable food. Pig clubs, poultry clubs, beekeepers' associations and similar bodies should be encouraged. If the producer does nothing more than keep himself and his family off the market for some particular food his activities have still been useful.

Small producers are always difficult to organize. Probably the simplest scheme is to arrange open markets at which they could sell their produce, an extension of what is already being done by some Women's Institutes. A special word should be put in for bees. England is rich in flowers and flowering shrubs and fruit trees, and these are rich in nectar which is only waiting to be collected and made into honey. The present production in England and Wales has been estimated at 120,000 cwt. per annum; it could with advantage be greatly increased; not only more honey but more fruit would be obtained; for bees are among the most effective pollinating agents.

Elimination of Waste

A large amount of food is lost each year through the depredations of insect and fungus pests, rabbits, pigeons, small birds, and rats, and special efforts are

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necessary to keep them down. The most remarkable feature is the persistence of rabbits; they are good food; a price is set on their head and they can be shot, netted, snared, and got out with ferrets; and in some cases even poison gas has to be used against them, yet they contrive to continue robbing farms. Pigeons are also good food but are more difficult to deal with; they can only be shot and that with difficulty. Small birds cause even greater troubles: they destroy fruit-buds and grain, but they are so numerous that the shooting of a few of them helps but little. Rats are perhaps the most troublesome because of their intelligence; very few farm and garden stores are proof against them. There is still, unfortunately, sheep worrying by dogs which results in losses of ewes and lambs. Had the lamb grown up it would have produced some 50 lb. of meat, while the ewe might have continued giving lambs—mostly twins—for two or three more years.

Our Future Food Supplies

Forecasting in any circumstances is a risky business, and particularly in wartime. But it seems safe to say that with a big enough effort Britain can produce all the potatoes and vegetables the public can eat. The production of wheat will increase, but Britain would be in grave difficulties if she had to depend on what she could grow. Happily wheat comes from Canada, and if the Atlantic can be kept sufficiently open and sufficient mills working, adequate supplies should always be available. Butter and fats cannot be produced at home in sufficient quantities, but they are so concentrated that a single shipload satisfies the require-

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ments of a large number of people. It looks as if Britain can get all the necessary calories, vitamins, and minerals wanted. But the position is less certain in regard to the supply of protein, especially of 'first-class' protein, which is usually of animal origin, and every effort will need to be made by farmers and others to increase production of milk, meat, and eggs. This necessitates ample supplies of protein for the animals: a specially difficult problem in winter time; fortunately more easy in summer when the grass is growing.

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
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THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY

BY

A. J. BROWN

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THE subject of this pamphlet is the economic contribution of the United States towards the defeat of the Axis Powers. After describing the movement of American opinion and action towards 'all aid to Britain' and her Allies, the author (who has been engaged on a continuous survey of the economic side of the war) discusses the war-potential of the United States and its mobilization in defence of the Western Hemisphere and of Britain. He sets out the problems of the transfer of a peace-time economy to a war footing, with the bottle-necks of machine tools, skilled labour, and raw materials; the results achieved and the plans laid down for shipbuilding, aircraft construction, and other supplies; and the relative strength of the Axis Powers and their opponents, with special reference to the time factor.

A more detailed account is given in C. J. Hitch's *America's Economic Strength* (World To-day Series, 2s. 6d. net).

The background of *American Foreign Policy* may be studied in D. W. Brogan's Oxford Pamphlet (No. 50) on that subject, and in Allan Nevins' *America in World Affairs* (World To-day Series, 2s. 6d. net).

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THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY

The President's Statement

SO now,' said President Roosevelt on 15th March 1941, 'our country is to be what our people have proclaimed it to be, the arsenal of democracy.' The object of the following pages is to explain why the people of the United States have come to this decision, what help they have given to the other democracies, what resources they have for making their arsenal, and how quickly they are making it.

The American Attitude to the War

The magazine *Fortune* has conducted surveys at various times during the war which show very clearly the changes of American opinion. In October 1939, a month after the outbreak of war, 83 per cent. of the people asked wanted Britain and her Allies to win, while only 1 per cent. wanted Germany to win. At the same time, only 3 per cent. wanted to enter the war at once, and only another 13 per cent. wanted to enter it even if Britain and her Allies looked like being defeated. As the law stood at that date, the United States could not even export arms to a belligerent country, though the majority of opinion, apparently, was in favour of amending this, as was subsequently done. The American attitude, therefore, was the traditional one of sympathy for other democracies

coupled with determination to keep out of foreign entanglements if possible.

What was the reason for this attitude? As regards the first element—the sympathy for other democracies—its origin is clear. The people of the United States are largely descended from ancestors who went there to escape from forms of government oppressive to them, so that they are acutely aware of the advantages of political freedom and tend to be more individualistic by temperament than the people of most other countries. Moreover, the sense of nationhood in the United States is inevitably founded far less upon a consciousness of a common history than is the case in older countries, and is therefore focused upon the democratic ideals embodied in the United States Constitution, which most Americans still regard as nearly perfect.

As for the element of isolationism in the American attitude to European affairs, it also is largely due to the individualism of most Americans and the desire of many of them to cut adrift from the troubles of a continent which they or their ancestors left not entirely regretfully. Even more, however, it is due to the facts of geography. The United States is the only great Power in the Western Hemisphere, so that the likelihood of a direct threat to it seems at first sight small. Moreover, many of its citizens live so far inside its frontiers as to be reminded only rarely that their country has any necessary connections at all with the outside world. In fact, the economic dependence of the United States upon the outside world is far smaller than that of any other advanced country. Before the war, Britain imported about a sixth of all the goods and services she used; Germany imported a fourteenth, the British Empire as a whole a twelfth,

Continental Europe a seventeenth, and the United States only a twenty-fifth.

It is clear on closer inspection, however, that complete isolation is not possible, even for the United States. Not only is it a fact that she became involved both in the Napoleonic Wars and in the Great War of 1914-18, but her position as the only great Power with substantial territory in the Western Hemisphere obviously has to be maintained in the face of any European or other Power ambitious to establish an empire in Latin America. Hence there arises the famous and much misrepresented 'Monroe Doctrine.' On 2nd December 1823, President Monroe told Congress that 'the American Continents, by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers.' This warning, however, would certainly not have been effective had it not been that the British Government supported the policy of preventing European intervention in Latin America, for then, and for the rest of the century, only Britain possessed the naval power necessary to protect the New World from the Old. Hence, the maintenance of the freedom of the Western Hemisphere from European interference demands that the seas shall be commanded either by Britain (or some Power equally sympathetic with United States policy) or by the United States herself.

In the summer of 1940, when many Americans thought that Britain would be defeated, it was clear both that the Powers threatening to overcome her were anything but sympathetic with the Monroe Doctrine, and that the United States was then in no very strong position to oppose them. A German plot (by no means the first of its kind in South America)

had been discovered earlier in the year which apparently had the object of converting Uruguay into a 'German colony of peasants.' Hitler has been reported by Dr. Rauschning to have confessed to designs upon both Mexico and Brazil, and there have been several more recent Nazi attempts to overthrow other Latin American governments.

The United States Navy at the beginning of the war, though about equal in strength to the British, and therefore one of the two most powerful in the world, was outnumbered in every category of ship by the combined navies of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the small fleets of the other American countries were not sufficient to make up the balance. On land and in the air the United States position was far less favourable still: her standing army, numbering only some 200,000 men, with only 19 modern medium, and 457 assorted light and no heavy tanks, was clearly insignificant beside the German Army of several million men, with its ten or more armoured divisions; her Army Air Corps, with 21,000 men and only 2300 aircraft of all kinds, was equally negligible in comparison with the Luftwaffe probably ten or fifteen times as large. In the year before the war, the three Axis Powers had spent more than seven times as much on armaments as the United States. The last column in fig. 1 (facing title-page) shows the situation clearly.

It was not surprising that as the position of Britain became more critical, these facts weighed more and more with Americans. According to a *Fortune* survey in June 1940, only 32 per cent. of them then thought that Britain would win the war, and 93 per cent. thought that the United States should spend whatever was necessary to build up the armed forces as quickly as possible—an opinion entirely consistent with

the belief, held by 78 per cent. of those asked, that a victorious Germany would interfere in South America, and of an only slightly smaller proportion that she would try to seize territory on the American side of the ocean. A majority of those with definite opinions on the point also believed that the Axis Powers, if victorious in Europe, would try to attack the United States as soon as possible.

The Battle of Britain had the effect of re-establishing American faith in the power of Britain to survive. In October, no less than 63 per cent. of the Americans asked believed that Britain would win—nearly twice the proportion of four months earlier. The natural conclusion from this new belief was that Britain, being a defensible outpost of democracy, should be helped to resist even if that meant slowing down the growth of the United States forces themselves.

Moreover, it came to be realized that it was necessary to think not only of the immediate future, but of the long run as well. The immediate fact was that the United States was weak in a military sense and that her first duty was to rearm. It became clear, however, that even a completely rearmed United States would not be in a comfortable position if opposed by an Old World under Axis domination. In the first place, it is never comfortable for a democracy to be fully armed; it involves sacrifices not only in standard of living; but in political freedom also. Secondly, many Latin American countries are economically dependent upon European markets, and, with all Europe under Nazi domination, the United States would have to face not only the military threat to the Western Hemisphere from outside, but also the threat of penetration from within, based upon economic blackmail. Thirdly, a survey of the war potentials of the World Powers,

assuming that they are all prepared to arm to the teeth, shows that the position of the United States in the long run could not be made by any means completely secure, even by the greatest sacrifices on her part, if the New World had to stand alone.

The War-Potential of the United States in relation to other Powers

There can be little doubt that, in ultimate capacity to support modern war, the United States is far the greatest of the World Powers (see fig. 1). Her population, it is true, is only a sixteenth of the world total, and is surpassed in size by the U.S.S.R., China, and the British Empire, but population is less important in modern war than production. In the value of goods and services produced, the United States ranks easily first. Her output is about a quarter of the world total, is three times as great as that of the United Kingdom, nearly three times as great as that of the U.S.S.R., and twice as great as that of Greater Germany, even though she was, in the year 1940 to which these comparisons refer, working much further below her utmost capacity than any of the other countries mentioned. Indeed, her capacity to produce is probably greater than that of the whole of Continental Europe, excluding Russia. In the field of industrial production, which is still more relevant to war-potential, her position is more favourable still. In 1937 her industrial output was about 40 per cent. of the world total, the share of Continental Europe (without Russia) being about 28 per cent., of the British Empire about 15 per cent., of the U.S.S.R. about 10 or 12 per cent., of Japan about $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and of Italy somewhat less than

this. Her position is perhaps even more favourable still if the comparison is limited to the particular industries which are most closely connected with war—metals, engineering, and chemicals. In these she possesses little less than half the capacity of the whole world. (See the comparison of steel-making capacities in fig. 1.)

Thus, taking into account the fact that she is far the most nearly self-sufficient of the great Powers (except Russia), one can see that her position, if she were fully armed, would be immensely strong. The fact that, to complete her independence of the Eastern Hemisphere, a very considerable amount of adjustment would be necessary, does not disturb this conclusion. Yet the fact that Continental Europe alone, excluding Russia, has more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the population of the United States is not without its importance. This population, organized and driven by the Nazis, and commanding all the resources of the Old World, would in time be able to produce a war-machine excelling the greatest which the United States could maintain. Even America could not, in the really long run, stand against the rest of the world.

The policy of helping Britain was therefore seen to be necessary, not only to give the United States time to arm, and not only to avoid a conclusion to the war which would impose upon America the need for permanent and enormous sacrifices in the interest of security, but in order also to give America the minimum conditions of security in the long run. Hence, it is clear why the people of the United States have gradually come to the view that the only satisfactory measure of American defence is one which ensures the final defeat of the Axis Powers. This is now seen to involve giving all possible help, not only to countries

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whose strategic positions are important and whose institutions the American people admire, but to all countries which are helping towards the desired end, including Russia. The American attitude to the belligerents may be said to have been founded in the beginning mostly upon ideals and sympathies, but events have transferred it on to a basis of grim necessity.

American Defence and Aid to the Democracies

Before considering the growth and problems of American war industry, it will be useful to summarize very briefly the steps which have been taken, both to defend America and to help the nations actively resisting aggression. The defence of America has been strengthened by the initiation of an enormous expenditure on armaments, by conscription, and by the acquisition and fortification of strategic bases. The total defence estimates submitted in January 1940 amounted only to £385 million, though there was an additional plan to spend £164 million on the Navy over a five-year period. By the end of July 1940 the total defence programme had expanded to £2500 million. It included provision for building a 'two-ocean navy,' involving the construction of 200 extra warships by 1946 or 1947, and for equipping an army of 1,200,000 men, with certain reserves of equipment for 800,000 more. The amount actually spent on defence in the year ending June 1941 was £1507 million, and the total defence programme authorized or asked for by the end of July 1941, excluding help for other democracies, was estimated to cost no less than £11,000 million, or more than twice Greater

Germany's annual war expenditure, though this cost will necessarily be spread over some years, and the rate of total defence expenditure reached by August 1941 was under £3000 million per annum. The present programme calls for the complete equipment of an army of 1,727,000 men, with essential items of equipment for 3,000,000 men. Conscription was introduced in September 1940, when the calling up of 800,000 men per year was begun. In August 1941 it was decided to retain the first year's draft for a further period: •

The programme of acquiring and fortifying bases has been even more spectacular. In September 1940 the United States acquired from Britain the lease of sites for bases in British Guiana, the West Indies, Bermuda, and Newfoundland; in April, 1941 it was announced that United States bases were to be set up in Greenland, and in July United States troops began to take over from the British the task of occupying Iceland. The North Atlantic approaches to the United States and the nearer approaches to the country's western seaboard and to the Panama Canal were thus covered. In the Pacific, United States bases are being enlarged or constructed in the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, the Philippines, the Aleutian Islands (west of Alaska), and in the Phoenix Islands and Tutuila in the Central Pacific, while the military defence of the Philippines has been put under the control of the United States forces. The approaches to the Americas from the West, and their important communications with South-East Asia, are thus also being protected. • The defence of the Western Hemisphere has been further consolidated by the work of the U.S.-Canadian Joint Defence Board, which has made plans for joint action in defence of both countries' territories, and by the Act of Havana, by

which all the American Republics agree to take joint action to prevent European colonies in the Western Hemisphere from falling into Axis hands. The system of keeping up naval patrols far out into the Atlantic, with orders (since 16th September 1941) to 'shoot first' at Axis raiders and to protect all ships over a large part of the North Atlantic, is the most active measure of American defence so far, and is consistent with traditional United States policy.

No less important than the development of the armed forces and bases for these is the securing of adequate supplies of strategic materials. A considerable number of these—notably tin, rubber, manganese, and tungsten—are not produced in adequate quantities in the Western Hemisphere, and a programme of accumulating stocks, as well as developing productive capacity and substitutes, was therefore initiated in June 1940.

The history of aid to Britain and her Allies falls into two periods—the first period of purely commercial relations and that in which aid has been a matter of national policy. At the beginning of the war, as mentioned above, the sale of arms to belligerents was forbidden, but in November 1939 the Neutrality Act was amended so that the belligerents could buy arms if they paid cash for them and provided for their carriage in non-American ships. All American ships were at the same time prohibited from approaching belligerents' territories. The French and the British Governments, who had been buying American aircraft since before the war, thereupon resumed their purchases of supplies of all kinds on a very large scale, Britain drawing heavily for this purpose upon her reserves of gold, dollars, and American securities.

The second period may be said to have begun after

Dunkirk, when the United States allowed the sale to Britain of large stocks of old rifles, machine-guns, and field guns. In September 1940 there followed the immensely important transfer to Britain of 50 old American destroyers, coinciding with the agreement to lease bases in British territory to America free of charge. During the later phase of the Presidential campaign, it was clear that both candidates had made help to Britain the main point of their foreign policy, and the importance attached to this help was revealed by President Roosevelt in the first press conference after his re-election, when he stated that, for some weeks past, it had been understood that newly produced war material which was competed for by the United States and British Governments should be divided more or less equally between them. That the United States Government should regard the arming of Britain as of equal urgency with the arming of its own forces was a remarkable proof of its realization of the vital importance of Britain's survival, and this realization was shown in many ways in the following months—by the steps which were taken, for instance, to release for Britain aircraft ordered by the United States Government, and to persuade American companies to accept British armament orders.

The next great stage on the road to full aid to Britain, 'short of war,' was the Lease-Lend Act, which was signed on 11th March 1941. The reason for this measure was that the British Government by the end of 1940 had spent, in the United States and elsewhere, £578 million out of the £1120 million of gold, dollars, and American securities which she had possessed at the beginning of the war, as well as the dollars which she had earned by her exports of goods

and newly produced gold in the meantime. The reserves remaining were only just sufficient, together with her probable exports and gold production during 1941, to pay for the £908 million worth of goods on order and due for delivery during that year. But for the Act, therefore, Britain could have obtained from the United States after the end of 1941 only what she could pay for by exports and gold production—i.e. probably only about half as much as she had been getting before that date. The Act prevented this reduction in the flow of supplies by empowering the President to lease, lend, or sell to any country whose defence he deemed vital to the defence of the United States, defence material built for the purpose in the United States or otherwise obtained. Food, raw materials, and machinery were included for this purpose as 'defence material,' and the Act was drawn up to cover also repairs, etc. in American dockyards to the ships of countries assisted. A sum of £1750 million was at once voted for the provision of such material, and in addition to this, the President was empowered to transfer goods belonging to the U.S. Army and Navy to assisted countries up to a total value of £325 million. In October 1941 a further £1500 million were voted under the Act.

Since the passing of the Act, further financial help to a total amount of £167 million has been given to Britain in the form of American Government loans and similar forms of assistance, which will contribute to the financing of orders already placed.

The chief measures of direct aid to Britain after this was the scheme to train 8000 British airmen a year in the Southern States, and the formation of the Shipping Pool, which is described below. Further developments of American policy, including the granting of

aid to Russia, are to follow the meeting between the President and Mr. Churchill in August 1941, and the Moscow Conference. What form this aid will take is, of course, beyond prediction, but there is no doubt that it will grow with America's power to give it, and will be treated, more and more, as a matter of urgent national necessity.

This very brief outline of the steps taken for American defence and the provision of aid to Britain and her Allies shows clearly how closely interlocked are these two objects of policy. Not only does the strengthening of the American position help to keep the enemies and potential enemies of Britain in check (as in Greenland and Iceland, for instance), not only does the clearing of raiders from American defence waters greatly relieve the pressure on British and Allied shipping, but Americans realize that Britain itself is more important strategically for the defence of America than any outpost now occupied by the forces of the United States.

The Development of the Defence Industries

The process of turning an industrial system, however powerful it may be, to the production of armaments in large quantities is necessarily a long one. An advanced industrial community can eventually reach the point where half or more of its output of goods and services is for defence. Germany and Britain reached this point, or something near it, in the last war, though only in the third and fourth years of the conflict. The United States was not at war long enough to reach it, and at the time of the Armistice was devoting about a quarter of her output to war purposes. In the present war Germany had a flying

start. Fig. 2 (at end) gives some indication of the lead which she had over other Powers in the total value of her expenditure on armaments (she had spent £5000 million on them in the five years ending September 1939, whereas Britain had spent less than £1400 million and the United States £840 million), but it is important to realize also that the years since 1933 had been spent in a conversion of German industry to war purposes which, compared with what Britain and America have had to perform, was leisurely. As much as 21 per cent. of all German output of goods and services was spent on war preparation in the year 1938, when the proportion so spent in Britain was $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and in the United States $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. (see fig. 3).

In the United States at the outbreak of war, and even in June 1940, when most Germans and many Americans thought the war in Europe was nearly over, the production of armaments was confined to a comparatively small number of Government and private plants, and, though something had been done to 'educate' other firms to produce them by small orders widely placed, the effect achieved was very small. It is true that the United States had the capacity to produce as much steel and three times as many motor vehicles as all the rest of the world, and had enormous reserves of unemployed labour and twice as much power per person engaged in industry as any other country, but, though these resources are important in the long run, their usefulness is limited at the beginning of rearmament by shortages of particular kinds of productive machinery, particular kinds of skilled labour, and particular kinds of material.

The productive machinery which is scarce consists mostly of machine tools—machines for the accurate

working of metal. Ordinary peace-time industry in the United States, such as the motor industry, possesses, of course, great numbers of these tools, but they are very largely highly specialized machines capable of producing only narrow ranges of products. In one motor works, it was found that 85 per cent. of the machinery was useful only for the particular purpose for which it was used. It could make, say, motor-car crank-shafts but not aeroplane crank-shafts. Where particular machine tools already in existence are useful for war-material production, it is frequently the case that the production of the material concerned also requires other machine tools not already available, so that those which are at hand cannot be set to work immediately. Machine tools thus constituted the first great 'bottle-neck' in American defence industry. Sales of them even in the great boom year of 1929 had amounted only to £46 million, while in March 1941 they were already at an annual rate of £172 million. The rate at which they can be supplied to war industry is limited, not only by shortage of the very high and special skill which is needed in their manufacture, but by the fact that a considerable proportion of the output in the early days of expansion is needed by the machine-tool industry itself. The export of these vital pieces of equipment has been very strictly controlled by licensing since December 1940, and they were among the first commodities with regard to which a system of mandatory priorities was imposed, so as to give defence industry the first call on them.

The shortage of skill has hitherto been apparent mostly in particular industries such as machine tools and aircraft, but with the completion of 'tooling-up' it will become much more widespread. General Motors,

for instance, expect to need 60,000 additional skilled men for defence orders. The Office of Education is subsidizing engineering colleges, in which 50,000 workers in defence industry are already enrolled, the thousand or more vocational schools of the country, which have already more than two million pupils taking part-time courses, are also receiving Government grants, and the industries themselves are doing a great deal of training—the Ford Company, for instance, is expanding its capacity so as to train 10,000 men per year. Moreover, though American industry works a nominal forty-hour week, the available resources of skill can be made to go a good deal further by overtime work, and the average number of hours per week worked in twenty-seven industries in March 1941 was over 41.

The shortage of materials was first apparent in the light metals, aluminium and magnesium, which are used largely in aircraft manufacture. Though America produced between two and three times as much steel as Greater Germany, her aluminium output has been well below the German level, and her magnesium output in 1941 is expected to be only between a half and a quarter of that of Germany, though it should shortly be doubled. It is officially stated that about thirteen times the output possible in mid-1941 will be needed by the end of 1942. As to aluminium, output in August 1941 was at the rate of 635 million pounds per year (compared with a capacity of about 1000 million pounds in territories under German control), and the official estimate is that military needs in 1942 will be two or three times as great as this. New private plant under construction should expand output by 120 million pounds, but the Government's Defence Plant Corporation (which

builds plants and leases them to private firms for operation) is to construct further capacity to produce 600 million pounds per year. The great expansion in aluminium and magnesium production brings in sight what would otherwise appear a remote possibility—a shortage of power (12 kilowatt-hours of electric power are needed for each pound of aluminium produced), and the Government's great water-power schemes carried out in the depression years are not only going to prove necessary far sooner than was expected, but will have to be extended.

It is plain from this example how shortage spreads from the original bottle-necks to branches of production which were recently thought to be capable of meeting any likely demands upon them. This tendency is aggravated by the fact that much of American industry, after the last eleven years of depression or of incomplete recovery, has large arrears of maintenance and replacement of equipment to make up. The railways, for instance, are short of rolling-stock. This fact, together with the direct and indirect defence demands, including the urgent demand for ships, for more rail transport and oil pipelines to replace ships transferred from coasting trade to duties connected with aid to Britain, for new factories and power plants, and for more motor-cars as private incomes rise, has created a shortage even of steel. Though output of that metal has been at a rate of almost 80 million tons per year, not only have priorities had to be allotted to defence needs, but an official report at the end of May 1941 stated that there was likely to be a shortage of 1.4 million tons in 1941 and of 6.4 million in 1942. An increase in capacity of 10 million tons has therefore been asked for, and civilian consumption is to be restricted to hasten this.

The output of motor-cars in particular (sales in the early months of 1941 being no less than 40 per cent. above those of a year before) is to be cut down. The steel shortage, too, is worst in special grades used for defence. A particular effort has had to be made to increase electric furnace capacity for the highest grades of steel for machine tools, aircraft engines, armour plate, etc., for the naval demand for armour plate alone is five times as great as before the 'Two-Ocean Navy' programme, and on top of this there is a new demand for light armour for tanks and aircraft.

Labour and Administrative Problems

To these physical difficulties of expanding war industry quickly are added the inevitable administrative and labour difficulties due to the political and social conditions of the country. The United States in the last ten years has been through, not only a great economic depression, but a time of great social and political tension which, in a country with less sound institutions and less common sense, might easily have given rise to catastrophic disturbances. The legacies of this period which are most important from the present point of view are the hostility of many business men to the President and to the more ardent economic planners—the 'New Dealers'—among his advisers, and the unfinished controversy about the rights of labour to organize. The difficulties created by these things have been made greater by the fact that the United States is not only not at war, but has only very gradually approached the position where it was possible for the President to declare a 'state of unlimited national emergency,' as he did on 27th May 1941.

Neither of the factors mentioned has, in fact, hindered the Defence Programme very much. There was apparently some reserve in considerable sections of the business community about undertaking costly and difficult developments, and there was delay in bringing in legislation providing for sufficiently large depreciation allowances in connection with such developments. A few important producers refused at first to make armaments for Britain, but they have mostly been persuaded to change their minds. Moreover, though there has been continuous discussion as to whether 'business' or 'New Deal' elements were uppermost at the moment in the administration of the Defence Programme, it is significant that this distinction is gradually giving place to one between those who want to go faster and those who think the Programme is going fast enough—a distinction not always along the same lines as the earlier one. The chief effect of the old hostility of important business men to the present Administration has been to necessitate the use of tact and personal prestige instead of compulsion. The National Defence Advisory Commission, for instance, which was in charge of armament production from May 1940 until its powers were largely transferred elsewhere in January 1941, had relatively little legal authority, and relied largely upon the prestige of its members, which included Mr. Knudsen, an ex-President of General Motors Corporation, and Mr. Stettinus of United States Steel. More recently, the gradual movement of public opinion, and the important fact that the Presidential election is over, have enabled more compulsory powers to be taken and the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board and the Maritime Commission have acquired powers over the distribution and pricing of materials and

over means of transport which are rapidly approaching those of the Ministry of Supply, the Board of Trade, and the Ministry of Shipping in Britain. The machinery for administering the United States Defence Programme, having grown up and acquired its powers gradually as circumstances permitted or demanded, still presents a somewhat ragged appearance, and until its reorganization at the end of August 1941 presented a still more ragged one, which distressed many Americans, but it has already shown that it is extraordinarily flexible; and it may undergo considerable further changes.

Labour problems have affected, or threatened to affect, the course of events in two ways. In the first place, the necessity of securing the goodwill of labour, as well as of capital, was partly responsible for the rejection of the machinery which had been previously planned for wartime economic mobilization in favour of the piecemeal development mentioned above. Secondly, there have been a small number of strikes in industries vital to defence, none of them supported by the great national trade union organizations (the American Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations), but some of them quite important enough to irritate public opinion. The danger arose that repressive legislation might be demanded for dealing with these which might have led to real trouble, but the Government seems to have averted this danger by taking adequate, but not repressive powers. The situation has been complicated by the fact that several employers have been defying the recent legislation defining the rights of labour (the Wages and Hours Act and the Wagner Act), thus inviting trouble, but the main culprits have been persuaded by various means (including in one

case at least the refusal of a Government contract) to make their peace with the Unions. The total amount of interference with production has, in any case, been quite small for a time when profits are rising, and surprisingly so if one considers the rising strength of trade unionism and the fierceness of the struggle from which it has scarcely emerged.

Output and Aid: (1) Shipping . .

Two particular branches of American production are of the utmost importance to Britain and her Allies, though for somewhat different reasons. An enormous increase in the rate of American shipbuilding is absolutely essential if Britain is to survive and receive supplies for carrying on the war. American aircraft, on the other hand, are important not merely because they afford the means whereby Britain will shortly gain the advantage over Germany in quantity as well as in quality, but because output of them is far further advanced than that of any other weapon.

Notwithstanding that Britain secured the use of a very large tonnage of ships from her Allies whose countries were overrun by the Germans, the effectiveness of her merchant fleet was reduced by the delays necessitated by convoy work and the great increase in the average length of haul due to the cutting off of European sources of supply and the closing of the Mediterranean, and by the need of the Navy for auxiliary vessels. Thus, even apart from losses by sinking, she had no tonnage to spare, and sinkings after the German seizure of the French ports in June 1940 reached an alarming rate, which in the early summer of 1941 was over six million gross tons per

year, though in the following quarter the annual rate of loss had sunk, thanks largely to the U.S. naval patrol system, to less than two million gross tons. British and Dominions output, reduced as it was by the competing demands of the Navy, could not have been much more than one million tons per year.

The shipbuilding capacity of the United States is already partly taken up with the building of naval vessels and auxiliaries. The number of ways for sea-going ships in May 1941 was only 139, and the estimated output of merchant shipping in the whole of that year was expected to be only about 850,000 tons. The United States therefore needed, if her aid was to reach Britain in the growing volume intended, to repeat her feat of 1917-19, when she attained an output of three million tons of shipping in a single year. The great plant at Hog Island—the 'magic city of American genius'—which was largely responsible for this feat, turned out the first of its standardized 'ugly ducklings' a month after the Armistice, and fifteen months after the signing of the contracts. Such an output therefore clearly takes time to achieve, and the realization that ships for Britain was a supreme need did not come in America until the end of 1940. The present position is that the British Government has 60 standardized 'ugly ducklings' of about 7000 tons each on order in America, 112 more are on order for it under the Lease-Lend Act, in addition to 100 more orthodox vessels, while the Federal Maritime Commission has orders of its own for 200 more 'ugly ducklings' and a large number of fast new ships. The tonnage to be delivered in 1942 has been estimated at over three million gross tons (though there are also lower estimates), and sometime in that year all or most of the new ways should be finished, giving a capacity

of 500 merchant ships totalling close on four million tons per year.

The problem as it appeared in the spring of 1941 was therefore to bridge the gap between then and the time, probably in 1942, when the combined British and American output passes the rate of sinking, assuming that this becomes no worse. To this end, Britain had already bought 600,000 tons of American shipping in 1940. On 1st May 1941, the President asked the Maritime Commission to obtain a pool of at least two million tons of ships to be put at the disposal of the Democracies, and this has been done, partly with the help of the 86 Axis ships which were seized in United States ports. About 100 of these ships are, or are to be, put on to the task of supplying the Allied forces in the Middle East (in the summer of 1941, 20 or 25 ships per month were sailing to this destination), 10 have been put on to the service to Rangoon to help China, but the majority are plying between various Western Hemisphere ports and New York, relieving British and Allied ships which are thereby enabled to concentrate on the vital North Atlantic traffic. This traffic has (as mentioned above) been greatly assisted by the American naval patrols on the route to Iceland and elsewhere. Legislation to permit the arming of American ships and their access to the war zones was introduced into Congress in October 1941.

The shipping situation has been relieved also by the practice of flying aircraft to their destination. Many hundreds of American-built bombers have been flown across the Atlantic, and arrangements have been made for American civil pilots to fly aircraft across the South Atlantic to West Africa and on to Egypt. Bases in Greenland and Iceland may make it possible to fly fighter aircraft across the North Atlantic also, or they

may be flown over in sections in the bombers, for the delivery of all American aircraft by air has been stated to be the official object.

(2) Aircraft

One of the main reasons why the aircraft industry itself is so much more advanced than any other branch of war production is that the British and French Governments had placed large orders and even invested capital in the industry themselves before the war and in its earlier stages; British investments in American industry between the outbreak of the war and the Lease-Lend Act amounted to no less than £44 million, and a large part of these investments was probably in the aircraft industry.

The wartime history of American aircraft production may be divided into four stages. In the first stage, which lasted until the autumn of 1940, only the aircraft industry proper was concerned, and the main difficulty was shortage of engines, especially liquid-cooled engines, which were manufactured only by the Allison division of General Motors. In the second stage, efforts were made to get the help of the motor industry. The first success was the agreement of the Packard Company to produce Rolls-Royce 'Merlin' engines for Britain and the United States, the first of which came off the assembly lines at the beginning of August 1941. Startling claims were made both by Mr. Ford and Mr. Reuther, a prominent trade union leader, as to the immense output of aircraft engines which the motor industry could make, mostly with existing plant, but these claims have been shown to be extravagant, for the reasons mentioned above, and motor manufacturers have been both more

willing and more able to build special plants for aircraft production than to adapt their existing plants. Their contribution to the speeding-up of output has therefore been largely one of experience and technique. The Ford Company, for instance, which has developed an entirely new liquid-cooled engine besides undertaking to manufacture Pratt and Whitney air-cooled engines, had to build a new plant for the purpose, and began production only in the summer of 1941. By this time engines had ceased to be a bottle-neck, for output was already as high as 2400 per month in March 1941, and was expected to rise to 6000 by March 1942.

The third stage began in the early summer of 1941, when attention was concentrated upon heavy bombers, and the hope was expressed that output of these would eventually reach 500 per month. Effort was concentrated upon two types of four-engined machines—'Liberators' and 'Fortresses'—and work was started on four Government-owned plants in the Middle West to assemble parts made by motor firms. At this stage, shortage of aluminium components was the chief 'bottle-neck,' and the collection of aluminium cooking utensils for scrap was resorted to, as had been done in Britain a year before. The fourth stage was foreshadowed when the motor industry, in June 1941, entered the field of complete aircraft production with the Ford Company's decision to build 'Liberator' bombers, as well as supplying parts of them for assembly elsewhere.

What is the result of this development? Output of military aircraft rose from 547 machines in July 1940 to 1914 in September 1941. Exports, which were mostly to the Allies, averaged 117 per month in the second half of 1939, were 331 per month in the six months

after the fall of France, and had risen to 591 by April 1941. Moreover, the number of separate engines exported, which at the beginning of the war was only slightly more than the number of complete aircraft, was more than 1000 per month by the spring of 1941. It is hoped that output of complete aircraft will reach about 3500 per month by July 1942, and if Britain and her Allies continue to get about half of them, as hitherto, their supremacy over the enemy should be secure. Current American estimates put German output at between 2000 and 3000 machines per month, and British output at 2000 per month or rather less, so that the critical importance of the supply which is already coming from America is clear. The Luftwaffe has already suffered defeat by the R.A.F., then numerically far inferior to it, largely because the latter had the advantage of machines more recent in design. It now has to face the prospect of numerical inferiority (for American capacity has every facility for expanding far faster than European), while there is no sign that its inferiority in quality is in any way diminished.

(3) Other Weapons and Goods

Production of weapons other than aircraft had to await development of plant which was not started until the late summer of 1940. Light tanks are relatively easy to produce, and many hundreds of them had been sent to the British forces by August 1941 (output in July was reported to be 10 per day). Many of them have done service in the Middle East. Medium (*i.e.* 28-ton) tanks are somewhat more difficult, but the Chrysler Corporation's arsenal for producing them should come into production in the autumn of 1941. Heavy guns will not be produced in quantity till 1942, but aircraft cannon, anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft

guns were beginning to appear in the summer of 1941, and output of them was rapidly increasing from then. Small arms were probably reaching the stage of large-scale output about the same time. In general, it may be said that the progress achieved gives no reason to doubt that the official intention to produce most weapons in quantity by 1942 will be realized.

It must not be overlooked, of course, that help to the Allies has been given in many forms other than actual fighting-machines. Iron and steel exports to Great Britain, for instance, excluding scrap, were at a rate equal to about a third of Britain's whole productive capacity at the end of 1940. Machine-tool exports to Great Britain at the same date were at a rate of about £20 million per year, or perhaps a sixth or a seventh of the whole rate of American output, while 40 per cent. more of that output was going to American plants working on British orders. Above all, great help has been given in food and medical supplies. In August 1941 about 230,000 tons of foodstuffs were shipped to Britain, these shipments being worth about £4 million, and it was hoped to increase them so that the total value sent between March 1941 and July 1942 would be £188 million, or nearly 40 per cent. of the value of food imported by Britain from all sources in fifteen months before the war.

An idea of the total volume of help to the Allies can be got from the fact that United States exports to the British Empire in the first six months of 1941 were valued at £325 million (of which about half went to the United Kingdom). From the beginning of the war to October 1941 the British Empire had obtained about £1125 million of goods in the United States, the greater part of which had been paid for in gold and securities rather than goods and services.

The transfers to the Allies under the Lease-Lend Act, for which no current payment at all is necessary, will probably not become very large until the end of 1941. In the first six months of the Act's working, £47 million worth of goods were actually exported to the Allies under its provisions, a further £9 million more were awaiting shipment, and services (such as repairs to ships) had been rendered under the Act to the value of £20 million. In that period the American Government ordered over £1000 million worth of goods for the Allies, over a third of them aircraft, but delivery of these goods (other than food and raw materials) cannot begin until they have been produced, which, as explained above, takes a considerable time. Meanwhile, the very large deliveries of weapons and stores which are being made are mostly in fulfilment of old British orders. It is impossible to guess how important Lease-Lend deliveries will be in 1941, but they will certainly be enormous in 1942.

America and the Balance of Power

Fig. 2 (at end) shows the defence and war expenditures of the chief Powers from 1935 to 1940 measured in sterling. It will be seen from this that the British Empire's total war expenditure rose immensely steeply in 1940, till, at the end of that year, it was about two-thirds of that of Greater Germany—including in the latter's war expenditure the 'occupation costs' and similar exactions which have been wrung out of the overrun countries of Europe. A good deal of this great increase, of course, was made possible only by drawing upon the production of the United States through the sale of securities and gold in exchange for war material. The military expenditure of Russia, so

far as can be seen, would have rather more than bridged the gap between that of Germany and that of the British Empire in the middle of 1941, while that of the United States, already approaching two-thirds of the British Empire's expenditure, gave the Allies a very substantial advantage over their opponents. This advantage, however, is illusory because of two factors—geography, which prevents America, Russia, and the British Empire from bringing all their resources to bear against Germany and her allies at once, and the fact that the expenditure of the United States (and of the British Empire to a smaller extent) was still largely upon the means of making weapons, and was not yet matched by output of the weapons themselves. This, of course, is a trouble which time is needed to cure, and is the ground for the urgency of President Roosevelt's appeal for 'speed, and speed now.'

Indeed, time and preparedness have so far been much more important in this war than ultimate resources, and it will be some time before resources exercise anything like their full power on the side of the Democracies. Fig. 3 shows, roughly, the percentages of their total outputs of goods and services which the chief Powers have devoted to war and the preparations for it. The United Kingdom alone is now about as fully transformed to a war basis as Germany, but has attained a high degree of economic mobilization only much more recently than her enemy. The Dominions have worked wonders, but, because of their smaller degree of industrialization and the smallness of their defence expenditure before the war, are about a year behind the United Kingdom in their preparations. Russia made preparations which were relatively large long before she was actually engaged in a major war, but the full urgency of such a war came to her only

much later than to Britain. The United States, in degree of economic mobilization, is about a year behind the British Dominions, and about two years behind the United Kingdom. The people of Britain, who remember their difficulties and inadequacies of preparation in 1939, and the people of the Dominions, who remember their own corresponding embarrassments of 1940, will understand the troubles of Americans in 1941, but they can also judge from their recent experience how rapidly America's war production will expand in 1942, and, knowing her resources, they trust that even the output of that year will be only a beginning.

